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THE

PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY:

OR, THE

OPINIONS

OF

MODERN PHILOSOPHERS

ON

METAPHYSICAL, MORAL, AND POLITICAL SUBJECTS.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

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THE

PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY.

P.

POLYTHEISM.

THE belief of a plurality of gods is one of the great errors with which the moderns reproach the Greeks and Romans. There ſeems to be no reaſon to infer that they had more than one Supreme God. We may read in a thouſand different parts of their writings, that Zeus Jupiter is the maſter of gods and men. *Jovis omnia plena.* And the Apoſtle Paul himſelf gives the ſame teſtimony with regard to the ancients: " *In God* we live, move, and have our being, as one of your poets expreſſes it." After this teſtimony, ſhall we preſume to accuſe our maſters of not acknowledging a Supreme God?

We are not here to examine, whether there was in former times a Jupiter, king of Crete; whether he was made a god; or whether the Egyptians had twelve great gods, or eight; or whether the Jupiter of the Latins was one of this number? The present object of inquiry is only to know, whether the Greeks or Romans acknowledged a Divine Being, supreme over the rest of heavenly beings? This they are for ever repeating, and therefore we cannot but believe them. Let us only look into the admirable epistle of the philosopher Maximus of Medavra to St Augustin. "There "is one God (says he) without beginning, the "common parent of all things, who has never be-"gotten any one like himself. Who is the man "so brutish or stupid, as to entertain a doubt "thereof?" Thus does this Heathen, who wrote in the fourth century, declare the sentiments of all antiquity.

If I was to draw the veil of the Egyptian mysteries, I should there find the *Knef* by whom all things were produced, and who presides over all the other deities; I should find Methra among the Persians, Brama among the Indians; and it is more than probable, that I should be able to demonstrate, that every well governed nation acknowledged a Supreme Being, who had other inferior gods subordinate to him. The Chinese have never acknowledged any more than one sole God

for

ſor upwards of 4000 years. The Greeks and Romans admitted numberleſs ſuperſtitions. There is no doubt of it. Every one knows they adopted the moſt ridiculous fables; and to this, I add, that they themſelves laughed at them. The baſis of their mythology, however, was founded in reaſon.

In the firſt place, allowing that the Greeks gave their heroes a place in heaven as a reward for their virtues; this was a moſt prudent and uſeful act of religion. What nobler incentive could have been propoſed? The number of ſaints to whom the Catholics have raiſed temples and altars, infinitely exceed thoſe of the Greek and Roman demigods and heroes. But their deified heroes, though they were admitted into the court, or partook of the favours of Zeus, the Demiurgos, the Eternal Lord, they did not ſhare his throne or power.

The ſecond ſubject of reproach we have againſt them, is for admitting ſuch a number of gods into the government of the world. Neptune preſides over the ſea; Juno over the air; Eolus over the winds; Pluto or Vecta over the earth; Mars over the field of battle. Let us reject theſe genealogies, and condemn all their adventures, which never made any part of the baſis of the Greek or Roman religion. But there ſeems no degree of folly in adopting beings of the ſecond order, to

whom ſome degree of power is given over us mortals. Do not we aſſign particular functions to ſeveral angels? There was a deſtroying angel who fought for the Jews: there was the angel of travellers, who ſerved as a guide to Tobias. Michael was the tutelary angel of the Hebrew people. We are told in Daniel, that he fought with the angel of the Perſians, and diſputed with the angel of the Greeks. In the prophet Zachariah, we read of an angel of an inferior order, who gives an account to Michael of the ſtate in which he found things upon earth. Every nation has its particular angel. The Septuagint verſion tells us in Deuteronomy, that the Lord divided the nations according to the number of the angels. The Apoſtle Paul in the Acts addreſſes himſelf to the angel of Macedonia. Theſe celeſtial ſpirits are often called by the name of gods, *Eloim*, in ſcripture; and the word that anſwers to Θεος, *Deus*, God, of all nations, does not conſtantly ſignify the Supreme Maſter of heaven and earth, but frequently a heavenly being, a being ſuperior to man, though dependent on the Sovereign Lord of nature.

We may from hence conclude, that the ridicule or error does not lie in polytheiſm itſelf, but in the abuſe made of that belief in the vulgar fables, and in the multitude of ridiculous deities which every one ſet up after his own fancy, which ſerved as the amuſements of the old women and children of Rome,

Rome, and proves that the word *Deus* had very different acceptations. It is certain, *Deus Crepitus* did not caufe the fame idea, as *Deus Divûm*, and *Hominum Pater* the father of gods and men. The Roman pontiffs never gave a place in their temples to thofe little puppets, with which the good women ufed to fill their chambers and clofets. The religion of the Romans was in the main extremely grave and rigid. Oaths were held inviolable. They could not begin a war till the college of the *Feciales* had declared it juft. A veftal, that was convicted of having broke her vow of virginity, was condemned to die. All which befpeaks a people rather rigid than ridiculous in their morals.

It may be afked, How a fenate who impofed chains and laws upon whole nations, could fuffer fo many extravagances, and countenance fuch a heap of abfurd fables among their pontiffs? It may be anfwered, Wife men in all nations have made ufe of fools. They willingly left the people in poffeffion of their favourite feafts, the Lupercalia and Saturnalia, as long as they continued obedient to authority. The holy chickens who foretold victory to their armies, were exempted from the fpit and the pot. Never let us be furprifed, that the wifeft governments have permitted the moft ridiculous cuftoms or improbable fables. Thefe cuftoms, thefe fables, exifted before thofe governments were formed; and we

do not pull down an extenſive and irregular city, merely for the ſake of building it again by rule and compaſs.

But how happens it, ſome may ſay, that on the one hand we perceive ſo much philoſophy and ſcience, and on the other ſo much fanaticiſm? It is becauſe ſcience and philoſophy came to the world a little before Cicero, and fanaticiſm had already been in being for many ages. Policy then ſaid to Folly and Fanaticiſm, let us all live together as comfortably as we can.

The ancients taught and were inſtructed to look upon utility, and not truth, as the end of the national religion. Their maxims with regard to the public worſhip were, *Quæ omnia ſapiens ſervabit tanquam legibus juſſa, non tanquam diis gratia.*

VOLTAIRE.

THE CAUSE OF THE LONG DURATION OF POLYTHEISM.

THE Pagan religion, deſpiſed by its own miniſters, inveighed againſt by the philoſophers, and neglected, the moſt frequently, by the people, was equally incapable of ſtriking a deep root and of forming a code of doctrines difficult to be overthrown. The credit which it maintained during a length of time is, notwithſtanding, unqueſtionable. To account, therefore, for all this, we muſt have

have recourſe to ſome more diſtant cauſe: for it is not ſufficient to demonſtrate with Mr Hume, that Polytheiſm is the firſt religion which muſt have offered itſelf to an untutored ſet of men; it is not even ſufficient to have diſcovered that this religion was mild, and that its modes of worſhip were agreeable and ingenious: on the one hand, it may be anſwered, that it exiſted during the moſt poliſhed ages; and, on the other hand, that the pain and cruelty attending its practices, have been already proved. We muſt therefore lead our obſervations ſtill further; and we ſhall then diſcover in the ſyſtem of politics, the true reaſon of the long duration of Polytheiſm. Would we, in general, comprehend ſome circumſtance from antiquity, we muſt not loſe ſight of two important facts; namely, that Aſia hath been the cradle, as it were, of the ſciences; and Greece, the cradle of poetry. From this ſingle conſequence a thouſand conſiderations will naturally flow. The poets, the firſt amongſt the Greeks who enjoyed the knowledge of any thing, have arranged, as well as they poſſibly could, all the materials which they were able to collect, from the ſentiments of the Phenicians and Egyptians, relative to the origin of the world, and the generation of gods; but theſe poets forged many new fables, which they mixed with the ancient fables, and particularly laboured at attempts to circulate deluſive accounts

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concerning the origin of the Greeks; an origin for which they bluſhed to have been indebted to merchants, or a people of ſlaves. Amidſt theſe poets, Homer quickly obtained the firſt rank. He compoſed ſo many tales, and ſpoke of ſuch a multitude of things, that his books, in this reſpect, like the Koran, were of themſelves ſufficient to found a religion. And yet the oracle of Delphos, another poet, Lycurgus, who made metrical laws, pretending indeed that they were dictated by Apollo, but which he had ſtolen from the Cretans, Heſiod, and many others, began to form, from a very ſmall number of acquired intelligences, and from a very great number of ingenious conjectures, a monſtrous and gigantic ſcaffolding of materials. From all theſe poems, and all theſe oracles, aroſe a particular language, ſtyled μυ'θος, in oppoſition to λογο'ς, which was the language of reaſon, and which did not prevail until ſome time afterwards. But the μυ'θος maintained its ground during whole ages; and as the poets had continually treated of the moſt intereſting ſubjects, ſuch as the origin of republics, the principles of legiſlation, the rights of magiſtracy, the limits of ſtates, &c. poetry, or fable, or, if it be a more proper expreſſion, religion, became, as it were, the general repoſitory of archives, and the titles of the nobility of republics. From thence ſprang the obligation which united polity with religion,

religion, and the neceſſity which preſerved tenets and ceremonies.

CHATELLUR.

POLYTHEISM THE PRIMARY RELIGION OF MANKIND.

IT is a matter of fact inconteſtable, that about 1700 years ago all mankind were idolaters. The doubtful and ſceptical principles of a few philoſophers, or the theiſm, and that, too, not entirely pure, of one or two nations, form no objection worth regarding. Behold, then, the clear teſtimony of hiſtory. The further we mount up into antiquity, the more do we find mankind plunged into idolatry. The moſt ancient records of human race ſtill preſent us with Polytheiſm as the popular and eſtabliſhed ſyſtem. Shall we aſſert, that, in more ancient times, before the knowledge of letters, or the diſcovery of any art or ſcience, men entertained *the principles of pure* Theiſm? That is, while they were ignorant and barbarous, they diſcovered truth; but fell into error as ſoon as they acquired learning and politeneſs. This aſſertion contradicts probability and experience. The ſavage tribes of America, Africa, and Aſia, are all idolaters. Not a ſingle exception to this rule.

It ſeems certain, that according to the natural pro-

progreſs of human thought, the ignorant multitude muſt firſt entertain ſome groveling and familiar notion of ſuperior powers, before they ſtretch their conception to that perfect Being, who beſtowed order on the whole frame of nature. We may as reaſonably imagine, that men inhabited palaces before huts and cottages, or ſtudied geometry before agriculture, as aſſert, that the Deity appeared to them a pure ſpirit, omniſcient, omnipreſent, omnipotent, before he was apprehended to be a powerful, though limited, being, with human paſſions and appetites, limbs and organs. The mind riſes gradually from inferior to ſuperior: By abſtracting from what is imperfect, it forms an idea of perfection: And ſlowly diſtinguiſhing the nobler parts of its frame from the groſſer, it learns to transfer only the former, much elevated and refined, to its Divinity. Nothing could diſturb this natural progreſs of thought, but ſome obvious and invincible argument, which might immediately lead the mind into the pure principles of Theiſm, and make it overleap at one bound the vaſt interval which is interpoſed between the human and the divine nature. But though the order and frame of the univerſe, when accurately examined, affords ſuch an argument; yet this conſideration could never have any influence on mankind when they formed their firſt rude notions of religion. The cauſes of ſuch objects

as

as are quite familiar to us, never ſtrike our attention or curioſity; and however extraordinary or ſurpriſing theſe objects in themſelves, they are paſſed over by the raw and ignorant multitude without much examination or inquiry. Adam riſing at once in paradiſe, and in the full perfection of his faculties, would naturally, as repreſented by Milton, be aſtoniſhed at the glorious appearances of nature, the heavens, the air, the earth, his own organs and members; and would be led to aſk, Whence this wonderful ſcene aroſe? But a barbarous, neceſſitous animal (ſuch as man is on the firſt origin of ſociety), preſſed by ſuch numerous wants and paſſions, has no leiſure to admire the regular face of nature, or make inquiries concerning the cauſe of objects, to which, from his infancy, he has been gradually accuſtomed. On the contrary, the more regular and uniform, that is, the more perfect nature appears, the more he is familiarized to it, and the leſs inclined to ſcrutinize and examine it. A monſtrous birth excites his curioſity, and is deemed a prodigy. It alarms him from its novelty; and immediately ſets him a trembling, and ſacrificing, and praying. But an animal, complete in all its limbs and organs, is to him an ordinary ſpectacle, and produces no religious affection or opinion. Aſk him from whence that animal aroſe? he will tell you, From the copulation of its parents. And theſe,

thefe, whence? from the copulation of theirs. A few removes fatisfy his curiofity, and fet the objects at fuch a diftance that he entirely lofes fight of them.

If men were at firft led into the belief of one Supreme Being, by reafoning from the frame of nature, they could never poffibly leave that belief in order to embrace idolatry; but the fame principles of reafon, which at firft produced and diffufed over mankind fo magnificent an opinion, muft be able, with great facility, to preferve it. The firft invention, or proof of any doctrine, is much more difficult than the fupporting and retaining it.

There is a great difference between hiftorical facts and fpeculative opinions; nor is the knowledge of the one propagated in the fame manner with that of the other. An hiftorical fact, while it paffes by oral tradition from eye-witneffes and cotemporaries, is difguifed in every fucceffive narration, and may at laft retain but very fmall, if any, refemblance of the original truth on which it was founded. The frail memories of men, their love of exaggeration, their fupine carelefsnefs; thefe principles, if not corrected by books and writing, foon pervert the account of hiftorical events, where argument or reafoning have little or no place, nor can ever recal the truth which has once efcaped thofe narrations. It is

thus the fables of Hercules, Thefeus, Bacchus, are fuppofed to have been originally founded in true hiftory, corrupted by tradition. But with regard to fpeculative opinions, the cafe is far otherwife. If thefe opinions be founded in arguments fo clear and obvious as to carry conviction with the generality of mankind, the fame arguments which at firft diffufed the opinions will *ftill preferve them in their original purity*. If the arguments be more abftrufe, and more remote from vulgar apprehenfion, the opinions will always be confined to a few perfons; and as foon as men leave the contemplation of the arguments, *the opinions will immediately be loft and be buried in oblivion.* Which ever fide of the dilemma we take, it muft appear impoffible, that Theifm could, from reafoning, have been the primary religion of the human race, and have afterwards by its corruptions, given birth to idolatry, and to all the various fuperftitions of the heathen world. Reafon, *when obvious, prevents thefe corruptions.* When abftrufe, it keeps the principles entirely from the knowledge of the vulgar, who are alone liable to corrupt any principles or opinions.

HUME.

POLYTHEISM NOT THE PRIMARY RELIGION OF MANKIND.

DAVID HUME, in his Natural Hiſtory of Religion, produces ſtrong reaſons to prove that the firſt religion was Polytheiſm; and that before improved reaſon came to ſee there could only be one Supreme Being, men began with believing ſeveral gods.

It may, however, on the contrary, be preſumed, that they began with worſhipping only one god, and that afterwards human weakneſs adopted ſeveral others. It is not to be doubted but villages and country towns were prior to large cities; and that men were divided into ſmall republics before they were united into large empires. It is very natural that a town, terrified at the thunder, diſtreſſed by the rain of its harveſt, inſulted by a neighbouring town, daily feeling its weakneſs, and every where perceiving an inviſible power, ſoon came to ſay, there is ſome being above us which does us good and hurt. It ſeems impoſſible that they ſhould have ſaid, there are two powers: For wherefore ſeveral? In every thing we begin with the ſimple, and then proceed to the compound; and often an improvement of knowledge brings us back again to the ſimple: this is the proceſs of the human mind.

Which

Which being was firſt worſhipped? Was it the ſun? Was it the moon? It is hardly credible. Only let us take a view of children, they are pretty nearly on a footing with ignorant men. The beauty and benefit of that luminous body, which animates nature, make no impreſſion on them; as inſenſible are they of the conveniences we derive from the moon, or of the regular variations of its courſe; they do not ſo much as think of theſe things; they are accuſtomed to them. What men do not fear, they never worſhip. Children look up to the ſky with as much indifference as on the ground; but at a tempeſt the poor creatures tremble, and run and hide themſelves. I am inclined to think it was ſo with the primitive men. They who firſt obſerved the courſe of the heavenly bodies, and brought them to be objects of admiration and worſhip, muſt neceſſarily have had a tincture of philoſophy: the error was too exalted for rude illiterate huſbandmen.

Thus the cry of a village would have been no more than this: There is a power which thunders, which ſends down hail on us, which cauſes our children to die; let us by all means appeaſe it: But which way? Why, we ſee that little preſents will ſoothe angry people; let us try what little preſents will do with this power. He muſt alſo, to be ſure, have a name or title; and that which naturally preſents itſelf firſt is, chief, ma-

ſter, lord: Thus is this power called My Lord. Hence it probably was that the firſt Egyptians called their god, Knef; the Syrians, Adoni; the neighbouring nations, Baal or Bel, or Molock or Meloc; the Scythians, Pape; all words ſignifying Lord, Maſter.

In like manner almoſt all America was found to be divided into multitudes of little colonies, all with their patron deity. The Mexicans and Peruvians, who were large nations, had but one only god; the latter worſhipping Mango Kapack, and the other the god of war, whom they called Vilipuſti, as the Hebrews had ſtyled their Lord *Sabaoth*. It is not from any ſuperiority or exerciſe of reaſon that all nations began with worſhipping only one deity; for had they been philoſophers, they would have worſhipped the univerſal God of nature, and not the god of a village; they would have examined the infinite teſtimonies acknowledged of a creating and preſerving Being: they examined nothing; they only perceived: and ſuch is the progreſs of our weak underſtanding. Every town perceived its weakneſs and want of a powerful protector. This tutelary and terrible being, they fancied to reſide in a neighbouring foreſt, or mountain, or in a cloud. They fancied only one ſuch power, becauſe in war the town had but one chief. This being they imagined to be corporeal, it being impoſſible they could have any

any other idea. They could not but believe that the neighbouring town had alſo its god. Accordingly Jephtha ſays to the inhabitants of Moab, "Wilt thou not poſſeſs that which Chemoſh thy "god giveth thee to poſſeſs? So whomſoever the "Lord our God ſhall drive out from before us, "them will we poſſeſs."

This ſpeech from one foreigner to another is very extraordinary.

It is very natural that, from the heat of fancy and a vague increaſe of knowledge, men ſoon multiplied their gods, and aſſigned guardians to the elements, ſeas, foreſts, ſprings, and fields. The more they ſurveyed the heavenly bodies, the greater muſt their aſtoniſhment have been. Well might they who worſhipped the deity of a brook pay their adorations to the ſun; and the firſt ſtep being taken, the earth was ſoon covered with deities; ſo that at length cats and onions came to be worſhipped.

However, time muſt neceſſarily improve reaſon: accordingly it produced ſome philoſophers, who ſaw that neither onions nor cats, nor even the heavenly bodies, had any ſhare in the diſpoſition of nature. All thoſe philoſophers, Babylonians, Perſians, Egyptians, Scythians, Greeks, and Romans, acknowledged only one ſupreme God, rewarding and puniſhing.

This they did not immediately make known to

the people; for a word againſt onions and cats, ſpoken before old women and prieſts, would have coſt a man his life: Thoſe good people would have ſtoned him.

Well, what was to be done? Orpheus and others inſtituted *myſteries*, which the initiated ſwear by execrable oaths never to reveal; and of theſe myſteries the principal is the worſhip of one only God. This great truth ſpreads over half the earth: the number of the initiated ſwells immenſely: the ancient religion indeed ſtill ſubſiſts; but not being contrary to the tenet of God's unity, it is connived at. The Romans had their Deus Optimus Maximus; the Greeks their Zeus, their ſupreme God. All the other deities are only intermediate beings; heroes and emperors were claſſed among the gods, which meant no more than the bleſſed; for it is not ſuppoſed that Claudius, Octavius, Tiberius, and Caligula, were accounted creators of heaven and earth.

In a word, it ſeems certain, that in Auguſtus's time, all who had any religion acknowledged one ſupreme eternal God, with ſeveral claſſes of ſecondary deities; the worſhipping of whom has ſince been called *idolatry*.

VOLTAIRE.

RE-

RELIEF OF THE POOR.

THE beſt way of doing good to the poor, is not making them eaſy in poverty, but by driving them out of it. The more public proviſions are made for the poor, the leſs they provide for themſelves, and become poorer: And, on the contrary, the leſs is done for them, the more they do for themſelves, and become richer. There is no country in the world where ſo many proviſions are eſtabliſhed for them as in England; ſo many hoſpitals to receive them when they are ſick or lame, founded and maintained by voluntary charities; beſides a general law made by the rich for the ſupport of the poor. Under all theſe obligations, are the poor modeſt, humble, thankful, induſtrious? On the contrary, it may be affirmed, that there is no country in the world in which the poor are more idle, diſſolute, drunken, and inſolent. The day the parliament paſſed that law, it took away from before their eyes the greateſt of all inducements to induſtry, frugality, and ſobriety, by giving them a dependence on ſomewhat elſe than a careful accumulation during youth and health, for ſupport in age and ſickneſs. In ſhort, a law to provide for the poor is a premium for the encouragement of idleneſs; and it has its effect in the increaſe of poverty. More will be done for the

the happineſs of the poor by inuring them to provide for themſelves, than could be done by dividing all the eſtates in the kingdom among them.

FRANKLIN.

THE POPULACE.

IT is the populace which compoſe the bulk of mankind: Thoſe which are not in this claſs are ſo few in number that they are hardly worth notice. Man is the ſame creature in every ſtate; therefore that which is the moſt numerous, ought to be moſt reſpected. To a man capable of reflection, all civil diſtinctions are nothing: He obſerves the ſame paſſions, the ſame feelings, in the clown and the man of quality. The principal difference between them conſiſts in the language they ſpeak; in a little refinement of expreſſion: But if there be any real diſtinction, it is certainly to the diſadvantage of the leaſt ſincere. The common people appear as they really are; and they are not amiable: If thoſe in high life were equally undiſguiſed, their appearance would make us ſhudder with horror. There is, ſay our philoſophers, an equal allotment of happineſs and miſery to every rank of men; a maxim as dangerous as it is abſurd. If all mankind are equally happy, it would be ridiculous to give ourſelves any trouble to promote their felicity. Let each remain

remain in his ſituation: Let the ſlave endure the laſh, the lame his infirmity, and let the beggar periſh, ſince they would gain nothing by a change of ſituation. The ſame philoſophers enumerate the pangs of the rich, and expatiate on the vanity of their pleaſures. Was there ever ſo palpable a ſophiſm! The pangs of a rich man are not eſſential to riches, but to the abuſe of them. If he were even more wretched than the poor, he would deſerve no compaſſion; becauſe he is the creator of his own miſery, and happineſs was in his power. But the ſufferings of the indigent are the natural conſequences of his ſtate; he feels the weight of his hard lot; no length of time nor habit can ever render him inſenſible of fatigue and hunger: Neither wiſdom nor good-humour can annihilate the evils which are inſeparable from his ſituation. What avails it an Epictetus to foreſee that his maſter is going to break his leg? Doth that prevent the evil? On the contrary, his foreknowledge adds greatly to his misfortune. If the populace were really as wiſe as we ſuppoſe them ſtupid, how could they act otherwiſe than as they do?

ROUSSEAU.

POPULAR OPINION.

THE popular opinion, in many inſtances, is as contemptible as it is ill-founded. It is oftentimes

times below the concern of a good man, and unworthy the notice of a wiſe one. A ſovereign ſcorn of it has been eſteemed the peculiar reſult of an elevation of ſoul, and an unequivocal indication of the trueſt wiſdom. This ſuperiority to current calumnies hath formed the poet's rhapſody, hath proved the philoſopher's impenetrable armour, and ſupported the real patriot under the ſtorms of obloquy, the preſſure of exile, and the agonies of an ignominious death. On occaſions of this ſort, it is neceſſary, it is uſeful, it is laudable. It leads to generous plans of conduct, and it inſpires reſolution to attempt their accompliſhment. It fortifies us againſt the probable event of ill ſucceſs; and conſoles us under the mortification of diſappointment, the envious ſtrife of tongues, and the envenomed ſhafts of low, illiberal reproach. When it is directed to theſe ends, and effects theſe purpoſes, it is the ſtrength and bleſſing of thoſe who poſſeſs it. But, then, its excellency entirely depends on this direction, and theſe effects. We are, unhappily, on many accounts, diſpoſed to extend its influence, and to overſtretch its tone. Self-deception obſcures our moral diſcernment, and renders us unjuſt and incompetent judges of our own motives to action. We ſometimes, perhaps, miſtake them involuntarily. But, oftentimes through weakneſs which we might have prevented, or through wickedneſs which

which we are ſtudious to conceal from our own view, we call that a contempt of popular rumour, which is no other than the lordly pride of intoxicated reaſon, or the ſordid vanity of blind ſelf-love.

Populus me ſibilat; at mihi plaudo
Ipſe domi.

For great occaſions there are, when the public verdict is reſpectable, and the public cenſure awful!

Interdum vulgus rectum videt:

When enormous abuſes extort a general and juſt diſapprobation, then the "Vox populi" is, without a perverſion of terms, "Vox Dei;" then God and man alike inſulted, alike condemn. In this caſe, no ſtation can juſtify inattention. An audience is due from the higheſt; and ſovereigns themſelves refuſe to liſten at the peril of their ſalvation. * *

POPULATION.

PEOPLE increaſe in proportion to the number of marriages; and that greater in proportion to the eaſe and convenience of ſupporting a family. When a family can be eaſily ſupported, more perſons marry, and earlier in life. As the increaſe of people depends on the encouragement of marriages, the following things muſt diminiſh a nation,

tion, viz. 1. The being conquered. 2. Lofs of territory. 3. Lofs of trade. 4. Lofs of food. 5. Bad government and infecure property. 6. Heavy taxes. 7. The introduction of flaves. The negroes brought into the Englifh fugar iflands have greatly diminifhed the Whites there; the poor are by thefe means deprived of employment, while a few families acquire vaft eftates, which they fpend on foreign luxuries; and educating their children in the habit of thofe luxuries, the fame income is needed for the fupport of one that might have maintained one hundred. The Whites who have flaves, not labouring, are enfeebled, and therefore not fo generally prolific; the flaves being worked too hard, and ill fed, their conftitutions are broken, and the deaths among them are more than the births; fo that a continual fupply is needed from Africa. The northern colonies having few flaves, increafe in Whites. Slaves alfo pejorate the families that ufe them; the white children become proud, difgufted with labour; and being educated in idlenefs, are rendered unfit to get a living by induftry. Hence the prince that acquires new territory, if he finds it vacant, or if he removes the natives to give his own people room; the legiflator that makes effectual laws for promoting of trade, increafing employment, improving land by more and better tillage, providing more food by fifheries, fecuring pro-

perty, &c. and the man that invents new trades, arts, manufactures, or new improvements in husbandry; may be properly called the *fathers* of *their* nation; as they are the cause of the generation of multitudes, by the encouragement they afford to marriage. As to privileges granted to the married (such as the *jus trium liberorum* among the Romans), they may hasten the filling a country that has been thinned by war or pestilence, or that has otherwise vacant territory; but cannot increase a people beyond the means provided for their subsistence. Foreign luxuries and needless manufactures, imported and used in a nation, do, by the same reasoning, increase the people of the nation that furnishes them, and diminish the people of the nation that uses them. Laws, therefore, that prevent such importations, and, on the contrary, promote the exportation of manufactures to be consumed in foreign countries, may be called (with respect to the people that make them) generative laws; as by increasing subsistence they encourage marriage. Such laws likewise strengthen a country doubly, by increasing its own people, and diminishing its neighbour's. Some European nations prudently refuse to consume the manufactures of East India. They should likewise forbid them to their colonies; for the gain to the merchant is not to be compared to the loss, by these means, of people to the na-

tion. Home luxury in the great, increaſes the nation's manufacturers employed by it, who are many; and only tends to diminiſh the families that indulge in it, who are few. The greater the faſhionable expence of any rank of people, the more cautious they are of marriage. Therefore luxury ſhould never be ſuffered to become common. The great increaſe of offspring in particular families, is not always owing to greater fecundity of nature, but ſometimes to examples of induſtry in the heads, and induſtrious education; by which the children are enabled to provide better for themſelves, and their marrying early is encouraged from the proſpect of good ſubſiſtence. To manners of this kind are owing the populouſneſs of Holland, Switzerland, China, Japan, and moſt parts of Indoſtan, &c. in every one of which the force of extent of territory and fertility of ſoil is multiplied, or their want compenſated by induſtry and frugality. Natural fecundity is hardly to be conſidered; becauſe the *vis generandi*, as far as we know, is unlimited, and becauſe experience ſhows, that the numbers of nations are altogether governed by collateral cauſes; and among theſe, none is of ſo much force as quantity of ſubſiſtence; whether ariſing from climate, ſoil, improvement of tillage, trade, fiſheries, ſecure property, conqueſt of new countries, and other favourable circumſtances. FRANKLIN.

On

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THERE is in all men, both male and female, a defire and power of generation, more active than is ever univerfally exerted. The reftraints which they lie under, muft proceed from fome difficulties in their fituation, which it belongs to a wife legiflature to obferve and remove. Almoft every man who thinks he can maintain a family will have one; and the human fpecies, at this rate of propagation, would more than double every generation. How faft do mankind multiply in every colony, or new fettlement, where it is an eafy matter to provide for a family; and where men are no ways ftraitened or confined as in long eftablifhed governments?—Hiftory tells us frequently of plagues, which have fwept away the third or fourth part of a people: yet in a generation or two the deftruction was not perceived, and the fociety had again acquired their former number. The lands which were cultivated, the houfes built, the commodities raifed, the riches acquired, enabled the people, who efcaped, immediately to marry, and to rear families, which fupplied the place of thofe who had perifhed. Where there is room for more people, they will always arife, even without the affiftance of naturalization bills. It is remarked, that the provinces of

Spain which ſend moſt people to the Indies, are moſt populous; which proceeds from their ſuperior riches. Every wiſe, juſt, and mild government, by rendering the condition of its ſubjects eaſy and ſecure, will always abound moſt in people, as well as in commodities and riches. A country, indeed, whoſe climate and ſoil are fitted for vines, will naturally be more populous than one which produces only corn; and that more populous than one which is only fitted for paſturage. In general, warm climates, as the neceſſities of the inhabitants are there fewer, and vegetation more powerful, are likely to be moſt populous: But if every thing elſe be equal, it ſeems natural to expect, that wherever there are moſt happineſs and virtue, and the wiſeſt inſtitutions, there will alſo be moſt people.

HUME.

THE POPULOUSNESS OF ANCIENT EUROPE.

IT has been contended by many, that Europe, when ignorant and barbarous, was more populous than at preſent. The anſwer to their numerous citations, is, That ten acres of wheat will nouriſh more men than a hundred acres of heath, paſturage, &c.; that Europe was formerly covered with vaſt foreſts; and that the Germans lived on the

the produce of their cattle. This Cæſar and Tacitus affirms; and their teſtimony decides the queſtion. A nation of herdſmen cannot be numerous. Civilized Europe is, therefore, neceſſarily more populous than it was when barbarous and ſavage. It is a folly to have recourſe to hiſtorians concerning this matter, who are often untrue or ill informed, when we have before us evident proofs of their falſehood. A country cannot ſupport a great number of people without agriculture, unleſs it be by a miracle; and miracles are much more rare than falſehoods.

HELVETIUS.

POSITIVE IDEAS FROM PRIVATIVE CAUSES.

WHATSOEVER is ſo conſtituted in nature, as to be able, by affecting our ſenſes, to cauſe any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the underſtanding an idea, which, whatever be the external cauſe of it when it comes to be taken notice of by our diſcerning faculty, it is by the mind looked on and conſidered there to be a real poſitive idea in the underſtanding, as much as any other whatſoever; though, perhaps, the cauſe of it be but a privation in the ſubject.

Thus the idea of heat and cold, light and darkneſs, white and black, motion and reſt, are e-

qually clear and *poſitive ideas* in the mind; though perhaps ſome of the *cauſes* which produce them are barely *privations* in thoſe ſubjects from whence our ſenſes derive thoſe *ideas*. Theſe the underſtanding, in its view of them, conſiders all as diſtinct poſitive *ideas*, without taking notice of the cauſes that produce them; which is an inquiry not belonging to the *idea* as it is in the underſtanding, but to the nature of things exiſting without us. Theſe are two very different things, and carefully to be diſtinguiſhed; it being one thing to perceive and know the *idea* of white and black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles they muſt be, and how ranged in the ſuperficies, to make any object appear white or black.

A painter or dyer, who never inquired into their cauſes, hath the idea of white and black, and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and diſtinctly in his underſtanding, and perhaps more diſtinctly, than the philoſopher who hath buſied himſelf in conſidering their natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cauſe poſitive or privative; and the *idea of black* is no leſs *poſitive* in his mind than that of white, *however the cauſe* of that colour in the external object may *be only a privation*.

I appeal to every one's own experience, whether the ſhadow of a man, though it conſiſts in

no-

thing but the abſence of light, (and the more the abſence of light is, the more diſcernible is the ſhadow) does not, when a man looks on it, cauſe as clear and poſitive an *idea* in the mind, as a man himſelf, though covered over with clear ſunſhine? And the picture of a ſhadow is a poſitive thing. Indeed, we have negative names which ſtand not directly for poſitive *ideas*, but for their abſence, ſuch as *inſipid*, *ſilence*, *nihil*, &c. which words denote poſitive *ideas*, v. g. taſte, ſound, being, with a ſignification of their abſence.

And thus one may truly be ſaid to ſee darkneſs. For ſuppoſing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected, it is certain one may ſee the figure of it, or it may be painted; or whether the ink I write with makes any other *idea*, is a queſtion. The privative cauſes I have here aſſigned of poſitive *ideas*, are according to the common opinion; but in truth it will be hard to determine whether there be really any *ideas* from a privative cauſe, till it be determined, *Whether reſt be any more a privation than motion.*

LOCKE.

THE

THE ORIGIN OF OPINION CONCERNING INVISIBLE INTELLIGENT POWER.

IT muſt be allowed, that in order to carry mens attention beyond the preſent courſe of things,, or lead them into any inference concerning inviſible intelligent power, they muſt be actuated by ſome paſſion, which prompts their thought and reflection ; ſome motive, which urges their firſt inquiry. But what paſſion ſhall we here have recourſe to, for explaining an effect of ſuch mighty conſequence ? Not ſpeculative curioſity ſurely, or the pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for men in ignorant ages and barbarous nations, and would lead men into inquires concerning the frame of nature ; a ſubject too large and comprehenſive for their groſs apprehenſions. No paſſions, therefore, can be ſuppoſed to work upon ſuch barbarians, but the ordinary affections of human life ; the anxious concern for happineſs, the dread of future miſery, the terror of death, the thirſt of revenge, the appetite for food and other neceſſaries. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, eſpecially the latter, men ſcrutinize, with a trembling curioſity, the courſe of future cauſes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in this diſordered ſcene, with eyes ſtill more diſordered

ordered and aſtoniſhed, they ſee the firſt obſcure traces of Divinity.—We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the true ſprings and cauſes of every event are entirely unknown to us; nor have we either ſufficient wiſdom to foreſee, or power to prevent, thoſe ills with which we are continually threatened. We hang in perpetual ſuſpence between life and death, health and ſickneſs, plenty and want; which are diſtributed amongſt the human ſpecies by ſecret and unknown cauſes, whoſe operation is often unexpected and always unaccountable. Theſe *unknown cauſes*, then, become the conſtant object of our hope and fear; and while the paſſions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of thoſe powers on which we have ſo entire a dependence.—In proportion as any man's courſe of life is governed by accident, we always find that he increaſes in ſuperſtition; as may particularly be obſerved of gameſters and ſailors, who though, of all mankind, the leaſt capable of ſerious conſideration, abound moſt in frivolous and ſuperſtitious apprehenſions. The gods, ſays *Coriolanus* in *Dionyſius*, have an influence in every affair; but above all in war, where the event is ſo uncertain. All human life, eſpecially before the inſtitution of order and good government, being ſubject to fortuitous accidents, it is natural that

that ſuperſtition ſhould prevail every where in barbarous ages, and put men on the moſt earneſt inquiry concerning thoſe inviſible powers who diſpoſe of their happineſs and miſery.—Any of the human affections may lead us into the notion of inviſible, intelligent power; hope as well as fear, gratitude as well as affliction: but if we examine our own hearts, or obſerve what paſſes around us, we ſhall find, that men are much oftener thrown on their knees by the melancholy than by the agreeable paſſions. Proſperity is eaſily received as our due; and few queſtions are aſked concerning its cauſe or author. It begets cheerfulneſs, and activity, and alacrity, and a lively enjoyment of every ſocial and ſenſual pleaſure: and during this ſtate of mind, men have little leiſure or inclination to think of the unknown inviſible regions. On the other hand, every diſaſtrous accident alarms us, and ſets us on inquiries concerning the principles whence it aroſe: apprehenſions ſpring up with regard to futurity; and the mind, ſunk in diffidence, terror, and melancholy, has recourſe to every method of appeaſing thoſe ſacred intelligent powers, on whom our fortune is ſuppoſed entirely to depend.—Even at this day, and in Europe, aſk any of the vulgar, Why he believes in an Omnipotent Creator of the world? he will never mention the beauty of final cauſes, of which he is ignorant: He will not hold

hold out his hand, and bid you contemplate the ſuppleneſs and variety of joints in his fingers, their bending all one way, the counterpoiſe which they receive from the thumb, the ſoftneſs and fleſhy parts of the inſide of his hand, with all the other circumſtances which render that number fit for the uſe for which it was deſtined. To theſe he has been long accuſtomed; and he beholds them with liſtleſſneſs and unconcern. He will tell you of the ſudden and unexpected death of ſuch a one; the fall and bruiſe of ſuch another; the exceſſive drought of this ſeaſon; the cold and rains of another. Theſe he aſcribes to the immediate operation of Providence: and ſuch events, as with good reaſoners are the chief difficulties in admitting a Supreme Intelligence, are with him the ſole arguments for it.——Convulſions in nature, diſorders, prodigies, miracles, though the moſt oppoſite to the plan of a wiſe ſuperintendant, impreſs mankind with the ſtrongeſt ſentiments of religion: *the cauſes of events ſeeming then the moſt unknown and unaccountable.* We may conclude, therefore, upon the whole, that ſince the vulgar, in nations which have embraced the doctrine of Theiſm, ſtill build it upon irrational and ſuperſtitious opinions, they are never led into that opinion by any proceſs of argument, but by a certain train of thinking more ſuitable to their genius and capacity. HUME.

THE

THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF POWER.

WHEN we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in any single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection, any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the *outward* senses. The mind feels no sentiment or *inward* impression from the succession of objects; consequently there is not, in any single particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection.—From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by the mere dint of thought and reasoning.

The scenes in the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted course; but the power or force which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed

from us, and never difcovers itfelf in any of the fenfible qualities of body. We know that, in fact, heat is a conftant attendant of flame; but what is the connection between them, we have no room fo much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impoffible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies in fingle inftances of their operation; becaufe no bodies difcover any power which can be the original of this idea.

Mr Locke, in his chapter of Power, fays, That finding, from experience, that there are feveral new productions in matter, and concluding that there muft fomewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive by this reafoning at the idea of power. But no reafoning can ever give us a new original fimple idea; as this philofopher himfelf confeffes. This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea. Nor can external objects, as they appear to the fenfes, give us any *idea of power or neceffary connection* by their operation in particular inftances. This idea is derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds, and is copied from internal impreffions. We are every moment confcious of internal power, while we feel that, by the fimple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our minds, in their operation. An act of volition produces

 motion

motion in our limbs, or raiſes a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by conſciouſneſs. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are certain, that we ourſelves, and all other intelligent beings, are poſſeſſed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, ſince it ariſes from reflecting on the operations of our minds, and on the command which is exerciſed by the will, both over the organs of the body and the faculties of the mind.

HUME.

PREJUDICE.

THERE is a high degree of difficulty in queſtioning opinions eſtabliſhed by time, by habit, and by education; every religious and political innovation is oppoſed by the timidity of ſome, the obſtinacy and pride of others, and the ignorance of the bulk of mankind, who are incapable of attention to reaſoning and argument; and muſt, if they have any opinions, have opinions of prejudice. All improvements therefore in religion and politics muſt be gradual. There was a time when the moſt part of the inhabitants of Britain would have been as much ſtartled at queſtioning the truth of the doctrine of Tranſubſtantiation, as they would, in this age, at the moſt ſceptical doubts on the being of a God. * *.

ON

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

WHEN an opinion appears to me indifferent, it is by the balance of my reaſon I weigh its advantages. But if that opinion excite in me hatred, love, or fear, it is not my reaſon, but my paſſions, that judge of its truth or falſity. Now, the more vigorous my paſſions are, the leſs ſhare will reaſon have in my judgments. To overcome the moſt groſs prejudice, it is not enough to ſee its abſurdity.—Have I demonſtrated in the morning the nonexiſtence of apparitions? If I am at night alone in my chamber or a wood, and phantoms or apparitions ſeem to riſe out of the floor or the earth, terror ſeizes me; the moſt ſolid reaſoning cannot diſſipate my fear. To ſtifle in me the fear of ſpectres, it is not ſufficient to prove their nonexiſtence; I muſt have the reaſons by which that prejudice is deſtroyed as habitually preſent with me, as *conſtantly in my memory*, as the prejudice itſelf. Now this is a work of time, and in ſome caſes of a very long time; till this time I ſhall tremble in the dark at the very name of ſpectre and magician.—This is a fact proved by experience. HELVETIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THERE is ſomething exceedingly curious in the conſtitution and operations of prejudice. It has the ſingular ability of accommodating itſelf to all the poſſible varieties of the human mind. Some paſſions and vices are but thinly ſcattered among mankind, and find only here and there a fitneſs of reception. But prejudice, like the ſpider, makes every where its home. It has neither taſte nor choice of place, and all that it requires is room. There is ſcarcely a ſituation, except fire and water, in which a ſpider will not live: So let the mind be as naked as the walls of an empty and forſaken tenement, gloomy as a dungeon, or ornamented with the richeſt abilities of thinking; let it be hot, cold, dark or light, lonely or inhabited; ſtill prejudice, if undiſturbed, will fill it with cobwebs, and live like the ſpider, where there ſeems nothing to live on. If the one prepares her food by poiſoning it to her palate and her uſe, the other does the ſame; and as ſeveral of our paſſions are ſtrongly characterized by the animal world, Prejudice may be denominated the ſpider of the mind.

TH. PAINE.

On

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THE Chinese theologian, who proves the nine incarnations of Wifthnou; and the Muffelman, who, after the Koran, maintains, that the earth is carried on the horns of a bull; certainly found their opinions on ridiculous principles and prejudices: yet each of them, in his own country, is efteemed a perfon of fenfe. What can be the reafon of this? It is becaufe they maintain opinions generally received. In relation to religious truths, reafon lofes all her force againft two grand miffionaries, Example and Fear. *Befides*, in all countries, the prejudices of the great are the laws of the little. This Chinefe and Muffulman pafs then for wife, only becaufe they are fools of the common folly.—Certain countrymen, it is faid, erected a bridge, and upon it carved this *infcription*: *The prefent bridge is built here:* If folly and ftupidity of this kind muft always excite laughter, why do not different abfurdities in our own country make the fame impreffion upon us? It is becaufe people freely ridicule the folly from which they think themfelves exempt, becaufe nobody repeats after the countrymen, *The prefent bridge is built here.*

HELVETIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

MEN are vain, full of contempt, and confequently unjuft, whenever they can be fo with impunity. For which reafon all men imagine, that on this globe there is no part of it, in this part of the earth no nation, in the nation no province, in the province no city, in the city no fociety, comparable to their own. We, ftep by ftep, furprife ourfelves into a fecret perfuafion that we are fuperior to all our acquaintance. If an oyfter, confined within its fhell, is acquainted with no more of the univerfe than the rock on which it is fixed, and therefore cannot judge of its extent; how can a man, in the midft of a fmall fociety, always furrounded by the fame objects, and acquainted with only one train of thoughts, be able to form a proper eftimate of merit without his own circle. Truth is never ingendered or perceived but in the fermentation of contrary opinions. The univerfe is only known to us in proportion as we become acquainted with it. Whoever confines himfelf to converfing with one fet of companions, cannot avoid adopting their prejudices, efpecially if they flatter his pride. Who can feparate himfelf from an error, when vanity, the companion of ignorance, has tied him to it, and rendered it dear to him?

It is the philofopher alone who contemplates the manners, laws, cuftoms, religions, and the different paffions that actuate mankind, that can become almoft infenfible both to the praife and fatire of his cotemporaries; can break all the chains of prejudice, examine with modefty and indifference the various opinions which divide the human fpecies; pafs, without aftonifhment, from a feraglio to a chartreufe, reflect with pleafure on the extent of human folly, and fee, with the fame eye, Alcibiades cut off the tail of his dog, and Mahomet fhut himfelf up in his cavern; the one to ridicule the folly of the Athenians, and the other to enjoy the adoration of the world. He knows, that our ideas neceffarily proceed from the company we keep, the books we read, and the objects prefented to our fight; and that a fuperior intelligence might divine our thoughts from the objects prefented before us, and from our thoughts divine the number and nature of the objects offered to the mind.—The Arab perfuaded of the infallibility of his Khalif, laughs at the credulity of the Tartar, who believes the Great Lama immortal. In Africa, the negro who pays his adorations to a root, the claw of a lobfter, or the horn of an animal, fees nothing on the earth but an immenfe mafs of deities, and laughs at the fcarcity of gods among us; while the ill-informed Muffelman accufes us with acknowledging three.

—If

—If a ſage, deſcended from heaven, and in his conduct conſulted only the light of reaſon, he would univerſally paſs for a fool. All are ſo ſcrupulouſly attached to the intereſt of their own vanity, that the title of wiſe is only given to the fools of the common folly. The more fooliſh an opinion is, the more dangerous it is to prove its folly. Fontenelle was accuſtomed to ſay, that if he held every truth in his hand, he would take great care not to open it to ſhow them to men.

In deſtroying of prejudices, we ought to treat them with reſpect: like the doves from the ark, we ought to ſend ſome truths on the diſcovery, to ſee if the deluge of prejudices does not yet cover the face of the earth; if error begin to ſubſide; and if there can be perceived here and there ſome iſles, where virtue and truth may find reſt for their feet, and communicate themſelves to mankind. HELVETIUS.

VIRTUES AND VICES OF PREJUDICE.

ALL thoſe virtues originate from prejudice, the exact obſervance of which does not in the leaſt contribute to the public happineſs; ſuch as the auſterities of thoſe ſenſeleſs Fakirs with which the Indies are peopled: virtues that, being often indifferent, and even prejudical to the ſtate, are the puniſhment of thoſe who make vows for the

the performance of them. These false virtues in most nations (for many of them are to be found in every nation under heaven) are more honoured than the true virtues; and those that practise them held in greater venerations than good citizens.—Happy the people among whom the virtues which originate from prejudice and folly are only ridiculous, they are frequently extremely barbarous. In the capital of Cochin they bring up crocodiles; and whoever exposes himself to the fury of one of these animals, and is devoured, is reckoned among the elect. What is more barbarous than the institution of convents among the Papists? In Martemban, it is an act of virtue, on the day when the idol is brought out, for the people to throw themselves under the wheels of his chariot; and whoever offers himself to this death, is reputed a saint.—As there are virtues of prejudice, there are also vices of prejudice. It is one for a Bramin to marry a virgin. *If, during the three months in which* the people of Formosa are ordered to go naked, a man fastens upon him the smallest piece of linen, he wears, say they, a clothing unworthy of a man. The neglect, in Catholic countries, of fasts, confessions, penances, and pater nosters, is a crime of the first magnitude. And there is, perhaps, no country where the people have not a greater abhorrence of some of these crimes of pre-

prejudice, than for villanies the moſt atrocious, and the moſt injurious to ſociety.

HELVETIUS.

RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL PREJUDICES.

IT is a very true obſervation, and a very common one, that our affections and paſſions put frequently a bias ſo ſecret, and yet ſo ſtrong, on our judgments, as to make them ſwerve from the direction of right reaſon: and on this principle we muſt account, in a great meaſure, for the different ſyſtems of philoſophy and religion, about which men diſpute ſo much, and fight and perſecute ſo often. But it is not ſo commonly obſerved, though it be equally true, that as extenſive as this principle is in itſelf, ſince it extends to almoſt all mankind, the action of it in one ſingle man is ſometimes ſufficient to extend the effects of it to millions. Many a ſyſtem, and many an inſtitution, has appeared and thrived in the world as a production of human wiſdom raiſed to the higheſt pitch, and even illuminated by inſpiration, which was owing, in its origin, to the predominant paſſion, or to the madneſs of one ſingle man. Authority comes ſoon to ſtand in the place of reaſon. Men come to defend what they never examined, and to explain what they never underſtood.

ftood. Their fyftem, or their inftitution, to which they were determined by chance, not by choice, is to them that rock of truth on which alone they can be faved from error: they cling to it accordingly; and doubt itfelf was this rock to the Academicians —*De rebus incognitis judicant, et ad quamcunque funt difciplinam quafi tempeftate delati, ad eam tanquam ad faxum adhærefcunt.* (Acad. quæft. lib. 2.)

All errors, even thofe of ignorance and fuperftition, are hard to remove when they have taken long hold of the minds of men, and efpecially when they are woven into fyftems of religion. But there are fome from which men are unwilling to depart, and of which they grow fond by degrees. As men advance in knowledge, their felf-conceit and curiofity are apt to increafe; and thefe are fure to be flattered by every opinion that gives man high notions of his own importance. What contradictions and inconfiftencies are not huddled together in the human mind?—Superftition is produced by a fenfe of our weaknefs, philofophical prefumption by an opinion of our ftrength; and fuperftition and prefumption contribute alike to continue, to confirm, to propagate error.—Errors in rules of policy and law are eafy to be corrected by experience, like errors in natural philofophy. Nay, the firft are fo the moft; becaufe how little regard foever philofophers may have to experience, in either

ther case, the truth will force itself upon them, or others; in one, by the course of affairs; whereas it must be sought, to be had in the other. But when it is sought, it is obtained. Errors in theology and metaphysics cannot be thus corrected. Systems of laws and politics may be various; nay, contrary to one another; and yet be such as right reason dictates, provided they do not stand in opposition to any of the laws of our nature. But in theological reasonings, and those which are called metaphysical, the various opinions may be all false; or if they are not all so, one alone can be true. This consideration should have two effects. It should render philosophers and divines more cautious in framing opinions on such subjects, and less positive in maintaining them from the beginning. The very contrary has happened, to such a degree of extravagance, as must seem delirious to every one who is not in the same delirium. Can he be less than mad, who pretends to contemplate an intellectual world, which he assumes in the dull mirror of his own mind; of which he knows little more than this, that it is both dull and narrow? Can he be less than mad, who perseveres dogmatically in this pretension, whilst he is obliged to own, that he arrives with many helps, much pains, and by slow degrees, to a little imperfect knowledge of the visible world which he inhabits; and concerning which he is, therefore,

 sober,

ſober, and modeſt enough to reaſon hypothetically?—In a word, can he be leſs than mad, who boaſts a revelation ſuperadded to reaſon, to ſupply the defects of it; and who ſuperadds reaſon to revelation, to ſupply the defects of this too, at the ſame time?—This is madneſs, or there is no ſuch thing incident to our nature.—All men are apt to have a high conceit of their own underſtandings, and to be tenacious of the opinions they profeſs: and yet almoſt all men are guided by the underſtandings of others, not by their own; and may be ſaid more truly to adopt, than to beget, their opinions. Nurſes, parents, pedagogues, and after them all, and above them all, that univerſal pedagogue Cuſtom, fill the mind with notions which it has no ſhare in framing; which it receives as paſſively as it receives the impreſſions of outward objects; and which left to itſelf, it would never have framed, perhaps, or would have examined afterwards. Thus prejudices are eſtabliſhed by education, and habits by cuſtom. We are taught to think what others think, not how to think for ourſelves: and whilſt the memory is loaded, the underſtanding remains unexerciſed, or exerciſed in ſuch trammels as conſtrain its motions, and direct its pace, till that which was artificial becomes in ſome ſort natural, and the mind can go no other. It may ſound oddly, but it is true in many caſes, to ſay, that if men had learn-

ed lefs, their way to knowledge would be fhorter and eafier. It is indeed fhorter and eafier to proceed from ignorance to knowledge, than from error. They who are in the laft, muft unlearn, before they can learn to any good purpofe: and the firft part of this double tafk is not, in many refpects, the leaft difficult; for which reafon it is feldom undertaken. The vulgar, under which denomination we muft rank, on this occafion, almoft all the fons of Adam, content themfelves to be guided by vulgar opinions. They know little, and believe much. They examine and judge for themfelves in the common affairs of life fometimes: and not always even in thefe. But the greateft and nobleft objects of the human mind are very tranfiently, at beft, the object of theirs. On all thefe they refign themfelves to the authority that prevails among the men with whom they live. Some of them want the means, all of them want the will, to do more: and as abfurd as this may appear in fpeculation, it is beft, perhaps, upon the whole, the human nature, and the nature of government confidered, that it fhould be as it is.

BOLINGBROKE.

THE

THE INEFFICACY OF LAWS TO REGULATE THE PRICE OF PROVISIONS.

IT is impracticable to fix the rates and prices of provifions and commodities by civil laws; and if it were poffible to reduce the price of food by any other expedient than introducing plenty, nothing could be more pernicious and deftructive to the public. Where the produce of a year, for inftance, falls fo far fhort, as to afford full fubfiftence only for nine months, the only expedient for making it lafte all the twelve, is to raife the prices, to put the people by that means on fhort allowance, and oblige them to fpare their food till a more plentiful year.--But in reality, the increafe of prices is a neceffary confequence of fcarcity; and laws, inftead of preventing it, only increafe the evil, by cramping and reftraining commerce.

HUME.

PRIDE.

IT is a trite obfervation in philofophy, and even in common life and converfation, that it is our own pride which makes us fo much difpleafed with the pride of other people; and that vanity becomes infupportable to us, merely becaufe we are vain. The gay naturally affociate themfelves with the

gay, and the amorous with the amorous. But the proud never can endure the proud; and rather ſeek the company of thoſe who are of an oppoſite diſpoſition. As we are, all of us, proud in ſome degree, pride is univerſally blamed and condemned by all mankind; as having a natural tendency to cauſe uneaſineſs in others by means of compariſon. And this effect muſt follow the more naturally, that thoſe who have an ill-grounded conceit of themſelves are for ever making thoſe compariſons; nor have they any other way of ſupporting their vanity. A man of ſenſe and merit is pleaſed with himſelf, independent of all foreign conſiderations; but a fool muſt always find ſome perſon that is more fooliſh, in order to keep himſelf in good humour with his own parts and underſtanding.

But though an overweening conceit of our own merit be vicious and diſagreeable, nothing can be more laudable, than to have a value for ourſelves where we really have qualities that are valuable. The utility and advantage of any quality to ourſelves is a ſource of virtue, as well as its agreeableneſs to others; and it is certain, that nothing is more uſeful to us in the conduct of life, than a due degree of pride, which makes us ſenſible of our own merit, and gives us a confidence and aſſurance in all our own projects and enterprizes. Whatever capacity any one may be endowed with, it

it is entirely uſeleſs to him if he be not acquainted with it, and form not deſigns ſuitable to it. It is requiſite on all occaſions to know our own force; and were it allowable to err on either ſide, it would be more advantageous to over-rate our merit, than to form ideas of it below its juſt ſtandard. Fortune commonly favours the bold and enterpriſing; and nothing inſpires us with more boldneſs than a good opinion of ourſelves. Thus ſelf-ſatisfaction and vanity may not only be allowable, but requiſite in a character. It is, however, certain, that good-breeding and decency require, that we ſhould avoid all ſigns and expreſſions which tend directly to ſhow that paſſion. We have all of us a wonderful partiality for ourſelves; and were we always to give vent to our ſentiments in this particular, we ſhould mutually cauſe the greateſt indignation in each other, not only by the immediate preſence of ſo diſagreeable a ſubject of compariſon, but alſo by the contrariety of our judgments. The *rules of good-breeding* are, therefore, eſtabliſhed, in order to prevent the oppoſition of mens pride, and render converſation agreeable and inoffenſive. Nothing is more diſagreeable than a man's overweening conceit of himſelf. Every one almoſt has a ſtrong propenſity to this vice. No one can well diſtinguiſh *in himſelf* betwixt the vice and virtue; or be certain that the eſteem of his own merit is well founded. For

these reasons, all direct expressions of this passion are condemned; nor do we make any exceptions to this rule in favour of men of sense and merit. They are not allowed to do themselves justice openly, in words, no more than other people; and even if they show a reserve and secret doubt in doing themselves justice in their own thoughts, they will be more applauded. That impertinent, and almost universal propensity in men to over-value themselves, has given such a prejudice against self-applause, that we are apt to condemn it, by a *general rule*, wherever we meet with it; and it is with some difficulty we give a privilege to men of sense, even in their most secret thoughts. At least, it must be owned, that some disguise in this particular is absolutely requisite; and that if we harbour pride in our breasts, we must carry a fair outside, and have the appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and behaviour. We must on every occasion be ready to prefer others to ourselves; to treat them with a kind of deference, even though they be our equals; to seem always the lowest and least in the company, where we are not very much distinguished above them. And if we observe these rules in our conduct, men will have more indulgence for our secret sentiments, when we discover them in an oblique manner.

It has never been believed by any one, who hath

hath had any practice in the world, and can penetrate into the ſentiments of men, that the humility which good-breeding and decency require of us, goes beyond the outſide, or that a thorough ſincerity in this particular is eſteemed a real part of our duty. On the contrary, we may obſerve, that a genuine and hearty pride, or ſelf-eſteem, if well concealed and well-founded, is eſſential to a man of honour; and that there is no quality of the mind which is more indiſpenſably requiſite to procure the eſteem and approbation of mankind. There are certain deferences and mutual ſubmiſſions, which cuſtom requires of the different ranks of men towards each other: and whoever exceeds in this particular, if through intereſt, is accuſed of meanneſs; if through ignorance, of ſimplicity. It is neceſſary, therefore, to know our rank and ſtation in the world, whether it be fixed by our birth, fortune, employments, talents, or reputation. It is neceſſary to feel the ſentiment and paſſion of pride in conformity to it, and to regulate our actions accordingly. And ſhould it be ſaid, that prudence may ſuffice to regulate our actions in this particular without any real pride; it may be obſerved, that here the object of prudence is to conform our actions to the general uſage and cuſtom; and that it is impoſſible thoſe tacit airs of ſuperiority ſhould ever have been eſtabliſhed and authoriſed by cuſtom, unleſs men

were generally proud, and unleſs that paſſion were generally approved when well-grounded.

In general, we may obſerve, that whatever we call *heroic virtue*, and admire under the character of greatneſs and elevation of mind, is either nothing but a ſteady and well-eſtabliſhed pride and ſelf-eſteem, or partakes largely of that paſſion. Courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, magnanimity, and all the other ſhining virtues of that kind, have plainly a ſtrong mixture of ſelf-eſteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from that origin. Accordingly, we find that many religious declaimers decry thoſe virtues as purely Pagan and natural, and repreſent to us the excellency of the *Chriſtian* religion, which places humility in the rank of virtues, and corrects the judgment of the world, and even of philoſophers, who ſo generally admire all the efforts of pride and ambition. Whether this virtue of humility has been rightly underſtood, it may not be eaſy to determine; but we muſt confeſs, that the world naturally eſteems a well-regulated pride, which ſecretly animates our conduct, without breaking out into ſuch indecent expreſſions of vanity as may offend the vanity of others.

HUME.

PRIESTS.

The firſt prieſts were probably botaniſts, chemiſts, phyſicians, natural philoſophers, and aſtronomers. Theſe performed cures, ſhowed wonders, and were in the rank of thoſe impoſtors who, under the name of conjurers, continue to deceive the world. The poets took up the principles and actions of theſe men; perſonified ſome of them; and referred thoſe they could not underſtand to the operations of inviſible powers, with whom the impoſtors pretended to converſe, and whoſe meſſengers and delegates they were ſuppoſed to be. Theſe inviſible beings, once introduced into the ſyſtem of nature, and being ſuppoſed to cure diſeaſes, to perform miracles, and to foretel events, men were ſoon prevailed upon, not only to conſign their health and fortunes to their direction, but even their underſtandings and ſenſes; and to receive rules from them for the conduct of life, which could only be derived from thoſe ſenſes and underſtandings: rules which gradually deviated from the effects of experience, until all attention was transferred from experience to the prieſt, and religion was ſet in oppoſition to morarality. WILLIAMS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THOUGH all mankind have a ſtrong propenſity to religion at certain times and in certain diſpoſitions, yet are there few or none who have it to that degree, and with that conſtancy, which is requiſite to ſupport the character of this profeſſion. It muſt therefore happen, that clergymen being drawn from the common maſs of mankind, as people are to other employments, by the views of profit, the greateſt part, though no Atheiſts or Free-thinkers, will find it neceſſary, on particular occaſions, to feign more devotion than they are at that time poſſeſſed of; and to maintain the appearance of fervor and ſerioufneſs, even when jaded with the exerciſes of their religion, or when they have their minds engaged in the common occupations of life. They muſt not, like the reſt of the world, give ſcope to their natural movements and ſentiments: they muſt ſet a guard over their looks, and words, and actions: and in order to ſupport the veneration paid them by the ignorant vulgar, they muſt not only keep a remarkable reſerve, but muſt promote the ſpirit of ſuperſtition, by a continued grimace and hypocriſy. This diſſimulation often deſtroys the candour and ingenuity of their temper, and makes an irreparable breach in their character.

If

If by chance any of them be poſſeſſed of a temper more ſuſceptible of devotion than uſual, ſo that he has but little occaſion for hypocriſy to ſupport the character of his profeſſion, it is ſo natural for him to overrate this advantage, and to think that it atones for every violation of morality, that frequently he is not more virtuous than the hypocrite. And though few dare openly avow thoſe exploded opinions, *That every thing is lawful to the ſaints, and that they alone have property in their goods*; yet may we obſerve, that theſe principles lurk in every boſom, and repreſent a zeal for religious obſervances as ſo great a merit, that it may compenſate for many vices and enormities. This obſervation is ſo common, that all prudent men are on their guard when they meet with any extraordinary appearance of religion; though, at the ſame time, they confeſs, that there are many exceptions to this general rule; and that probity and ſuperſtition, or even probity and fanaticiſm, are not altogether, and in every inſtance, incompatible.

Moſt men are ambitious; but the ambition of other men may commonly be ſatisfied, by excelling in their particular profeſſion, and thereby promoting the intereſts of ſociety. The ambition of the clergy can often be ſatisfied only by promoting ignorance, and ſuperſtition, and implicit faith, and pious frauds. And having got what

Archi-

Archimedes only wanted, (viz. another world on which he could fix his engines), no wonder they move this world at their pleaſure.

Moſt men have an overweening conceit of themſelves; but theſe have a peculiar temptation to that vice, who are regarded with ſuch veneration, and are even deemed ſacred, by the ignorant multitude.

Moſt men are apt to bear a particular regard for members of *their own profeſſion*: but as a lawyer, or phyſician, or merchant, does each of them follow out his buſineſs apart, the intereſts of theſe profeſſions are not ſo cloſely united as the intereſts of clergymen of the ſame religion; where the whole body gains by the veneration paid to their common tenets, and by the ſuppreſſion of antagoniſts.

Few men bear contradiction with patience; but the clergy proceed even to a degree of fury on this article: becauſe all their credit and livelihood depend upon the belief which their opinions meet with; and they alone pretend to a divine and ſupernatural authority, or have any colour for repreſenting their antagoniſts as impious and prophane. The *odium theologicum*, or theological hatred, is noted even to a proverb; and means that degree of rancour which is the moſt furious and implacable.

Revenge is a natural paſſion to mankind; but

ſeems to reign with the greateſt force in prieſts and women. Becauſe, being deprived of the immediate exertion of anger, in violence and combat, they are apt to fancy themſelves deſpiſed on that account; and their pride ſupports their vindictive diſpoſition.

Thus many of the vices in human nature are, by fixed moral cauſes, inflamed in that profeſſion; and though ſeveral individuals eſcape the contagion, yet all wiſe governments will be on their guard againſt the attempts of a ſociety who will for ever combine into one faction; and while it acts as a ſociety, will for ever be actuated by ambition, pride, revenge, and a perſecuting ſpirit.

The temper of religion is grave and ſerious; and this is the character required of prieſts, which confines them to ſtrict rules of decency, and commonly prevents irregularity and intemperance among them. The gaiety, much leſs the exceſſes of pleaſure, is not permitted in that body; and this virtue is, perhaps, the only one they owe to their profeſſion. In religions, indeed, founded on ſpeculative principles, and where public diſcourſes make a part of religious ſervices, it may alſo be ſuppoſed, that the clergy will have a conſiderable ſhare in the learning of the times, though it is certain that their taſte in eloquence will always be better than their ſkill in reaſoning and philoſophy. But whoever poſſeſſes the other

noble virtues of humanity, meeknefs, and moderation, as very many of them, no doubt, do, is beholden for them to nature or reflection, not to the genius of his calling.

It was no bad expedient in the old Romans, for preventing the ftrong effect of the prieftly character, to make it a law, that none fhould be received into the facerdotal office till he was paft fifty years of age, (Dion. Hal. lib. 1.) The living a layman *till that age, it is* prefumed, would be able to fix the character.

It is a trite, but not altogether a falfe maxim, That *priefts of all religions are the fame*; and though the character of the profeffion will not, in every inftance, prevail over the perfonal character, yet is it fure always to predominate with the greater number. For, as chemifts obferve, that fpirits when raifed to a certain height are all the fame, from whatever materials they are extracted; fo thefe men, being elevated above humanity, acquire a uniform character, which is entirely their own, and which, in my opinion, is, generally fpeaking, not the moft amiable that is to be met with in human fociety.

HUME.

PRIMOGENITURE CONTRARY TO THE REAL INTEREST OF FAMILIES.

WHEN land, like moveables, is confidered as the means only of fubfiftence and enjoyment, the natural law of fucceffion divides it, like them, among all the children of the family; of all of whom the fubfiftence and enjoyment may be fuppofed equally dear to the father. This natural law of fucceffion accordingly took place among the Romans, who made no more diftinction between elder and younger, between male and female, in the inheritance of lands, than we do in the diftribution of moveables. But when land was confidered as the means, not of fubfiftence merely, but of power and protection, it was thought better that it fhould defcend undivided to one. In thofe diforderly times, every great landlord was a fort of petty prince. His tenants were his fubjects. He was their judge, and in fome refpects their legiflator in peace, and their leader in war. He made war according to his own difcretion, frequently againft his neighbours, and fometimes againft his fovereign. The fecurity of a landed eftate, therefore, the protection which its owner could afford to thofe who dwelt on it, depended upon its greatnefs. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expofe every part of it to

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be oppreſſed and ſwallowed up by the incurſions of its neighbours. The law of primogeniture, therefore, came to take place, not immediately indeed, but in proceſs of time, in the ſucceſſion of landed eſtates, for the ſame reaſon that it has generally taken place in that of monarchies, though not always at their firſt inſtitution. That the power, and conſequently the ſecurity, of the monarchy may not be weakened by diviſion, it muſt deſcend entire to one of the children. To which of them ſo important a preference ſhall be given, muſt be determined by ſome general rule, founded not upon the doubtful diſtinctions of perſonal merit, but upon ſome plain and evident difference which can admit of no diſpute. Among the children of the ſame family, there can be no indiſputable difference but that of ſex, and that of age. The male ſex is univerſally preferred to the female; and when all other things are equal, the elder every-where takes place of the younger. Hence the origin of the right of primogeniture, and of what is called lineal ſucceſſion.

Laws frequently continue in force long after the circumſtances which firſt gave occaſion to them, and which could alone render them reaſonable, are no more. In the preſent ſtate of Europe, the proprietor of a ſingle acre of land is as perfectly ſecure of his poſſeſſion as the proprietor of a hundred thouſand. The right of primogeniture,

geniture, however, ſtill continues to be reſpected; and as of all inſtitutions it is the fitteſt to ſupport the pride of family-diſtinctions, it is ſtill likely to endure for many centuries. In every other reſpect, nothing can be more contrary to the real intereſt of a numerous family, than a right which, in order to enrich one, beggars all the reſt of the children.

Entails are the natural conſequences of the law of primogeniture. They were introduced to preſerve a certain lineal ſucceſſion, of which the law of primogeniture firſt gave the idea, and to hinder any part of the original eſtate from being carried out of the propoſed line, either by gift or deviſe, or alienation; either by the folly, or by the misfortune of any of its ſucceſſive owners. They were altogether unknown to the Romans. Neither their ſubſtitutions nor fideicommiſſes bear any reſemblance to entails, though ſome French lawyers have thought proper to dreſs the modern inſtitution in the language and garb of thoſe ancient ones.

When great landed eſtates were a ſort of principalities, entails might not be unreaſonable. Like what are called the fundamental laws of ſome monarchies, they might frequently hinder the ſecurity of thouſands from being endangered by the caprice or extravagance of one man. But in the preſent ſtate of Europe, when ſmall as well as

great eſtates derive their ſecurity from the laws of their country, nothing can be more completely abſurd. They are founded upon the moſt abſurd of all ſuppoſitions, the ſuppoſition that every ſucceſſive generation of men have not an equal right to the earth, and to all that it poſſeſſes; but that the property of the preſent generation ſhould be reſtrained and regulated according to the fancy of thoſe who died perhaps five hundred years ago. Entails, however, are ſtill reſpected through the greater part of Europe; in thoſe countries particularly in which noble birth is a neceſſary qualification for the enjoyment either of civil or military honours. Entails are thought neceſſary for maintaining this excluſive privilege of the nobility to the great offices and honours of their country; and that order having uſurped one unjuſt advantage over the reſt of their fellow-citizens, leſt their poverty ſhould render it ridiculous, it is thought reaſonable that they ſhould have another. The common law of England, indeed, is ſaid to abhor perpetuities, and they are accordingly more reſtricted there than in any other European monarchy; though even England is not altogether without them. In Scotland more than one-fifth, perhaps more than one-third part of the whole lands of the country, are at preſent ſuppoſed to be under ſtrict entail.

Great tracts of uncultivated land were in this manner

manner not only engroſſed by particular families, but the poſſibility of their being divided again was as much as poſſible precluded for ever. It ſeldom happens, however, that a great proprietor is a great improver. In the diſorderly times which gave birth to thoſe barbarous inſtitutions, the great proprietor was ſufficiently employed in defending his own territories, or in extending his juriſdiction and authority over thoſe of his neighbours. He had no leiſure to attend to the cultivation and improvement of land. When the eſtabliſhment of law and order afforded him this leiſure, he often wanted the inclination, and almoſt always the requiſite abilities. If the expence of his houſe and perſon either equalled or exceeded his revenue, as it did very frequently, he had no ſtock to employ in this manner. If he was an œconomiſt, he generally found it more profitable to employ his annual ſavings in new purchaſes, than in the improvement of his old eſtate. To improve land with profit, like all other commercial projects, requires an exact attention to ſmall ſavings and ſmall gains, of which a man born to a great fortune, even though naturally frugal, is very ſeldom capable. The ſituation of ſuch a perſon naturally diſpoſes him to attend rather to ornament which pleaſes his fancy, than to profit for which he has ſo little occaſion. The elegance of his dreſs, of his equipage, of his houſe and houſehold-

houſehold-furniture, are objects which from his infancy he has been accuſtomed to have ſome anxiety about. The turn of mind which this habit naturally forms, follows him when he comes to think of the improvement of land. He embelliſhes perhaps four or five hundred acres in the neighbourhood of his houſe, at ten times the expence which the land is worth after all his improvements; and finds, that if he was to improve his whole eſtate in the ſame manner, and he has little taſte for any other, he would be a bankrupt before he had finiſhed a tenth part of it. There ſtill remain in both parts of the united kingdoms ſome great eſtates, which have continued without interruption in the hands of the ſame family ſince the times of feudal anarchy. Compare the preſent condition of thoſe eſtates with the poſſeſſions of the ſmall proprietors in their neighbourhood, and you will require no other argument to convince you how unfavourable ſuch extenſive property is to improvement.

A. SMITH.

PROBABILITY.

THERE is certainly a probability which ariſes from a ſuperiority of chances on any ſide; and according as this ſuperiority increaſes and ſurpaſſes the oppoſite chances, the probability receives

ceives a proportionable increaſe, and begets ſtill a higher degree of belief or aſſent to that ſide in which we diſcover the ſuperiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or number of ſpots on four ſides, and with another figure or number of ſpots on the two remaining ſides, it would be more probable that the former would turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thouſand ſides marked in the ſame manner, and only one ſide different, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or expectation of the event more ſteady and ſecure.--Mr Locke divides all arguments into demonſtrative and probable. In this view we muſt ſay, that it is only probable all men muſt die, or that the ſun will riſe to-morrow. But, to conform our language more to common uſe, we ſhould divide arguments into demonſtrations, proofs, and probabilities: by proofs, meaning ſuch arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or oppoſition.

HUME.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

AS demonſtration is the ſhowing the agreement or diſagreement of two ideas by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a conſtant, immutable, and viſible connection one with another; ſo probability is nothing but the appearance of ſuch

ſuch an agreement or diſagreement, by the intervention of proofs, whoſe connection is not conſtant and immutable, or at leaſt is not perceived to be ſo, but is, or appears for the moſt part to be ſo, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the propoſition to be true or falſe, rather than the contrary. For example: In the demonſtration of it, a man perceives the certain immutable connection there is of equality between the three angles of a triangle and thoſe intermediate ones which are made uſe of to ſhow their equality to two right ones; and ſo, by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or diſagreement of the intermediate ideas in each ſtep of the progreſs, the whole ſeries is continued with an evidence, which clearly ſhows the agreement or diſagreement of thoſe three angles in equality to two right ones: and thus he has certain knowledge that it is ſo.—But another man, who never took the pains to obſerve the demonſtration, hearing a mathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, aſſents to it, *i. e.* receives it for true: in which the foundation of his aſſent is the probability of the thing, the proof being ſuch as for the moſt part carries truth with it; the man on whoſe teſtimony he receives it not being wont to affirm any thing contrary to or beſides his knowledge, eſpecially in matters of this kind. So that

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that which caufes his affent to this propofition, That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take thefe ideas to agree without knowing them to do fo, is the wonted veracity of the fpeaker in other cafes, or his fuppofed veracity in this.

LOCKE.

GROUNDS OF *PROBABILITY*.

PROBABILITY being to fupply the defect of our knowledge, and to guide us where that fails, is always converfant about propofitions whereof we have *no certainty*, but only fome inducements to receive them for true.

The grounds of it are thefe two following:

Firft, The conformity of any thing with our own knowledge, obfervation, and experience.

Secondly, The teftimony of others, vouching their obfervation, and experience. In the teftimony of others is to be confidered, 1. The number, 2. The integrity, 3. The fkill of the witneffes. 4. The defign of the author, where it is a teftimony out of a book cited. 5. The confiftency of the parts, and circumftances of the relation. 6. Contrary teftimonies.

Probability wanting that intuitive evidence which infallibly determines the underftanding and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it would

would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and ſee how they make more or leſs, for or againſt, any propoſition, before it aſſents to or diſſents from it; and, upon a due balancing the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or leſs firm aſſent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one ſide or the other. For example:

If I myſelf ſee a man walk on the ice, it is paſt probability, it is knowledge: but if another tells me he ſaw a man in England, in the midſt of a ſharp winter, walk upon water hardened with cold; this has ſo great a conformity with what is uſually obſerved to happen, that I am diſpoſed by the nature of the thing itſelf to aſſent to it, unleſs ſome manifeſt ſuſpicion attend the relation of that matter of fact. But if the ſame thing be told to one born between the tropics, who never ſaw nor heard of any ſuch thing before, there the whole probability relies on teſtimony; and as the relators are more in number, and of more credit, and have no intereſt to ſpeak contrary to the truth, ſo that matter of fact is like to find more or leſs belief. Though, to a man whoſe experience has always been quite contrary, and has never heard of any thing like it, the moſt untainted credit of a witneſs will ſcarce be able to find belief. As it happened to a Dutch ambaſſador,

dor, who entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquifitive after, amongft other things told him, that the water in his country would fometimes, in cold weather, be fo hard, that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant if he were there. To which the king replied, "Hi-"*therto I have* believed the ftrange things you "have told me, becaufe I *look* upon you as a fo-"ber fair man; but now I am fure you *lie*."

Upon thefe grounds depends the probability of any propofition; and as the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of obfervations, as the frequency and conftancy of experience, and the number and credibility of teftimonies, do more or lefs agree or difagree with it; fo is any propofition in itfelf more or lefs probable. There is another, I confefs, which though by itfelf it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made ufe of for one, by which men moft commonly regulate their affent, and upon which they pin their faith more than any thing elfe, and that is the opinion of others; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to miflead one, fince there is much more falfehood and error among men than truth and knowledge. And if the opinions and perfuafions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of affent, men have reafon to be Hea-

thens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papiſts in Spain, Proteſtants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden. LOCKE.

TENDENCY AND EFFECTS OF PRODIGALITY.

CAPITALS are increaſed by parſimony, and diminiſhed by prodigality and miſconduct.

Whatever a perſon ſaves from his revenue he adds to his capital, and either employs it himſelf in maintaining an additional number of productive hands, or enables ſome other perſon to do ſo, by lending it to him for an intereſt, that is, for a ſhare of the profits. As the capital of an individual can be increaſed only by what he ſaves from his annual revenue or his annual gains; ſo the capital of a ſociety, which is the ſame with that of all the individuals who compoſe it, can be increaſed only in the ſame manner.

Parſimony, and not induſtry, is the immediate cauſe of the increaſe of capital. Induſtry indeed provides the ſubject which parſimony accumulates. But whatever induſtry might acquire, if parſimony did not ſave and ſtore up, the capital would never be the greater.

Parſimony, by increaſing the fund which is deſtined for the maintenance of productive hands, tends to increaſe the number of thoſe hands whoſe labour adds to the value of the ſubject upon which it

it is beſtowed. It tends therefore to increaſe the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country. It puts into motion an additional quantity of induſtry, which gives an additional value to the annual produce.

What is annually ſaved is as regularly conſumed as what is annually ſpent, and nearly in the ſame time too; but is conſumed by a different ſet of people. That portion of his revenue which a rich man annually ſpends, is in moſt caſes conſumed by idle gueſts and menial ſervants, who leave nothing behind them in return for their conſumption. That portion which he annually ſaves, as, for the ſake of the profit, it is immediately employed as a capital, is conſumed in the ſame manner, and nearly in the ſame time too, but by a different ſet of people; by labourers, manufacturers, and artificers, who reproduce with a profit the value of their annual conſumption. His revenue, we ſhall ſuppoſe, is paid him in money. Had he ſpent the whole, the food, clothing, and lodging which the whole could have purchaſed, would have been diſtributed among the former ſet of people. By ſaving a part of it, as that part is for the ſake of the profit immediately employed as a capital either by himſelf or by ſome other perſon, the food, clothing, and lodging, which may be purchaſed with it, are neceſſarily

reserved for the latter. The consumption is the same; but the consumers are different.

By what a frugal man annually saves, he not only affords maintenance to an additional number of productive hands for that or the ensuing year; but, like the founder of a public workhouse, he establishes as it were a perpetual fund for the maintenance of an equal number in all times to come. The perpetual allotment and destination of this fund, indeed, is not always guarded by any positive law, by any trust-right, or deed of mortmain. It is always guarded, however, by a very powerful principle, the plain and evident interest of every individual to whom any share of it shall ever belong. No part of it can ever afterwards be employed to maintain any but productive hands, without an evident loss to the person who thus perverts it from its proper destination.

The prodigal perverts it in this manner. By not confining his expence within his income, he encroaches upon his capital. Like him who perverts the revenues of some pious foundation to profane purposes, he pays the wages of idleness with those funds which the frugality of his forefathers had as it were consecrated to the maintenance of industry. By diminishing the funds destined for the employment of productive labour, he necessarily diminishes, so far as it depends upon

on him, the quantity of that labour which adds a value to the ſubject upon which it is beſtowed, and conſequently the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the whole country, the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. If the prodigality of ſome was not compenſated by the frugality of others, the conduct of every prodigal, by feeding the idle with the bread of the induſtrious, tends not only to beggar himſelf, but to impoveriſh his country.

Though the expence of the prodigal ſhould be altogether in home-made, and no part of it in foreign commodities, its effect upon the productive funds of the ſociety would ſtill be the ſame. Every year there would be ſtill a certain quantity of food and clothing, which ought to have maintained productive, employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Every year, therefore, there would ſtill be ſome diminution in what would otherwiſe have been the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country.

This expence, it may be ſaid indeed, not being in foreign goods, and not occaſioning any exportation of gold and ſilver, the ſame quantity of money would remain in the country as before. But if the quantity of food and clothing, which were thus conſumed by unproductive, had been diſtributed among productive hands, they would have reproduced, together with a profit, the full

value of their conſumption. The ſame quantity of money would in this caſe equally have remained in the country, and there would beſides have been a reproduction of an equal value of conſumable goods. There would have been two values inſtead of one.

The ſame quantity of money, beſides, cannot long remain in any country in which the value of the annual produce diminiſhes. The ſole uſe of money is to circulate conſumable goods. By means of it, proviſions, materials, and finiſhed work, are bought and ſold, and diſtributed to their proper conſumers. The quantity of money, therefore, which can be annually employed in any country, muſt be determined by the value of the conſumable goods annually circulated within it. Theſe muſt conſiſt either in the immediate produce of the land and labour of the country itſelf, or in ſomething which had been purchaſed with ſome part of that produce. Their value, therefore, muſt diminiſh as the value of that produce diminiſhes, and along with it the quantity of money which can be employed in circulating them. But the money which by this annual diminution of produce is annually thrown out of domeſtic circulation will not be allowed to lie idle. The intereſt of whoever poſſeſſes it requires that it ſhould be employed. But having no employment at home, it will, in ſpite of all laws

laws and prohibitions, be ſent abroad, and employed in purchaſing conſumable goods which may be of ſome uſe at home. Its annual exportation will in this manner continue for ſome time to add ſomething to the annual conſumption of the country beyond the value of its own annual produce. What, in the days of its proſperity, had been ſaved from that annual produce, and employed in purchaſing gold and ſilver, will contribute for ſome little time to ſupport its conſumption in adverſity. The exportation of gold and ſilver is, in this caſe, not the cauſe, but the effect of its declenſion; and may even, for ſome little time, alleviate the miſery of that declenſion.

The quantity of money, on the contrary, muſt in every country naturally increaſe as the value of the annual produce increaſes. The value of the conſumable goods annually circulated within the ſociety being greater, will require a greater quantity of money to circulate them. A part of the increaſed produce, therefore, will naturally be employed in purchaſing, wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of gold and ſilver neceſſary for circulating the reſt. The increaſe of thoſe metals will in this caſe be the effect, not the cauſe, of the public proſperity. Gold and ſilver are purchaſed every where in the ſame manner. The food, clothing, and lodging, the revenue and maintenance of all thoſe whoſe labour or

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ſtock is employed in bringing them from the mine to the market, is the price paid for them in Peru as well as in England. The country which has this price to pay, will never be long without the quantity of thoſe metals which it has occaſion for; and no country will ever long retain a quantity which it has no occaſion for.

Whatever, therefore, we may imagine the real wealth and revenue of a country to conſiſt in, whether in the value of the annual produce of its land and labour, as plain reaſon ſeems to dictate; or in the quantity of the precious metals which circulate within it, as vulgar prejudices ſuppoſe; in either view of the matter, every prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and every frugal man a public benefactor.

The effects of miſconduct are often the ſame as thoſe of prodigality. Every injudicious and unſucceſsful project in agriculture, mines, fiſheries, trade, or manufactures, tends in the ſame manner to diminiſh the funds deſtined for the maintenance of productive labour. In every ſuch project, though the capital is conſumed by productive hands only, yet as, by the injudicious manner in which they are employed, they do not reproduce the full value of their conſumption, there muſt always be ſome diminution in what would otherwiſe have been the productive funds of the ſociety.

It can ſeldom happen, indeed, that the circumſtances of a great nation can be much affected either by the prodigality or miſconduct of individuals; the profuſion or imprudence of ſome being always more than compenſated by the frugality and good conduct of others.

With regard to profuſion, the principle which prompts to expence is the paſſion for preſent enjoyment, which, though ſometimes violent and very difficult to be reſtrained, is in general only momentary and occaſional. But the principle which prompts to ſave is the deſire of bettering our condition; a deſire which, though generally calm and diſpaſſionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave. In the whole interval which ſeparates thoſe two moments, there is ſcarce perhaps a ſingle inſtant in which any man is ſo perfectly and completely ſatisfied with his ſituation, as to be without any wiſh of alteration or improvement of any kind. An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propoſe and wiſh to better their condition. It is the means the moſt vulgar and the moſt obvious; and the moſt likely way of augmenting their fortune, is to ſave and accumulate ſome part of what they acquire, either regularly and annually, or upon ſome extraordinary occaſions. Though the principle of expence, therefore, prevails in almoſt all men

men upon ſome occaſions, and in ſome men upon almoſt all occaſions; yet in the greater part of men, taking the whole courſe of their life at an average, the principle of frugality ſeems not only to predominate, but to predominate very greatly.

With regard to miſconduct, the number of prudent and ſucceſsful undertakings is every where much greater than that of injudicious and unſucceſsful ones. After all our complaints of the frequency of bankruptcies, the unhappy men who fall into this misfortune make but a very ſmall part of the whole number engaged in trade and all other ſorts of buſineſs; not much more perhaps than one in a thouſand. Bankruptcy is perhaps the greateſt and moſt humiliating calamity which can befal an innocent man. The greater part of men, therefore, are ſufficiently careful to avoid it. Some indeed do not avoid it; as ſome do not avoid the gallows.

Great nations are never impoveriſhed by private, though they ſometimes are by public prodigality and miſconduct. The whole, or almoſt the whole, public revenue is in moſt countries employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Such are the people who compoſe a numerous and ſplendid court, a great eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhment, great fleets and armies, who in time of peace produce nothing, and in time of war acquire nothing which can compenſate the expence of

of maintaining them, even while the war lafts. Such people, as they themfelves produce nothing, are all maintained by the produce of other mens labour. When multiplied, therefore, to an unneceffary number, they may in a particular year confume fo great a fhare of this produce, as not to leave a fufficiency for maintaining the productive labourers, who fhould reproduce it next year. The next year's produce, therefore, will be lefs than that of the foregoing; and if the fame diforder fhould continue, that of the third year will be ftill lefs than that of the fecond. Thofe unproductive hands, who fhould be maintained by a part only of the fpare revenue of the people, may confume fo great a fhare of their whole revenue, and thereby oblige fo great a number to encroach upon their capitals, upon the funds deftined for the maintenance of productive labour, that all the frugality and good conduct of individuals may not be able to compenfate the wafte and degradation of produce occafioned by this violent and forced encroachment.

This frugality and good conduct, however, is upon moft occafions, it appears from experience, fufficient to compenfate, not only for private prodigality and mifconduct of individuals, but the public extravagance of government. The uniform, conftant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, the principle from which

which public and national as well as private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progreſs of things toward improvement, in ſpite both of the extravagance of government, and of the greateſt errors of adminiſtration. Like the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently reſtores health and vigour to the conſtitution, in ſpite not only of the diſeaſe, but of the abſurd preſcriptions of the doctor.

A. SMITH.

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DETERMINE THE MERIT OF PROFESSORS IN UNIVERSITIES.

IN countries where church-benefices are the greater part of them very moderate, a chair in a univerſity is generally a better eſtabliſhment than a church-benefice. The univerſities have, in this caſe, the picking and chooſing of their members from all the churchmen of the country, who, in every country, conſtitute by far the moſt numerous claſs of men of letters. Where church benefices, on the contrary, are many of them very conſiderable, the church naturally draws from the univerſities the greater part of their eminent men of letters; who generally find ſome patron who does himſelf honour by procuring them

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church-perferment. In the former ſituation, we are likely to find the univerſities filled with the moſt eminent men of letters that are to be found in the country. In the latter, we are likely to find few eminent men among them; and thoſe few among the youngeſt members of the ſociety, who are likely too to be drained away from it, before they can have acquired experience and knowledge enough to be of much uſe to it. It is obſerved by M. de Voltaire, that Father Porree, a Jeſuit of no great eminence in the republic of letters, was the only profeſſor they had ever had in France whoſe works were worth the reading. In a country which has produced ſo many eminent men of letters, it muſt appear ſomewhat ſingular, that ſcarce one of them ſhould have been a profeſſor in a univerſity. The famous Gaſſendi was, in the beginning of his life, a profeſſor in the univerſity of Aix. Upon the firſt dawning of his genius, it was repreſented to him, that by going into the church he could eaſily find a much more quiet and comfortable ſubſiſtence, as well as a better ſituation for purſuing his ſtudies; and he immediately followed the advice. The obſervation of M. de Voltaire may be applied, I believe, not only to France, but to all other Roman Catholic countries. We very rarely find, in any of them, an eminent man of letters who is a profeſſor in a univerſity, except, perhaps,

in the profeſſions of law and phyſic; profeſſions from which the church is not ſo likely to draw them. After the church of Rome, that of England is by far the richeſt and beſt endowed church in Chriſtendom. In England, accordingly, the church is continually draining the univerſities of all their beſt and ableſt members; and an old college tutor, who is known and diſtinguiſhed in Europe as an eminent man of letters, is as rarely to be found there as in any Roman Catholic country. In Geneva, on the contrary, in the Proteſtant cantons of Switzerland, in the Proteſtant countries of Germany, in Holland, in Scotland, in Sweden, and Denmark, the moſt eminent men of letters whom thoſe countries have produced, have, not all indeed, but the far greater part of them, been profeſſors in univerſities. In thoſe countries the univerſities are continually draining the church of all its moſt eminent men of letters.

A. SMITH.

PROMISES, AND THEIR OBLIGATION.

THE only intelligible reaſon why men ought to keep their promiſes is this, That it is for the advantage of ſociety they ſhould keep them; and if they do not, that, as far as puniſhment will go, they ſhould be made to keep them. It is for the

the advantage of the whole number that the promiſes of each individual ſhould be kept; and, rather than they ſhould not be kept, that ſuch individuals as fail to keep them ſhould be puniſhed. If it be aſked, How this appears? the anſwer is at hand:—Such is the benefit to gain, and miſchief to avoid, by keeping them, as much more than compenſates the miſchief of ſo much puniſhment as is requiſite to oblige men to it. Suppoſe the conſtant and univerſal effect of an obſervance of promiſes were to produce *miſchief*, would it then be mens duty to obſerve them? Would it then be right to make laws, and apply *puniſhment, to oblige* men to obſerve them?—"No, (it may perhaps be replied); but for this "reaſon: Among promiſes, there are ſome that, "as every one allows, are void: A promiſe that "is in itſelf void, cannot, it is true, create any ob-"ligation; but allow the promiſe to be valid, "and it is the promiſe itſelf that creates the obli-"gation, and nothing elſe." The fallacy of this argument it is eaſy to perceive. For what is it then the promiſe depends on for its validity? What is it that being preſent makes it valid? What is it that being wanting makes it void? To acknowledge that any one promiſe may be void, is to acknowledge, that if any other is binding, it is not merely becauſe it is a promiſe. That circumſtance, then, whatever it be, on which the validity

validity of a promife depends, that circumftance, I fay, and not the promife itfelf, muft, it is plain, be the caufe of the obligation which a promife is apt in general to carry with it, and not the intrinfic obligation of promifes upon thofe who make them. Now this other principle that ftill recurs upon us, what other can it be than the principle of utility? the principle which furnifhes us with that reafon, which alone depends not on any higher reafon, but which is itfelf the fole and all-fufficient reafon for every point of practice whatfoever. J. BENTHAM.

PROPERTY.

LAWS and conventions are neceffary in order to unite duties with privileges, and confine juftice to its proper objects. In a ftate of nature, where every thing is common, I owe nothing to thofe I have promifed nothing; I acknowledge nothing to be the property of another, but what is ufelefs to myfelf. In a ftate of fociety the cafe is different, where the rights of each are fixed by law. Each member of the community, in becoming fuch, devotes himfelf to the public from that moment, in fuch a ftate as he then is, with all his powers and abilities; of which abilities his poffeffions make a part. Not that in confequence of this act the poffeffion changes its nature by

changing

changing hands, and becomes actual property in those of the sovereignty; but as the power of the community is incomparably greater than that of an individual, the public possession is in fact more fixed and irrevocable, without being more lawful, at least with regard to foreigners. For every state is, with regard to its members, master of all their possessions by virtue of the social compact; which in a state, serves as the basis of all other rights; but with regard to other powers or states, it is master of them only by the right of prior occupancy, which it derives from individuals.— The right of prior occupancy, although more real than that of the strongest, becomes not an equitable right till after the establishment of property. Every man hath naturally a right to every thing which is necessary for his subsistence; but the positive act by which he is made the proprietor of a certain possession excludes him from the property of any other. His portion being assigned him, he ought to confine himself to that, and hath no longer any right to a community of possession. Hence it is, that the right of prior occupancy, thought but of little force in a state of nature, is so respectable in that of society. The point to which we are chiefly directed in the consideration of this right, rather what belongs to another, than what does not belong to us.—— Is is easy to conceive, how the united and con-

tiguous eſtates of individuals become the territory of the public, and in what manner the right of ſovereignty, extending itſelf from the ſubjects to the lands they occupy, becomes at once both real and perſonal; a circumſtance which lays the poſſeſſors under a ſtate of the greateſt dependence, and makes even their own abilities a ſecurity for their fidelity. This is an advantage which does not appear to have been duly attended to by ſovereigns among the ancients; who, by ſtyling themſelves only Kings of the Perſians, the Scythians, the Macedonians, ſeemed to look on themſelves only as chief of men, rather than as maſters of a country. Modern princes more artfully ſtyle themſelves the Kings of England, France, Spain, &c. and thus, by claiming the territory itſelf, are ſecure of the inhabitants.—What is very ſingular in this alienation is, that the community, in accepting the poſſeſſions of individuals, is ſo far from deſpoiling them thereof, that, on the contrary, it only confirms them in ſuch poſſeſſion, by converting an uſurpation into an actual right, and a bare poſſeſſion into a real property. The poſſeſſors alſo being conſidered as the depoſitories of the public wealth, while their rights are reſpected by all the members of the ſtate, and maintained by all its force againſt a foreign power, they acquire, if I may ſo ſay, by a ceſſion advantageous to the public, and ſtill more ſo to themſelves,

ſelves, every thing they ceded by it: a paradox which is eaſily explained by a diſtinction between the rights which the ſovereign and the proprietor have in the ſame fund.—It may alſo happen, that men may form themſelves into a ſociety before they have any poſſeſſions; and that, acquiring a ſufficient territory for all, they may poſſeſs it in common, or divide it among them either equally, or in ſuch different proportions as may be determined by the ſovereign. Now, in whatſoever manner ſuch acquiſition may be made, the right which each individual has to his own eſtate muſt be always ſubordinate to the right which the community hath over the poſſeſſions of all; for, without this, there would be nothing binding in the ſocial tie, nor any real force in the exerciſe of the ſupreme power.

ROUSSEAU.

THE DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY BY TESTAMENT.

PUFFENDORF has demonſtrated, from the very nature of the right of property, that it extends not beyond the life of the proprietor; but that the moment a man is dead, his eſtate no longer belongs to him. Thus, to preſcribe the conditions according to which he is to diſpoſe of it, is in reality leſs altering his right in appearance than ex-

extending it in fact.—In general, although the institution of the laws, which regulate the power of individuals to dispose of their effects, belongs only to the sovereign, the spirit of the laws, which government ought to follow in their application, is that of father to son, and from relation to relation, so that the estate of a family should go as little out of it and be as little alienated as possible. There is a very sensible reason for this in favour of children, to whom the right of property would be useless, if the father should leave them nothing, and who, besides having often contributed to their father's wealth, are associates with him in his right of property. But there is another reason more distant, though not less important; and this is, that nothing is more fatal to manners and to the republic than the continual shifting of rank and fortune among its members: these changes being the source of a thousand disorders; overturning and confounding every thing: for those who are elevated for one purpose are often qualified only for another; neither those who rise, nor those who fall, being able to adopt the maxims, or possess themselves of the qualifications requisite for their new condition, and still much less to discharge the duties of it.

ROUSSEAU.

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THE ORIGIN OF PROPERTY.

ACCORDING to Mr Locke, "A law is a rule "prefcribed to the people, with the fanction of "fome punifhment or reward, proper to deter-"mine their wills. All laws (according to him) "fuppofe rewards or punifhments attached to the "obfervation or *infraction* of them."

The definition laid down, The *man who* violates, among a polifhed people, a convention not attended with this fanction, is not punifhable: he is however unjuft. But could he be unjuft before *the* eftablifhment of *all* convention, and the formation of a language proper to exprefs injuftice? No: for in that ftate man can have no idea of property, nor confequently of juftice.—Injuftice, therefore, cannot precede the eftablifhment of a convention, a law, and a common intereft. Now *what* does the eftablifhment of laws fuppofe? The union *of men in* fociety, greater or lefs, and the formation of a language proper to communicate a certain number of ideas. Now, if there be favages whofe language does not contain above five or fix founds or cries, the formation of a language muft be the work of feveral centuries. Until that work be completed, men without convention and laws muft live in a ftate of war. That condition is a ftate, it may be faid, of

of misery; and misery being the creator of laws, must force men to accept them. Before the public interest has declared the law of first possession to be held sacred, what can be the plea of a savage inhabitant of a woody district, from which a stronger savage had driven him out? What right have you, he would say, to drive me from my possession? What right have you, says the other, to that possession? Chance, replies the first, led my steps thither: it belongs to me because I inhabit it, and land belongs to the first occupier.— What is that right of the first occupier? replies the other; if chance first led you to this spot, the same chance has given me the force necessary to drive you from it. Which of these two rights deserves the preference? Would you know all the superiority of mine? Look up to heaven, and see the eagle that darts upon the dove: turn thine eyes to the earth, and see the lion that preys upon the stag: look toward the sea, and behold the goldfish devoured by the shark. *All things in* nature show that the weak is a prey to the powerful. Force is the gift of the gods; by that I have a right to possess all that I can seize. Heaven, by giving me these nervous arms, has declared its will. Begone from hence; yield to superior force, or dare the combat. What answer can be given to the discourse of this savage, or with what injustice can he be accused, if the

law

law of firſt occupation be not yet eſtabliſhed ?— Juſtice then ſuppoſes the eſtabliſhment of laws. The obſervance of juſtice ſuppoſes an equilibrium in the power of the inhabitants. It is by a mutual and ſalutary fear that men are made to be juſt to each other. Juſtice is unknown to the ſolitary ſavage. It is at the period that men, by increaſing, are forced to manure the earth, that they perceive the neceſſity of ſecuring to the labourer his haveſt, and the property of the land he cultivates. Before cultivation, it is no wonder that the ſtrongeſt ſhould think he has as much right over a piece of barren ground as the firſt occupier.

HELVETIUS.

PROPHECIES.

THE truth of prophecies can never be proved without the concurrence of three things, which cannot poſſibly happen. Theſe are, that I ſhould in the firſt place be a witneſs to the delivery of the prophecy; next, that I ſhould alſo be a witneſs to the event; laſtly, that it ſhould be clearly demonſtrated to me that ſuch event could not have followed by accident: for though a prophecy were as preciſe, clear, and determinate as an axiom of geometry; yet as the perſpicuity of the prediction, made at random, does not render the

the accomplifhment of it impoffible, that accomplifhment, when it happens, proves nothing in fact concerning the foreknowledge of him who predicted it.

ROUSSEAU.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

ALL prophecies are real miracles; and as fuch only can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretel future events, it would be abfurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a Divine miffion or authority from heaven.

HUME.

THE PRINCIPLES OF PROTESTANTISM.

WHEN the Reformers feparated themfelves from the church of Rome, they accufed it of error; and in order to correct this error at the fountain-head, they interpreted the fcriptures in a different fenfe from what the church had been accuftomed to. When they were afked, On what authority they ventured thus to depart from received doctrines? they anfwered, On their own authority; on that of their reafon. They faid, the meaning of the Scriptures was plain and intelligible to all mankind, as far as they related to

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ſalvation: that every man was a competent judge of doctrines, and might interpret the Bible, which is the rule of faith, according to his own mind: that by this means all would agree as to eſſential points; and as to thoſe on which they would not agree, they muſt be uneſſential.

Here then was private judgment eſtabliſhed as the only interpreter of the Scriptures: Thus was the authority of the church at once rejected, and the religious tenets of individuals left to their own particular juriſdiction. Such are the two fundamental points of the Reformation; to acknowledge the Bible as the rule of belief, and to admit of no other interpreter of its meaning than one's ſelf. Theſe two points combined, form the principle on which the Proteſtants ſeparated from the church of Rome: nor could they do leſs, without being inconſiſtent with themſelves; for what authority of interpretation could they pretend to, after having rejected that of the church?—But it may be aſked, How on ſuch principles the Reformed could ever be united among themſelves? How, every one having his own particular way of thinking, they could form themſelves into a body, and make head againſt the Catholic Church? This it was neceſſary for them to do; and therefore they united with regard to this one point, they acknowledged every one to be a competent judge as far as related to

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himſelf. They tolerated, as in ſuch circumſtances they ought, every interpretation but one, viz. that which prohibited other interpretations. Now this interpretation, the only one they rejected, was that of the Catholics. It was neceſſary for them unanimouſly to proſcribe the Romiſh church, which in its turn equally proſcribed them all. Even the diverſity of their manner of thinking from all others was the common bond of union. They were ſo many little ſtates in league againſt a great power, each loſing nothing of its own independence by their general confederacy.

Thus was the Reformation eſtabliſhed, and thus it ought to be maintained. It is true, that the opinion of the majority may be propoſed to the whole, as the moſt probable manner, or as the moſt authentic. The ſovereign may even reduce it into form, and recommend it to thoſe who are appointed to teach it; becauſe ſome rule and order ought to be obſerved in public inſtructions: and in fact, no perſon's liberty is infringed by it, as none are compelled to be taught againſt their will. But it does not hence follow that individuals are obliged directly to adopt the interpretations thus propoſed to them, or that doctrine which is thus publicly taught. Every one remains, after all, a judge for himſelf, and in that acknowledges no other authority than his own.

Good inſtructions ought leſs to fix the choice

we ought to make, than to qualify us for making ſuch choice. Such is the true ſpirit of the Reformation; ſuch its real foundation; according to which private judgment is left to determine in matters of faith, which are to be deduced from the common ſtandard, *i. e.* the goſpel. Freedom is ſo eſſential alſo to reaſon, that it cannot, if it would, ſubject itſelf to authority. If we infringe ever ſo little on this principle of private judgment, Proteſtantiſm inſtantly falls to the ground.

Now the liberty of interpreting the Scripture, not only includes the right of explaining its ſeveral paſſages, but that of remaining in doubt with regard to ſuch as appear dubious, and alſo that of not pretending to comprehend thoſe which are incomprehenſible. The Proteſtant religion is tolerant from principle; it is eſſentially ſo, as much as it is poſſible for a religion to be; ſince the only tenet it does not tolerate is that of perſecution. ROUSSEAU.

PROVIDENCE, AND A FUTURE STATE.

WHEN we infer any particular cauſe from an effect, we muſt proportion the one to the other; and can never be allowed to aſcribe to the cauſe any qualities but what are exactly ſufficient to produce the effect. If the cauſe, aſſigned for any effect, be not ſufficient to produce it, we

muſt either reject the cauſe, or add to it ſuch qualities as will give it a juſt proportion to the effect. But if we aſcribe to it other qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we indulge the licence of conjecture, and ſuppoſe qualities and energies without reaſon.——The ſame rule holds, whether the cauſe aſſigned be brute unconſcious matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cauſe be known only by the effect, we never ought to aſſign to it any qualities beyond what are preciſely requiſite to produce the effect: nor can we, by any rules of juſt reaſoning, return back from the cauſe, and infer other effects from it beyond thoſe by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely from the ſight of one of Zeuxis's pictures, could know that he was alſo a ſtatuary or architect, and was an artiſt no leſs ſkilful in ſtone and marble than in colours. Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the exiſtence or order of the univerſe; it follows, that they poſſeſs that preciſe degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their workmanſhip; but nothing further can ever be proved. So far as any attribute at preſent appears, ſo far may we conclude theſe attributes to exiſt. The ſuppoſition of further attributes is mere hypotheſis; much more the ſuppoſition, that in diſtant periods of time and place, there has been, or will be, a more magni-

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ficent diſplay of theſe attributes, and a ſcheme of adminiſtration more ſuitable to ſuch imaginary virtues.—The Divinity may poſſibly poſſeſs attributes which we have never ſeen exerted; may be governed by principles of action which we cannot diſcover to be ſatisfied. All this may be allowed. But ſtill this is mere poſſibility and *hypotheſis*. If there be any marks of a diſtributive juſtice in the world, we may conclude from thence, that ſince juſtice here exerts itſelf, it is ſatisfied. If there be no marks of a diſtributive juſtice iu the world, we have no reaſon to aſcribe juſtice, in our ſenſe of it, to the gods. If it be ſaid, *that the juſtice of the gods at preſent exerts itſelf in part, but not in its full extent*; I anſwer, that we have no reaſon to give it any particular extent, but only ſo far as we ſee it at preſent exert itſelf.

In works of human art and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cauſe, and, returning back from the cauſe, to form new inferences concerning the effect, and examine the alterations which it has probably undergone, or may ſtill undergo. But what is the foundation of this manner of reaſoning? Plainly this: That man is a being, whom we know by experience, whoſe motives and deſigns we are acquainted with, and whoſe projects and inclinations have a certain connection and coherence according to the laws

which nature has eſtabliſhed for the government of ſuch a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work hath proceeded from the ſkill and induſtry of man; as we are otherwiſe acquainted with the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him; and theſe inferences will all be founded in experience and obſervation. But did we know man only from the ſingle work or production which we examine, it were impoſſible for us to argue in this manner; becauſe our knowledge of all the qualities which we aſcribe to him, being in that caſe derived from the production, it is impoſſible they could point to any thing further, or be the foundation of any new inferences.

If we ſaw upon the ſea-ſhore the print of one human foot, we ſhould conclude from our other experience, that there was probably another foot, which alſo left its impreſſion, though effaced by time or other accident. Here we mount from the effect to the cauſe; and deſcending again from the cauſe, infer alterations in the effect: but this is not a continuation of the ſame ſimple chain of reaſoning. We comprehend in this caſe a hundred other experiences and obſervations concerning the uſual figure and members of that ſpecies of animal; without which this method of argument would be fallacious and ſophiſtical.

ftical.—The cafe is not the fame with our rea-fonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a fingle being in the univerfe, nor comprehended under any fpecies or genus, from whofe experienced attributes or qualities we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the univerfe fhows wifdom and goodnefs, we infer wifdom and goodnefs. As it fhows a particular degree of thefe perfections, we infer a particular degree of them, precifely adapted to the effect which we examine.—The great fource of our miftake in all our reafonings on the works of nature is, that we tacitly confider ourfelves as in the place of the Supreme Being; and conclude, that he will, on every occafion, obferve the fame conduct which we ourfelves, in his fituation, would have embraced as reafonable and eligible. But befides that the ordinary courfe of nature may convince us, that almoft every thing is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours; befides this, it muft evidently appear contrary to all rule of analogy to reafon from the intentions and projects of men, to thofe of a Being fo different and fo much fuperior, who bears much lefs analogy to any other being in the univerfe than the fun to a waxen taper; and who difcovers himfelf only by fome faint traces or

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outlines, beyond which we have no authority to aſcribe to him any attribute or perfection.

It may, indeed, be matter of doubt whether it be poſſible for a cauſe to be known only by its effect (as we have all along ſuppoſed), or to be of ſo ſingular or particular a nature as to have no parallel and no ſimilarity with any other cauſe or object that has ever fallen under our obſervation. It is only when two ſpecies of objects are found to be conſtantly conjoined that we can infer the one from the other; and were an effect preſented which was entirely ſingular, and could not be comprehended under any known ſpecies, we could form no conjecture or inference at all concerning its cauſe. The univerſe is ſuch an effect: it is quite ſingular and unparalleled, and ſuppoſed to be the proof of a Deity; a cauſe no leſs ſingular and unparalleled. If experience and obſervation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides in inferences of this nature; both the effect and cauſe muſt bear a *ſimilarity* and reſemblance to other effects and cauſes which we know, and which we have found, in many inſtances, to be conjoined with each other.

HUME.

THE

THE PROVINCES OF ABSOLUTE MONARCHIES BETTER TREATED THAN THOSE OF FREE STATES.

IT may eaſily be obſerved, that although free governments have been commonly the moſt happy for thoſe who partake of their freedom; yet are they the moſt ruinous and oppreſſive to their provinces. When a monarch extends his dominions by conqueſt, he ſoon learns to conſider his old and his new ſubjects as on the ſame footing; becauſe, in reality, all his ſubjects are to him the ſame, except the few friends and favourites with whom he is perſonally acquainted. He does not, therefore, make any diſtinction between them in his *general* laws; and, at the ſame time, is careful to prevent all *particular* acts of oppreſſion on the one as well as on the other. But a free ſtate neceſſarily makes a great diſtinction; and muſt always do ſo, till men learn to love their neighbours as well as themſelves. The conquerors in ſuch a government are all legiſlators; and will be ſure ſo to contrive matters, by reſtrictions of trade, and by taxes, as to draw ſome private as well as public advantages from their conqueſts. Provincial governors have alſo a better chance in a republic to eſcape with their plunder by means of bribery or intrigue; and their fellow-citizens, who

who find their own ſtate to be enriched by the ſpoils of the ſubject-provinces, will be the more inclined to tolerate ſuch abuſes. Not to mention, that it is a neceſſary precaution in a free ſtate to change the governors frequently; which obliges thoſe temporary tyrants to be more expeditious and rapacious, that they may accumulate ſufficient wealth before they give place to their ſucceſſors. What cruel tyrants were the Romans over the world during the time of their commonwealth! It is true, they had laws to prevent oppreſſion in their provincial magiſtrates: But Cicero informs us, that the Romans could not better conſult the intereſt of the provinces than by repealing thoſe very laws. For, in that caſe, ſays he, our magiſtrates having entire impunity, would plunder no more than would ſatisfy their own rapacioufneſs; whereas, at preſent, they muſt alſo ſatisfy that of their judges, and of all the great men of Rome, of whoſe protection they ſtand in need. Who can read of the cruelties and oppreſſions of *Verres* without horror and aſtoniſhment? And who is not touched with indignation to hear, that, after Cicero had exhauſted on that abandoned criminal all the thunders of his eloquence, and had prevailed ſo far as to get him condemned to the utmoſt extent of the laws, yet that cruel tyrant lived peaceably to old age, in opulence and eaſe; and thirty years afterwards was put into the

the proſcription of Mark Anthony, on account of his exorbitant wealth, where he fell with Cicero himſelf, and all the moſt virtuous men of Rome? After the diſſolution of the commonwealth, the Roman yoke became eaſier upon the provinces, as Tacitus informs us; and it may be obſerved, that many of the worſt emperors, Domitian, for inſtance, were careful to prevent all oppreſſion on the provinces. In Tiberius's time, Gaul was eſteemed richer than Italy itſelf. It does not appear that, during the whole time of the Roman monarchy, the empire became leſs rich or populous in any of its provinces; though indeed its valour and military diſcipline were always upon the decline. The oppreſſion and tyranny of the Carthaginians over their ſubject ſtates in Africa went ſo far, as we learn from Polybius, that, not content with exacting the half of all the produce of the ground, which of itſelf was a very high rent, they alſo loaded them with many other taxes. If we paſs from ancient to modern times, we ſhall ſtill find the obſervation to hold, The provinces of abſolute monarchies are always better treated than thoſe of free ſtates. Compare the *Pais Conquis* of France with Ireland, and you will be convinced of this truth; though this latter kingdom, being in a good meaſure peopled from England, poſſeſſes ſo many rights and privileges, as ſhould naturally make it challenge better treat-

ment

ment than that of a conquered province. Corſica, alſo, is an obvious inſtance to the ſame purpoſe.

HUME.

PRUDENCE.

THE prudence ſo much boaſted of, and ſometimes ſo uſeful to individuals, is not, with reſpect to a whole nation, a virtue of ſuch great utility as is imagined. Of all the gifts heaven could beſtow upon a people, the moſt fatal, without diſpute, would be that of prudence, if it was rendered common to all the citizens. What, in fact, is the prudent man?—He who keeps evils at a diſtance; an image ſtrong enough for what balances in his mind the preſence of a pleaſure that would be fatal to him. Now, let us ſuppoſe that prudence was to deſcend on all the heads that compoſe a nation, where would be found the man who, for fivepence a-day, would, in battle, confront death, fatigue, and diſeaſes? What woman would preſent herſelf at the altar of Hymen, to expoſe herſelf to the trouble of child-bearing, to the pain and danger of delivery, to the humours and contradiction of a huſband, and to the vexations occaſioned by the death or ill-conduct of children? What man, in conſequence of the principles of his religion, would not deſpiſe the fleeting pleaſures of this world, and entirely de-

voting himſelf to the care of his ſalvation, ſeek only, in an auſtere life, the means of increaſing the felicity that is to be the reward of ſancti-ty? It is, then, to imprudence that poſterity owes its exiſtence. It is the preſence or proſpect of pleaſure, its all-powerful view, that braves diſtant misfortune, and deſtroys foreſight; it is, there-fore, to imprudence and folly, that heaven attaches the preſervation of empires, and the duration of the world.

Great talents and a prudent conduct are ſeldom united in the ſame perſon. Great abilities always ſuppoſe ſtrong paſſions, which produce a thou-ſand irregularities. On the contrary, good conduct is commonly the effect of the abſence of the paſ-ſions, and conſequently the appendage of mode-rate abilities; and if ſome ſingular concurrence of circumſtances have ſometimes united them in the ſame man, yet they are very ſeldom blended together.

HELVETIUS.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THE happy age is that in which a man is the dupe of his friends and his miſtreſſes. Wo to him whoſe prudence is not the effect of experi-ence! A premature diſtruſt is the certain ſign of a depraved heart and an unhappy temper. Who

knows whether he is not the moſt ſenſeleſs of all mankind, who, that he may not be the dupe of his friends, expoſes *himſelf* to the puniſhment of perpetual diſtruſt?

HELVETIUS.

NO NECESSARY CONNECTION BETWEEN PUBLIC SPIRIT AND PRIVATE VIRTUES.

GOOD laws may beget order and moderation in the government, where the manners and cuſtoms have inſtilled little humanity and juſtice into the tempers of men. The moſt illuſtrious period of the Roman hiſtory, conſidered in a political view, is that between the beginning of the firſt and end of the laſt Punic war; the due balance between the nobility and people being then fixed by the conteſt of the tribunes, and not being yet loſt by the extent of conqueſts. Yet at this very time, the horrid practice of *poiſoning* was ſo common, that during part of a ſeaſon a prætor puniſhed capitally for this crime above three thouſand perſons in a part of Italy; and found informations of this kind ſtill multiplying upon him. There is a ſimilar, rather a worſe inſtance, in the more early times of the commonwealth. So depraved in private life were that people, whom in their hiſtories we ſo much admire.

mire. It ſeems they were really more virtuous during the time of the two *triumvirates*; when they were tearing their common country to pieces, and ſpreading ſlaughter and deſolation over the face of the earth merely for the choice of tyrants.

HUME.

PUBLIC WORKS, AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, HOW TO BE MAINTAINED.

ONE of the duties of the ſovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and maintaining thoſe *public* *inſtitutions* and thoſe public works, which, though they may be in the *higheſt degree* advantageous to a great ſociety, are, however, of ſuch a nature, that the profit could never repay the expence to any individual, or ſmall number of individuals; and which it therefore cannot be expected *that* any individual, or ſmall number of *individuals, ſhould* erect *or maintain*. The performance of this duty requires, too, very different degrees of expence in the different periods of ſociety.

After the public inſtitutions and public works neceſſary for the defence of the ſociety, and for the adminiſtration of juſtice, the other works and inſtitutions of this kind are chiefly thoſe for facilitating the commerce of the ſociety, and thoſe for

promoting the inſtruction of the people. The inſtitutions for inſtruction are of two kinds; thoſe for the education of the youth, and thoſe for the inſtruction of people of all ages.

A. SMITH.

THE POWER OF PUNISHMENTS.

EXPERIENCE ſhows, that in countries remarkable for the *lenity of their laws*, the ſpirit of the inhabitants is as much affected by ſlight penalties as in other countries by ſeverer puniſhments.

If an inconveniency or abuſe ariſes in the ſtate, a violent government endeavours ſuddenly to redreſs it; and inſtead of putting the old laws in execution, it eſtabliſhes ſome cruel puniſhment, which inſtantly puts a ſtop to the evil. But the ſpring of government hereby loſes its elaſticity: the imagination grows accuſtomed to the ſevere as well as to the milder puniſhment; and as the fear of the latter diminiſhes, *they are ſoon obliged* in every caſe to have recourſe to the former. Robberies on the highway were grown common in ſome countries: in order to remedy this evil, they invented the puniſhment of breaking upon the wheel; the terror of which put a ſtop for a while to this miſchievous practice, but ſoon after robberies on the highways became as common as ever.

Man-

Mankind muſt not be governed with too much ſeverity; we ought to make a prudent uſe of the means which nature has given us to conduct them. If we inquire into the cauſe of all human corruptions, we ſhall find that they proceed from the impunity of criminals, and not from the moderation of puniſhments.

Let us *follow* nature, who has given ſhame to man for his ſcourge; and let the heavieſt part of the puniſhment be the infamy attending it.

But if there be ſome countries where ſhame is not a conſequence of puniſhment, this muſt be owing to tyranny, which has inflicted the ſame penalties on honeſt men and villains.—And if there are others where men are deterred *only by* cruel puniſhments, we may be ſure that this muſt, in a great meaſure, ariſe from the violence of the government which has uſed ſuch penalties for ſlight tranſgreſſions.—It often happens that a legiſlator, deſirous of remedying an abuſe, thinks of nothing elſe; his eyes are open only to this object, and ſhut to its inconveniences. When the abuſe is redreſſed, you ſee only the ſeverity of the legiſlator: yet there remains an evil in the ſtate that has ſprung from this ſeverity; the minds of the people are corrupted, and become habituated to deſpotiſm.

There are two ſorts of corruption: one when the people do not obſerve the laws; the other

when they are corrupted by the laws: an incurable evil, becaufe it is in the very remedy itfelf.

MONTESQUIEU.

PUNISHMENTS.

AMONG a people hardly yet emerged from barbarity, punifhments fhould be moft fevere as ftrong impreffions are required; but in proportion as the minds of men become foftened by their intercourfe in fociety, the feverity of punifhments fhould be diminifhed, if it be intended that the neceffary relation between the object and the fenfation fhould be maintained.—That a punifhment may not be an act of violence of one, or of many, againft a private member of fociety, it fhould be public, immediate, and neceffary; the leaft poffible in the cafe given; proportioned to the crime, and determined by the laws.

BECCARIA.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS.

THE frequency of executions is always a fign of the weaknefs or indolence of government. There is no malefactor who might not be made good for fomething; nor ought any perfon to be put to death, even by way of example, unlefs fuch as could not be preferved without endangering

ing the community. In a well-governed ſtate there are but few executions; not becauſe there are many pardoned, but becauſe there are few criminals: Whereas, when a ſtate is on the decline, the multiplicity of crimes occaſions their impunity. Under the Roman republic, neither the ſenate nor the conſuls ever attempted to grant *pardons: even the people never did this, although they ſometimes recalled their own* ſentence. The frequency of pardons indicates, that in a ſhort time crimes will not ſtand in need of them; and every one may ſee the conſequence of ſuch conduct. ROUSSEAU.

THE INTENT OF PUNISHMENTS.

THE intent of puniſhments is not to torment a ſenſible being, nor to undo a crime already committed. Is it poſſible that torments and uſeleſs *cruelty, the inſtrument of furious* fanaticiſm, or of impotency of tyrants, can be authoriſed by a political body; which, ſo far from being influenced by paſſion, ſhould be the cool moderator of the paſſions of individuals? Can the groans of a tortured wretch recal the time paſt, or reverſe the crime he has committed?—The end of puniſhment, therefore, is no other than to prevent the criminal from doing further injury to ſociety, and to prevent others from commiting the like offence,

offence. Such puniſhments, therefore, and ſuch a mode of inflicting them, ought to be choſen, as will make the ſtrongeſt and moſt laſting impreſſions on the minds of others, with the leaſt torment to the body of the criminal.

BECCARIA.

IMMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS.

THE more immediately after the commiſſion of a crime a puniſhment is inflicted, the more juſt and uſeful it will be. It will be more juſt, becauſe it ſpares the criminal the cruel and ſuperfluous torment of uncertainty, which increaſes in proportion to the ſtrength of his imagination and the ſenſe of his weakneſs; and becauſe the privation of liberty, being a puniſhment, ought to be inflicted before condemnation but for as ſhort a time as poſſible. The time ſhould be determined by the neceſſary preparation for the trial, and the right of priority in the oldeſt priſoners. The impriſonment ſhould be attended with as little ſeverity as poſſible. The confinement ought not to be cloſer than is requiſite to prevent his flight or his concealing the proofs of his crime, and the trial ſhould be conducted with all poſſible expedition. Can there be a more cruel contraſt than that between the indolence of a judge and the painful anxiety of the accuſed; the comforts and

and pleaſures of an inſenſible magiſtrate, and the filth and miſery of the priſoner? The degree of the puniſhment, and the conſequences of a crime, ought to be ſo contrived, as to have the greateſt poſſible effect on others, with the leaſt poſſible pain to the delinquent.——An immediate puniſhment is more uſeful; becauſe the ſmaller the interval of time between the puniſhment and the crime, the ſtronger and more laſting will be the aſſociation of the two ideas, crime and puniſhment; ſo that they may be conſidered, one as the cauſe, and the other as the unavoidable and neceſſary effect.——It is then of the greateſt importance, that the puniſhment ſhould ſucceed the crime as immediately as poſſible, if we intend that, in the rude minds of the multitude, the ſeducing picture of the advantage ariſing from the crime ſhould inſtantly awake the attendant idea of puniſhment. Delaying the puniſhment ſerves only to ſeparate theſe two ideas; and thus affects the minds of the ſpectators rather as being a terrible ſight, than the neceſſary conſequence of a crime; the horror of which ſhould contribute to heighten the idea of puniſhment.——There is another excellent method of ſtrengthening this important connection between the ideas of crime and puniſhment; that is, to make the puniſhment as analogous as poſſible to the nature of the crime; in order that the puniſhment may lead the mind to con-

confider the crime in a different point of view from that in which it was placed by the flattering idea of promifed advantages. BECCARIA.

INFAMOUS PUNISHMENTS.

THE punifhment of infamy is a mark of the public difapprobation. This is not always in the power of the laws. It is neceffary that the infamy inflicted by the laws fhould be the fame with that which refults from the relations of things, from univerfal morality, or from that particular fyftem adopted by the nation and the laws which governs the opinion of the vulgar. If, on the contrary, one be different from the other, either the laws will no longer be refpected, or the received notions of morality and probity will vanifh; which are always too weak to refift the force of example. If we declare thofe actions infamous which are in themfelves indifferent, we leffen the infamy of thofe which are really infamous. The punifhment of infamy is properly adapted to thofe injuries which affect the honour of the citizens in any government: but it fhould not be too frequently inflicted, for the power of opinion grows weaker by repetition; nor fhould it be inflicted on a number of perfons at the fame time, for the infamy of many refolves itfelf into the infamy of none. BECCARIA.

MILD

MILD PUNISHMEMTS.

CRIMES are more effectually prevented by the certainty than the ſeverity of puniſhment. The certainty of a ſmall puniſhment will make a ſtronger impreſſion than the fear of one more ſevere, if attended with the hopes of eſcaping; for it is the nature of mankind to be terrified at the approach of the ſmalleſt inevitable evil, whilſt hope, the beſt gift of heaven, hath the power of diſpelling the apprehenſion of a greater; eſpecially if ſupported by examples of impunity, which weakneſs or avarice too frequently afford.—— If puniſhments be very ſevere, men are naturally led to the perpetration of other crimes, to avoid the puniſhment due to the firſt.—— In proportion as puniſhments become more cruel, the minds of men, as a fluid riſes to the ſame height with that which ſurrounds it, grow hardened and inſenſible; and the force of the paſſions ſtill continuing, in the ſpace of an hundred years the wheel terrifies no more than formerly the priſon. That a puniſhment may produce the effect required, it is ſufficient that the evil it occaſions ſhould exceed the good expected from the crime; including in the calculation the certainty of the puniſhment and the privation of the expected advantage. All ſeverity beyond this is ſuperfluous, and therefore

ſore tyrannical.——Men regulate their conduct by the repeated impreſſion of evils they know, and not by thoſe with which they are unacquainted. Let us, for example, ſuppoſe two nations, in one of which the greateſt puniſhment is perpetual ſlavery, and in the other the wheel. Both will inſpire the ſame degree of terror; and there can be no reaſons for increaſing the puniſhments of the firſt, which are not equally valid for augmenting thoſe of the ſecond to more laſting and ingenious modes of tormenting.—The moſt artful contrivance of puniſhments can never eſtabliſh an exact proportion between the crime and the puniſhment; the human frame can only ſuffer to a certain degree, beyond which it is impoſſible to proceed, be the enormity of the crime ever ſo great. Severe puniſhments alſo occaſion impunity. Human nature is limited no leſs in evil than in good. Exceſſive barbarity can never be more than temporary; it being impoſſible that it ſhould be ſupported by a permanent *ſyſtem of legiſlation*; for if the laws be too cruel they muſt be altered, or anarchy and impunity will ſucceed.

BECCARIA.

PROPORTION BETWEEN PUNISHMENTS AND OFFENCES.

THE ſeveral circumſtances and rules which, in eſtabliſhing the proportion betwixt puniſhments and offences, are to be attended to, ſeem to be as follows:

I. *On the part of the offence:*

1. The profit of the offence;
2. The miſchief of the offence;
3. The profit and miſchief of other greater or leſſer offences, of different ſorts, which the offender may have to chooſe out of;
4. The profit and miſchief of other offences, of the ſame ſort, which the ſame offender may probably have been guilty of already.

II. *On the part of the puniſhment:*

5. The magnitude of the puniſhment, compoſed of its intenſity and duration;
6. The deficiency of the puniſhment in point of certainty;
7. The deficiency of the puniſhment in point of proximity;
8. The quality of the puniſhment;
9. The accidental advantage in point of qua-

lity of a puniſhment, not ſtrictly needed in point of quantity;

10. The uſe of a puniſhment of a particular quality, in the character of a moral leſſon.

III. *On the part of the offender:*

11. The reſponſibility of the claſs of perſons in a way to offend;

12. The ſenſibility of each particular offender;

13. The particular merits or uſeful qualities of any particular offender, in caſe of a puniſhment which might deprive the community of the benefit of them;

14. The multitude of offenders on any particular occaſion.

IV. *On the part of the public*, at any particular conjuncture:

15. The inclinations of the people, for or againſt any quantity or mode of puniſhment;

16. The inclinations of foreign powers.

V. *On the part of the law;* that is, of the public for a continuance:

17. The neceſſity of making ſmall ſacrifices, in point of proportionality, for the ſake of ſimplicity.

There are ſome, perhaps, who, at firſt ſight, may look upon the nicety employed in the adjuſtment

juſtment of ſuch rules, as ſo much labour loſt: for groſs ignorance, they will ſay, never troubles itſelf about laws, and paſſion does not calculate. But the evil of ignorance admits of cure: and as to the propoſition that paſſion does not calculate, this, like moſt of theſe very general and oracular propoſitions, is not [illegible]. When matters of ſuch importance [illegible] pain and pleaſure are at ſtake, and there in the higheſt degree (the only matters in ſhort that can be of importance), who is there that does not calculate? Men calculate, ſome with leſs exactneſs indeed, ſome with more: but all men calculate. I would not ſay, that even a madman does not calculate. Paſſion calculates, more or leſs, in every man: in different men, according to the warmth or coolneſs of their diſpoſitions; according to the firmneſs or irritability of their minds; according to the nature of the motives by which they are acted on. Happily, of all paſſions, that is the moſt given to calculation, from the exceſſes of which, by reaſon of its ſtrength, conſtancy, and univerſality, ſociety has moſt to apprehend, I mean that which correſponds to the motive of pecuniary intereſt: ſo that theſe niceties, if ſuch they are to be called, have the beſt chance of being efficacious, where efficacy is of the moſt importance.

J. BENTHAM.

OBJECTS OF PUNISHMENT.

THE general object of all laws is to prevent mischief, when it is worth while: and in that case there are four subordinate designs or objects, which, in the course of his endeavours to compass, as far as may be, that one general object, a legislator, whose views are governed by the principle of utility, comes naturally to propose to himself.

1. His first, most extensive, and most eligible object, is to prevent, in as far as it is possible, and worth while, all sorts of offences whatsoever; in other words, so to manage, that no offence whatsoever may be committed.

2. But if a man must needs commit an offence of some kind or other, the next object is to induce him to commit an offence less mischievous, rather than one more mischievous: in other words, to choose always the least mischievous, of two offences that will either of them suit his purpose.

3. When a man has resolved upon a particular offence, the next object is to dispose him to do no more mischief than is necessary to his purpose: in other words, to do as little mischief as is consistent with the benefit he has in view.

4. The last object is, whatever the mischief be, which it is proposed to prevent, to prevent it at as cheap a rate as possible. J. BENTHAM.

R

R.

REASON.

OF all the words in our language the meaning of the word *reason* is the most ambiguous. Sometimes it is taken for that fitness in subjects to one another which is natural and independent on will and pleasure; as when we say, that such or such a thing is agreeable or contrary to the reason of things. Sometimes it is taken for human capacity and comprehension; as in that trite observation, That many things are *above* our reason which are *not contrary* to our reason: for the meaning of that sentence must be, if it has any meaning at all, that there are many things which we have no capacity to comprehend. And this indeed every man, who reflects ever so little upon human nature, must be fully convinced of; for

we can no more argue upon ſuch ſubjects, than we can deſcribe objects which are confeſſedly out of ſight. Sometimes the word *reaſon* is taken for the cauſe or inducement which prevailed upon us to act after this or that manner rather than any other; as when we ſay, This was my reaſon for acting thus or thus. Sometimes it ſignifies the argument by which we prove any truth or detect any falſehood; as we ſay, a thing muſt be true or falſe for this or that reaſon. Sometimes it ſignifies the human intellect or underſtanding; which is that faculty of the mind by which it perceives objects ſuitable to it, and which may be communicated to it by various means. Sometimes by reaſon we mean the moral ſenſe, moral virtue in general, or more particularly the virtue of juſtice; as when we ſay, it is contrary to reaſon to make one law for ourſelves, and another for other people: and thus we call a man good, who is governed more by reaſon than appetite and paſſion. And ſometimes it is taken for the power of judging or drawing a concluſion from premiſes; which is the greateſt mean by which we arrive at knowledge. The difference between the knowledge of God and of his intelligent creatures is, that he knows and ſees all things, with all their poſſible combinations and circumſtances, by intuition at one view: whereas we come to our knowledge by ſlow degrees, and after many deductions

tions of one thing from another. But as all good things come from God, we could not poſſibly have any knowledge at all, unleſs he had been pleaſed to communicate to us ſome portion of his own divine knowledge, and made us to perceive and ſee by intuition, and at the firſt view, ſome certain truths that we call Axioms, Data, or Self-evident Principles; which by the uſe of our reaſon or faculty of comparing and judging ſhould lead us on to other truths, and raiſe us ſtep by ſtep to larger views, and more extenſive knowledge. This is the moſt proper uſe of the word Reaſon; and this includes the intellectual, the moral, and the diſcuſſive powers of the mind: the two former as certain principles; the latter as the power of comparing objects which are thus preſented to us with each other, and thereby finding out wherein they agree or diſagree. This is what we commonly call reaſoning or exerciſing our reaſon. This is the characteriſtic of human nature; this diſtinguiſhes man from all the other animals of the earth, and makes him wiſer than the beaſts that periſh. ROBERTSON.

FAITH AND REASON.

I FIND every ſect, as far as reaſon will help them, make uſe of it gladly: and where it fails them, they cry out, it is matter of faith, and above

above reaſon. And I do not ſee how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a gainſayer who makes uſe of the ſame plea, without ſetting down ſtrict boundaries between faith and reaſon; which ought to be the firſt point eſtabliſhed in all queſtions where faith has any thing to do.

Reaſon, therefore, here, as contradiſtinguiſhed to faith, I take to be the diſcovery of the certainty or probability of ſuch propoſitions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made from ſuch ideas, which it has got by the uſe of its natural faculties, viz. by ſenſation or reflection.

Faith, on the other ſide, is the aſſent to any propoſition, not thus made out by the deductions of reaſon, but upon the credit of the propoſer, as coming from God, in ſome extraordinary way of communication. This way of diſcovering truths to men we call Revelation.

Firſt, then, I ſay, that no man inſpired by God can by any revelation communicate to others any new ſimple ideas which they had not before from ſenſation and reflection. For whatſoever impreſſions he himſelf may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new ſimple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words, or any other ſigns. Becauſe words, by their immediate operations on us, cauſe no other ideas but of their natural ſounds: and it is by the cuſtom of uſing them for ſigns that they excite and

and revive in our minds latent ideas; but yet only fuch ideas as were there before. For words feen or heard, recall to our thoughts thofe ideas only which to us they have been wont to be figns of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new and formerly unknown fimple ideas. The fame holds in all other figns, which cannot fignify to us things of which we have before never had any idea at all.

Thus, whatever things were difcovered by the Apoftle Paul, when he was wrapt up into the third heaven, whatever new ideas his mind there received, all the defcription he can make to others of that place is only this, That there are fuch things "as eye hath not feen, nor ear heard, nor "hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive." And fuppofing God fhould difcover to any one, fupernaturally, a fpecies of creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is poffible there may be fuch, nobody can deny) which had fix fenfes, and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that fixth fenfe, he could no more, by words, produce in the minds of other men thofe ideas imprinted by that fixth fenfe, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour by the founds of words into a man, who, having the other four fenfes perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth of feeing. For our fimple ideas then, which are the foundation and fole mat-

matter of all our notions and knowledge, we muſt depend wholly on our reaſon, I mean our natural faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation; I ſay traditional revelation, in diſtinction to original revelation. By the one, I mean that firſt impreſſion which is made immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot ſet any bounds; and by the other, thoſe impreſſions delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another.

Secondly, I ſay, that the ſame truths may be diſcovered, and conveyed down from revelation, which are diſcoverable to us by reaſon, and by thoſe ideas we naturally may have. So God might, by revelation, diſcover the truth of any propoſition in Euclid; as well as men, by the natural uſe of their faculties, come to make the diſcovery themſelves. In all things of this kind, there is little need or uſe of revelation; God having furniſhed us with natural and ſurer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatſoever truth we come to the clear diſcovery of from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be more certain to us, than thoſe which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation. For the knowledge we have, that this revelation came at firſt from God, can never be ſo ſure, as the know-

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ledge we have from the clear and diſtinct perception of the agreement or diſagreement of our own ideas; *v. g.* if it were revealed ſome ages ſince, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might aſſent to the truth of that propoſition, upon the credit of the tradition, that it was revealed; but that would never amount to ſo great a certainty, as the knowledge of it, upon the comparing and meaſuring my own ideas of two right angles and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact, knowable by our ſenſes; *v. g.* the hiſtory of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings, which had their original from revelation; and yet nobody, I think, will ſay he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah that ſaw it; or as he himſelf would have had, had he then been alive, and ſeen it. For he has no greater an aſſurance than that of his ſenſes, that it is written in the book ſuppoſed written by Moſes inſpired: but he has not ſo great an aſſurance that Moſes wrote that book, as if he had ſeen Moſes write it. So that the aſſurance of its being a revelation is leſs ſtill than the aſſurance of his ſenſes. LOCKE.

REASON AND FAITH NOT OPPOSITE.

THERE is a uſe of the word reaſon, wherein it is oppoſed to faith; which, though it be in itſelf

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a very improper way of ſpeaking, yet common uſe has ſo authoriſed it, that it would be folly either to oppoſe or hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not be amiſs to take notice, that however faith may be oppoſed to reaſon, faith is nothing but a firm aſſent of the mind: which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reaſon; and ſo cannot be oppoſite to it. He that believes without having any reaſon for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither ſeeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him uſe thoſe diſcerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of miſtake and error. He that does not this to the beſt of his power, however he ſometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckineſs of the accident will excuſe the irregularity of his proceeding. This, at leaſt, is certain, that he muſt be accountable for whatever miſtakes he runs into: whereas he that makes uſe of the light and faculties God has given him, and ſeeks ſincerely to diſcover truth by thoſe helps and abilities he has, may have this ſatisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that, though he ſhould miſs truth, he will not miſs the reward of it: for he governs his aſſent right, and places it as it ſhould, who, in any caſe and matter whatſoever, believes or diſbelieves according as reaſon

directs him. He that doth otherwiſe tranſgreſſes againſt his own light; and miſuſes thoſe faculties which were given him to no other end, but to ſearch and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability. LOCKE.

NATURE AND REASON SUFFICIENT TO TEACH US MORALITY AND THE TRUE WORSHIP OF THE DEITY.

WHAT purity of morals, what ſyſtem of faith uſeful to man, or honourable to the Creator, can we deduce from any poſitive doctrines, that we cannot deduce as well without them from a good uſe of our natural faculties? Let any one ſhow me what can be added, either for the glory of God, the good of ſociety, or my own advantage, to the obligations we are laid under by nature; let him ſhow me what virtue can be produced from any new worſhip which is not the conſequence of natural religion. The moſt ſublime ideas of the Deity are inculcated by reaſon alone. Take a view of the works of nature, liſten to the voice within, and then tell me what God hath omitted to ſay to our ſight, our conſcience, our underſtandings? Where are the men who can tell us more of him than he thus tells us of himſelf? Their revelations only debaſe the Deity, in aſcribing to him human paſſions. So

far from giving us enlightened notions of the Deity, their particular tenets, in my opinion, give us the moſt obſcure and confuſed ideas. To the inconceivable myſteries by which the Supreme Being is hid from our view, they add the moſt abſurd contradictions. They ſerve to make mankind proud, perſecuting, and cruel: inſtead of eſtabliſhing peace on earth, they bring fire and ſword. I aſk myſelf, To what good purpoſe tends all this? without *being able to reſolve the* queſtion. *Artificial* religion preſents to my view only the wickedneſs and miſeries of mankind. It is ſaid, indeed, that revelation is neceſſary to teach mankind the manner in which God would be ſerved: As a proof of this, they bring *the diverſity of whimſical modes of worſhip which* prevail in the world; and that without remarking, that this very diverſity ariſes from the whim of adopting revelations. Ever ſince men have taken it into their heads to make the Deity ſpeak, every people make him ſpeak in their own way, and ſay *what they* like beſt. Had *they liſtened only* to what the Deity hath ſaid in their hearts, there would have been but one religion on earth. It may be ſaid, that it is neceſſary that the worſhip of God ſhould be uniform; it may be proper: but is this a point ſo very important, that the whole apparatus of divine power was neceſſary to eſtabliſh it? Let us not confound the ceremonials of religion with religion

ligion itſelf. The worſhip of God demands that of the heart; and this, when it is ſincere, is ever uniform. Men muſt entertain very ridiculous notions of the Deity indeed, if they imagine he can intereſt himſelf in the dreſs of a prieſt, in the order of the words he pronounces, or in the ceremonies of the altar. God requires to be worſhipped in ſpirit and in truth: this is a duty incumbent on men of all religions and countries. With regard to exterior forms, it is merely an affair of government; the adminiſtration of which, ſurely, requires not the aid of revelation.

ROUSSEAU.

GENERAL REASONINGS AND PARTICULAR DELIBERATIONS, AND THEIR DIFFERENCE.

GENERAL reaſonings ſeem intricate, merely becauſe they are general: nor is it eaſy for the bulk of mankind to diſtinguiſh, in a great number of particulars, that common circumſtance in which they all agree, or to extract it pure and unmixed from the other ſuperfluous circumſtances. Every judgment or concluſion, with them, is particular. They cannot enlarge their view to thoſe univerſal propoſitions, which comprehend under them an infinite number of individuals, and include a whole ſcience in a ſingle theorem. Their

eye is confounded with ſuch an extenſive proſpect; and the concluſions derived from it, even though clearly expreſſed, ſeem intricate and obſcure. But however intricate they may ſeem, it is certain that general principles, if juſt and ſound, muſt always prevail in the general courſe of things. It may be added, that it is alſo the chief buſineſs of politicians; eſpecially in the domeſtic government of the ſtate, where the public good, which is, or ought to be their object, depends on the concurrence of a multitude of caſes; not, as in foreign politics, on accidents and chances, and the caprices of a few perſons.

There are certainly many caſes where no reaſoning is to be truſted, but what is natural and eaſy. When a man deliberates concerning his conduct in any *particular* affair, and forms ſchemes in politics, trade, œconomy, or any buſineſs in life, he never ought to draw his arguments too fine, or connect too long a chain of conſequences together. Something is ſure to happen that will diſconcert his reaſoning, and produce an event different from what he expected. But when we reaſon upon general ſubjects, one may juſtly affirm, that our ſpeculations can ſcarcely ever be too fine, provided they be juſt. From hence, therefore, we may obſerve the difference between *particular* deliberations and *general* reaſonings; and that ſubtlety and refinement are much

much more ſuitable to the latter than to the former. HUME.

THE REFORMATION.

IT will eaſily be conceived, that though the balance of evil prevailed in the Romiſh church, this was not the chief reaſon which produced the Reformation. A concurrence of incidents muſt have contributed to forward that great work. Pope Leo X. by his generous and enterpriſing temper, had very much exhauſted his treaſury, and was obliged to make uſe of every invention which might yield money, in order to ſupport his projects, pleaſures, and liberalities. The ſcheme of ſelling indulgences was ſuggeſted to him, as an expedient which had often ſerved in former times to draw money from the Chriſtian world, and to make devout people willing contributors to the grandeur and riches of the court of Rome. The church, it was ſuppoſed, was poſſeſſed of a great ſtock of merit, as being intitled to all the good works of the ſaints beyond what was employed in their own juſtification; and even to the merits of Chriſt himſelf, which were infinite and unbounded: and from this unexhauſted treaſury the Pope might retail particular portions, and by that traffic acquire money, to be employed in pious purpoſes, the reſiſting the Turk or ſubduing ſchiſ-

matics. When the money came into his treaſury, the greateſt part of it was uſually diverted to other purpoſes. It is commonly believed that Leo, from the penetration of his genius and his familiarity with literature, was fully acquainted with the ridicule and fallacy of the doctrines which, as ſupreme pontiff, he was obliged by his intereſt to promote: and it is the leſs wonder, therefore, that he employed for his profit thoſe pious frauds which his predeceſſors, the moſt ignorant and credulous, had always, under plauſible pretences, made uſe of for their ſelfiſh purpoſes. He publiſhed the ſale of a general indulgence; and as his expences had not only exhauſted his uſual revenue, but even anticipated the income of this extraordinary expedient, the ſeveral branches of it were openly given away to particular perſons, who were intitled to levy the impoſition. The produce, particularly of Saxony and the countries bordering on the Baltic, was aſſigned to his ſiſter Magdalene, married to Cibo, natural ſon to Innocent the VIII.; and ſhe, in order to enhance her profit, had farmed out the revenue to one Arcemboldi a Genoeſe, now a biſhop, formerly a merchant, who ſtill retained all the lucrative arts of his former profeſſion. The Auſtin friars had uſually been employed in Saxony to preach the indulgences, and from this truſt had derived both profit and conſideration: but Arcemboldi,

boldi, fearing left practice might have taught them means to fecrete the money, and expecting no extraordinary fuccefs from the ordinary methods of collection, gave this occupation to the Dominicans. Thefe monks, in order to prove themfelves worthy of the diftinction conferred on them, exaggerated the benefit of indulgences by the moft unbounded panegyrics; and advanced doctrines on that head, which, though not more ridiculous than thofe already received, were fuch as the ears of the people were not fully accuftomed to. To add to the fcandal, the collectors of this revenue are faid to have lived very licentious lives, and to have fpent in taverns, gaming-houfes, and places ftill more infamous, the money which devout perfons had faved from their ufual expences in order to purchafe a remiffion of fins. All thefe circumftances might have given offence; but would have been attended with no event of any importance, had there not arifen a man qualified to take advantage of the incident. Martin Luther, an Auftin friar, profeffor in the univerfity of Wirtemberg, refenting the affront put upon his order, began to preach againft thefe abufes in the fale of indulgences; and being naturally of a fiery temper, and being provoked by oppofition, he proceeded even to decry indulgences themfelves; and was thence carried, by the heat of difpute, to queftion the authority of the Pope, from which his

his adverſaries derived their chief arguments a-gainſt him. Still as he enlarged his reading in order to ſupport theſe tenets, he diſcovered ſome new abuſe or error in the church of Rome; and finding his opinions greedily hearkened to, he promulgated them by writing, diſcourſes, ſermons, conferences; and daily increaſed the number of his diſciples. All Saxony, all Germany, all Europe, were in a very little time filled with the voice of this daring innovator; and men, rouſed from that lethargy in which they had ſo long ſlept, began to call in queſtion the moſt ancient and moſt received opinions. The Elector of Saxony, favourable to Luther's doctrine, protected him from the violence of the papal juriſdiction: the republic of Zurich even reformed their church according to the new model: many ſovereigns of the empire, and the imperial diet itſelf, ſhowed a favourable diſpoſition towards it: and Luther, a man naturally inflexible, vehement, opinionative, was become incapable, either from promiſes of advancement or terrors of ſeverity, to relinquiſh a ſect of which he was himſelf the founder, and which brought him a glory ſuperior to all others, the glory of dictating the religious faith and principles to multitudes *. The quick and ſurpriſing progreſs

* I was told (ſays M. d'Alembert, in his account of the deſtruction of the Jeſuits in France) by a perſon extremely

grefs of this bold fect may juftly in part be afcribed to the late invention of printing and revival of learning: Not that reafon bore any confiderable part in opening mens eyes with regard to the impoftures of the Romifh church; for of all branches of literature, philofophy had as yet, and till long afterwards, made the moft inconfiderable progrefs; neither is there any inftance where argument has been able to free the people from that enormous load of abfurdity with which fuperftition has every where overwhelmed them: not to mention that the rapid advance of the Lutheran doctrine, and the violence with which it was embraced, prove fufficiently that it owed not its fuccefs to reafon and reflection. The art of printing and the revival of learning forwarded its progrefs in another manner. By means of that art, the books of Luther and his fectaries, full of vehemence, declamation, and a rude eloquence, were propagated more

tremely worthy of credit, that he was particularly acquainted with a Jefuit, who had been employed twenty years in the miffions of Canada, and who, while he did not believe a God, as he owned privately to this friend, had faced death twenty times for the fake of the religion which he had preached with fuccefs to the favages.—— This friend reprefented to the Jefuit the inconfiftency of his zeal. "Ah!" replied the miffionary, "you have "no idea of the pleafure which is felt in commanding "the attention of twenty thoufand people, and in per-"fuading them to what we believe not ourfelves."

more quickly, and in greater numbers. The minds of men, ſomewhat awakened from a profound ſleep of ſo many centuries, being prepared for every novelty, ſcrupled leſs to tread in any unuſual path which was opened to them. And as copies of the Scripture and other ancient monuments of the Chriſtian faith became more common, men perceived the innovations which were introduced after the firſt centuries; and though argument and reaſoning could not give conviction, an hiſtorical fact, well ſupported, was able to make impreſſion on their underſtandings. Many of the powers, indeed, aſſumed by the church of Rome were very ancient, and were prior to almoſt every political government eſtabliſhed in Europe. But as the eccleſiaſtics would not agree to poſſeſs their privileges as matters of civil right, which time could render valid, but appealed ſtill to a divine origin, men were tempted to look into their primitive charter; and they could, without much difficulty, perceive its defect in truth and authenticity.—In order to beſtow on this topic the greater influence, Luther and his followers, not ſatisfied with oppoſing the pretended divinity of the Romiſh church, and diſplaying the temporal inconveniences of that eſtabliſhment, carried matters much further, and treated the religion of their anceſtors as abominable, deteſtable, damnable, foretold by ſacred writ itſelf as the ſource

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of all wickedneſs and pollution. They denominated the Pope Antichriſt, called his communion the ſcarlet whore, and gave to Rome the appellation of Babylon; expreſſions which, however applied, were to be found in Scripture, and which were better calculated to operate on the multitude than the moſt ſolid arguments. Excited by conteſt and perſecution on the one hand, by ſucceſs and applauſe on the other, many of the reformers carried to the greateſt extremity their oppoſition againſt the church of Rome; and, in contradiction to the multiplied ſuperſtitions with which that communion was loaded, they adopted an enthuſiaſtic ſtrain of devotion, which admitted of no obſervances, rites, or ceremonies; but placed all merit in a myſterious ſpecies of faith, in inward viſion, rapture, and ecſtaſy. The new ſectaries, ſeized with this ſpirit, were indefatigable in the propagation of their doctrine, and ſet at defiance all the anathemas and puniſhments with which the Roman pontiff endeavoured to overwhelm them. That the civil power, however, might afford them protection againſt the eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction, the Lutherans advanced doctrines favourable in ſome reſpects to the temporal authority of ſovereigns. They inveighed againſt the abuſes of the court of Rome, with which men were at that time generally diſcontented; and exhorted princes to reinſtate themſelves in thoſe powers,

powers, of which the encroaching ſpirit of the eccleſiaſtics, and eſpecially of the ſovereign pontiff, had ſo long bereaved them. They condemned celibacy and monaſtic vows; and they thereby opened the doors of the convents to thoſe who were either tired of the obedience and chaſtity, or diſguſted with the licence in which they had hitherto lived. They blamed the exceſſive riches, the idleneſs, the libertiniſm of the clergy; and pointed out their treaſures and revenues as lawful ſpoil to the firſt invader. And as the eccleſiaſtics had hitherto conducted a willing and ſtupid audience, and were totally unacquainted with controverſy, much more with every ſpecies of true literature, they were unable to defend themſelves againſt men armed with authorities, citations, and popular topics, and qualified to triumph in every altercation or debate.—Such were the advantages with which the reformers began their attack of the Roman hierarchy; and ſuch were the cauſes of their rapid and aſtoniſhing ſucceſs.

HUME.

REFORMATION, AND ITS EFFECTS.

THE authority of the church of Rome was in a ſtate of declenſion, when the diſputes which gave birth to the Reformation began in Germany, and ſoon ſpread themſelves through every

part of Europe. The new doctrines were every where received with a high degree of popular favour. They were propagated with all that enthusiastic zeal which commonly animates the spirit of party when it attacks established authority. The teachers of those doctrines, though perhaps in other respects not more learned than many of the divines who defended the established church, seem in general to have been better acquainted with ecclesiastical history, and with the origin and progress of that system of opinions upon which the authority of the church was established; and they had thereby some advantage in almost every dispute. The austerity of their manners gave them authority with the common people, who contrasted the strict regularity of their conduct with the disorderly lives of the greater part of their own clergy. They possessed too, in a much higher degree than their adversaries, all the arts of popularity and of gaining proselytes; arts which the lofty and dignified sons of the church had long neglected, as being to them in a great measure useless. The reason of the new doctrines recommended them to some, their novelty to many; the hatred and contempt of the established clergy to a still greater number; but the zealous, passionate, and fanatical, though frequently coarse and rustic, eloquence with which they

were almoſt every where inculcated, recommended them to by far the greateſt number.

The ſucceſs of the new doctrines was almoſt every where ſo great, that the princes who at that time happened to be on bad terms with the court of Rome, were by means of them eaſily enabled, in their own dominions, to overturn the church; which, having loſt the reſpect and veneration of the inferior ranks of people, could make ſcarce any reſiſtance. The court of Rome had diſobliged ſome of the ſmaller princes in the northern parts of Germany, whom it had probably conſidered as too inſignificant to be worth the managing. They univerſally, therefore, eſtabliſhed the Reformation in their own dominions. The tyranny of Chriſtiern II. and of Troll archbiſhop of Upſal, enabled Guſtavus Vaſa to expel them both from Sweden. The Pope favoured the tyrant and the archbiſhop, and Guſtavus Vaſa found no difficulty in eſtabliſhing the Reformation in Sweden. Chriſtiern II. was afterwards depoſed from the throne of Denmark, where his conduct had rendered him as odious as in Sweden. The Pope, however, was ſtill diſpoſed to favour him; and Frederick of Holſtein, who had mounted the throne in his ſtead, revenged himſelf by following the example of Guſtavus Vaſa. The magiſtrates of Berne and Zurich, who had no particular quarrel with the Pope, eſtabliſhed with great eaſe

eaſe the Reformation in their reſpective cantons, where juſt before, ſome of the clergy had, by an impoſture ſomewhat groſſer than ordinary, rendered the whole order both odious and contemptible.

In this critical ſituation of its affairs, the Papal court was at ſufficient pains to cultivate the friendſhip of the powerful ſovereigns of France and Spain, of whom the latter was at that time emperor of Germany. With their aſſiſtance it was enabled, though not without great difficulty and much bloodſhed, either to ſuppreſs altogether, or to obſtruct very much, the progreſs of the Reformation in their dominions. It was well enough inclined too to be complaiſant to the king of England. But, from the circumſtances of the times, it could not be ſo without giving offence to a ſtill greater ſovereign, Charles V. king of Spain and emperor of Germany. Henry VIII. accordingly, though he did not himſelf embrace the greater part of the doctrines of the Reformation, was yet enabled, by their general prevalence, to ſuppreſs all the monaſteries, and to aboliſh the authority of the church of Rome in his dominions. That he ſhould go ſo far, though he went no further, gave ſome ſatisfaction to the patrons of the Reformation; who having got poſſeſſion of the government in the reign of his ſon and ſucceſſor,

 completed,

completed without any difficulty the work which Henry VIII. had begun.

In ſome countries, as in Scotland, where the government was weak, unpopular, and not very firmly eſtabliſhed, the Reformation was ſtrong enough to overturn not only the church, but the ſtate likewiſe for attempting to ſupport the church.

Among the followers of the Reformation, diſperſed in all the different countries of Europe, there was no general tribunal, which, like that of the court of Rome, or an œcumenical council, could ſettle all diſputes among them, and with irreſiſtible authority preſcribe to all of them the precise limits of orthodoxy. When the followers of the Reformation in one country, therefore, happened to differ from their brethren in another, as they had no common judge to appeal to, the diſpute could never be decided; and many ſuch diſputes aroſe among them. Thoſe concerning the government of the church, and the right of conferring eccleſiaſtical benefices, were perhaps the moſt intereſting to the peace and welfare of civil ſociety. They gave birth accordingly to the two principal parties or ſects among the followers of the Reformation, the Lutheran and Calviniſtic ſects; the only ſects among them, of which the doctrine and diſcipline have ever yet been eſtabliſhed by law in any part of Europe.

The

The followers of Luther, together with what is called the church of England, preſerved more or leſs of the epiſcopal government, eſtabliſned ſubordination among the clergy, gave the ſovereign the diſpoſal of all the biſhopricks and other conſiſtorial benefices within his dominions, and thereby rendered him the real head of the church; and without depriving the biſhop of the right of collating to the ſmaller benefices within his diocеſe, they, even to thoſe benefices, not only admitted, but favoured the right of preſentation both in the ſovereign and in all other lay-patrons. This ſyſtem of church-government was from the beginning favourable to peace and good order, and to ſubmiſſion to the civil ſovereign. It has never, accordingly, been the occaſion of any tumult or civil commotion in any country in which it has once been eſtabliſhed. The church of England in particular has always valued herſelf, with great reaſon, upon the unexceptionable loyalty of her principles. Under ſuch a government the clergy naturally endeavour to recommend themſelves to the ſovereign, to the court, and to the nobility and gentry of the country, by whoſe influence they chiefly expect to obtain preferment. They pay court to thoſe patrons, ſometimes, no doubt, by the vileſt flattery and aſſentation, but frequently too by cultivating all thoſe arts which beſt deſerve, and which are therefore moſt likely

to gain them the esteem of people of rank and fortune; by their knowledge in all the different branches of useful and ornamental learning; by the decent liberality of their manners; by the social good-humour of their conversation; and by their avowed contempt of those absurd and hypocritical austerities which fanatics inculcate and pretend to practise, in order to draw upon themselves the veneration, and upon the greater part of men of rank and fortune, who avow that they do not practise them, the abhorrence of the common people. Such a clergy, however, while they pay their court in this manner to the higher ranks of life, are very apt to neglect altogether the means of maintaining their influence and authority with the lower. They are listened to, esteemed and respected by their superiors; but before their inferiors they are frequently incapable of defending, effectually and to the conviction of such hearers, their own sober and moderate doctrines, against the most ignorant enthusiastic who chooses to attack them.

The followers of Zuinglius, or more properly those of Calvin, on the contrary, bestowed upon the people of each parish, whenever the church became vacant, the right of electing their own pastor; and established at the same time the most perfect equality among the clergy. The former part of this institution, as long as it remained in vigour,

vigour, ſeems to have been productive of nothing but diſorder and confuſion, and to have tended equally to corrupt the morals both of the clergy and of the people. The latter part ſeems never to have had any effects but what were perfectly agreeable.

As long as the people of each pariſh preſerved the right of electing their own paſtors, they acted almoſt always under the influence of the clergy, and generally of the moſt factious and fanatical of the order. The clergy, in order to preſerve their influence in thoſe popular elections, became, or affected to become, many of them, fanatics themſelves, encouraged fanaticiſm among the people, and gave the preference almoſt always to the moſt fanatical candidate. So ſmall a matter as the appointment of a pariſh-prieſt occaſioned almoſt always a violent conteſt, not only in one pariſh, but in all the neighbouring pariſhes, who ſeldom failed to take part in the quarrel. When the pariſh happened to be ſituated in a great city, it divided all the inhabitants into two parties; and when that city happened either to conſtitute itſelf a little republic, or to be the head and capital of a little republic, as is the caſe with many of the conſiderable cities in Switzerland and Holland, every paltry diſpute of this kind, over and above exaſperating the animoſity of all their other factions, threatened to leave behind

hind it both a new ſchiſm in the church, and a new faction in the ſtate. In thoſe ſmall republics, therefore, the magiſtrate very ſoon found it neceſſary, for the ſake of preſerving the public peace, to aſſume to himſelf the right of preſenting to all vacant benefices. In Scotland, the moſt extenſive country in which this Preſbyterian form of church-government has ever been eſtabliſhed, the rights of patronage were in effect aboliſhed by the act which eſtabliſhed Preſbytery in the beginning of the reign of William III. That act at leaſt put it in the power of certain claſſes of people in each pariſh, to purchaſe, for a very ſmall price, the right of electing their own paſtor. The conſtitution which this act eſtabliſhed was allowed to ſubſiſt for about two and twenty years; but was aboliſhed by the 10th of Queen Anne, ch. 12. on account of the confuſions and diſorders which this more popular mode of election had almoſt every where occaſioned. In ſo extenſive a country as Scotland, however, a tumult in a remote pariſh was not ſo likely to give diſturbance to government as in a ſmaller ſtate. The 10th of Queen Anne reſtored the rights of patronage. But though in Scotland the law gives the benefice without any exception to the perſon preſented by the patron; yet the church requires ſometimes (for ſhe has not in this reſpect been very uniform in her deciſions) a certain concurrence

of

of the people, before ſhe will confer upon the preſentee what is called the cure of ſouls, or the eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction in the pariſh. She ſometimes at leaſt, from an affected concern for the peace of the pariſh, delays the ſettlement till this concurrence can be procured. The private tampering of ſome of the neighbouring clergy ſometimes to procure, but more frequently to prevent this concurrence, and the popular arts which they cultivate in order to enable them upon ſuch occaſions to tamper more effectually, are perhaps the cauſes which principally keep up whatever remains of the old fanatical ſpirit, either in the clergy or in the people of Scotland.

The equality which the Preſbyterian form of church-government eſtabliſhes among the clergy, conſiſts, firſt, in the equality of authority or eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction; and, ſecondly, in the equality of benefice. In all Preſbyterian churches the equality of authority is perfect; that of benefice is not ſo. The difference, however, between one benefice and another is ſeldom ſo conſiderable as commonly to tempt the poſſeſſor even of the ſmall one to pay court to his patron, by the vile arts of flattery and aſſentation, in order to get a better. In all the Preſbyterian churches, where the rights of patronage are thoroughly eſtabliſhed, it is by nobler and better arts that the eſtabliſhed clergy in general endeavour to gain the favour

favour of their ſuperiors; by their learning, by the irreproachable regularity of their life, and by the faithful and diligent diſcharge of their duty. Their patrons even frequently complain of the independency of their ſpirit, which they are apt to conſtrue into ingratitude for paſt favours, but which at worſt, perhaps, is ſeldom any more than that indifference which naturally ariſes from the conſciouſneſs that no further favours of the kind are ever to be expected. There is ſcarce perhaps to be found any where in Europe a more learned, decent, independent, and reſpectable ſet of men, than the greater part of the Preſbyterian clergy of Holland, Geneva, Switzerland, and Scotland.

Where the church-benefices are all nearly equal, none of them can be very great; and this mediocrity of benefice, though it may no doubt be carried too far, has, however, ſome very agreeable effects. Nothing but the moſt exemplary morals can give dignity to a man of ſmall fortune. The vices of levity and vanity neceſſarily render him ridiculous; and are, beſides, almoſt as ruinous to him as they are to the common people. In his own conduct, therefore, he is obliged to follow that ſyſtem of morals which the common people reſpect the moſt. He gains their eſteem and affection by that plan of life which his own intereſt and ſituation would lead him to follow. The common people look upon him with that kindneſs

neſs with which we naturally regard one who approaches ſomewhat to our own condition, but who, we think, ought to be in a higher. Their kindneſs naturally provokes his kindneſs. He becomes careful to inſtruct them, and attentive to aſſiſt and relieve them. He does not even deſpiſe the prejudices of people who are diſpoſed to be ſo favourable to him, and never treats them with thoſe contemptuous and arrogant airs which we ſo often meet with in the proud dignitaries of opulent and well-endowed churches. The Preſbyterian clergy, accordingly, have more influence over the minds of the common people than perhaps the clergy of any other eſtabliſhed church. It is accordingly in Preſbyterian countries only that we ever find the common people converted, without perſecution, completely, and almoſt to a man, to the eſtabliſhed church.

A. SMITH.

NATIONAL REFORMATIONS.

THERE is no abuſe ſo great in civil ſociety as not to be attended with a great variety of beneficial conſequences; and, in the beginnings of reformation, the loſs of theſe advantages is always felt very ſenſibly, while the benefit reſulting from the change is the ſlow effect of time, and is ſeldom perceived by the bulk of a nation.

HUME.

RE-

RELIGION.

THERE is naturally every where a religion affirmative or negative, (ſome religions indeed partake of both), and which enter deeply in forming the habits and manners of the people. Where religion is affirmative, *i. e.* conſiſts of forms and ceremonies, it gives a looſe and enthuſiam to the fancy, which conveys a ſpirit into the air and manners. A negative religion being formed in direct oppoſition to the firſt, its meaſures are regulated accordingly, much pains are taken to root out, and to remove, every thing that can give wing to the imagination, and to regulate the external conduct by a torpid, inanimate compoſure, gravity, and indifference. Some religions appear to be the grave of arts and ſciences, of genius, of ſenſibility, and of all the finer and ſpiritual parts of the human faculties. Other religions have been the nurſe and mother of them; they have embraced all the arts, poetry, painting, muſic, architecture; every effort of ingenuity have been employed in giving a force and furtherance to their views. If the Greeks had been of the ſame leaven with our Quakers, Puritans, and Mahometans, they would not only have been without an Apelles, or a Phidias; but (the connection of things conſidered) perhaps without

poets; and without any thing that could be a proof, that there was either genius or imagination amongst them.

* *

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

RELIGION, in general, at its origin, is believed literally as it is professed; and it is afterwards rather refined by the learned, than debated by the ignorant. The institution of a religion has been, in every country, the first step towards an emersion from savage barbarism and the establishment of civil society. The human mind, at that period when reason is just beginning to dawn, and science is yet below the horizon, has by no means acquired that facility of invention, and those profound habits of thinking, which are necessary to strike out and arrange a connected, consistent chain of abstruse allegory. The vulgar and illiterate have always understood the mythology of their country in its most simple and literal sense; and there was a time to every nation, when the highest rank in it was equally vulgar and illiterate with the lowest: we have therefore no right to expect in them a greater capability of refinement than in the modern vulgar. The progress of science is slow and gradual; men start not up at once into divines and philosophers; yet it may be fairly presumed, that when the man-

ners of a people become poliſhed, and their ideas enlightened, attempts will be made to reviſe and refit their religious creed into a conformity with the reſt of their improvements; and that thoſe doctrines which the ignorant anceſtor received with reverence and conviction, as the literal expoſition of undoubted fact, the philoſophic divine will ſtrive to gloſs over by *à poſteriori* conſtructions of his own, and in the fury of ſymbol and allegory obſcure and diſtort the text, which the ſimplicity of its author never ſuſpected as liable to the poſſibility of ſuch mutilation. Theſe innovations, however, have always been ſcreened with moſt ſcrupulous attention from the general view of mankind: and if a hardy ſage hath, at any time, ventured to remove the veil, his opinions have uſually been received with deteſtation, and his perſon hath frequently paid the forfeit of his temerity. The Eleuſinian myſteries were not coëval with the Pagan mythology, to whoſe diſproval they owed their eſtabliſhment: probably the inſtitution was formed at a more advanced period of ſcience, when the minds of the learned were eager to pierce through the obſcurity of ſuperſtition; and when the vanity of ſuperior penetration made them aſhamed, literally, to believe thoſe tenets which popular prejudices would not ſuffer them abſolutely to renounce.

Preface to GENTOO *Laws.*

ON

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

THE religions, inſtituted by human, under the maſk of divine authority, though they might be intended to reſtrain and reform mankind, to give ſtronger ſanctions to the law of nature, and to be ſubſervient to government, have ſerved in all ages to very different purpoſes. They have promoted falſe conceptions of the Deity, they have ſubſtituted ſuperſtition in the place of thoſe real duties which we owe to God and man; they have added new occaſions to thoſe that ſubſiſted before of enmity and ſtrife; and inſociablity has increaſed as they have flouriſhed. Nay, the firſt principles have been laid in it, in direct oppoſition to the religion of nature and reaſon; the firſt principle of which is a ſociablity that flows from univerſal benevolence. We are obliged to except out of the religions inſtituted by human authority the Jewiſh and the Chriſtian; but we cannot except even theſe, as one of them was taught originally, as the other of them has been taught in the courſe of it, and as both of them have been practiſed, out of the religions that have ſerved to the ill purpoſes here mentioned, to that principally of inſociability. On the contrary, no religions have rendered the profeſſors of them ſo inſociable to other men, as thoſe which have claimed, truly

or falſely, to be immediate revelations of the Supreme Being, and have exacted an implicit faith as well as an implicit obedience. Inſociability was at the firſt, and continues ſtill, the great characteriſtic of Judaiſm. So it was, and ſo it is, of Mahometiſm: ſo it was not of Goſpel Chriſtianity, but ſo it is become of theological Chriſtianity; if it be allowed to make a diſtinction, which will juſtify itſelf in every inſtance of compariſon. BOLINGBROKE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

A CHRISTIAN, who takes his religion from the goſpel, and not from ſyſtems of theology, far from being under any obligation of believing, is under the ſtrongeſt of rejecting, every law, whether perpetual or occaſional; whether given to the Jews alone, or to them and to others, that is evidently repugnant to the law of nature and of right reaſon and to the precepts of *the goſpel. If this was the Spirit of God in the days of* Chriſt, it was the Spirit of God in the days of Moſes: and whatever differences there might be in the ſeveral diſpenſations and the objects of them, God could have effected his purpoſes without contradicting his Spirit. We may believe any thing ſooner than this, that immutability admits of change; and yet we muſt admit both the contradiction

tradiction and the change, if we give entire credit to all that we find related, and as it ſtands related in the books of the Old Teſtament. Father Simon, a divine of the faculty of Paris, held that the authenticity of theſe books, and the divine inſpiration of their authors, ſhould be underſtood to extend no further than to matters purely of doctrine, or to ſuch as have a neceſſary connection with theſe. *Upon the ſame*, or even a ſtronger principle of reaſon, we may aſſert, that as the ſacred writers have no claim to inſpiration when they write on other ſubjects; ſo neither have they when they write any thing on theſe which are *evidently inconſiſtent with right reaſon*, in matters that are proper objects of reaſon, and with the firſt principles of natural law, and which are at the ſame time the firſt principles of Chriſtianity. The all-perfect Being cannot contradict himſelf; but he would contradict himſelf, if the laws contained in the 13th chapter of Deuteronomy, to *mention no others here, were his laws, ſince they* contradict thoſe of nature. From theſe indiſputable premiſes we muſt conclude, that all thoſe expreſſions in the text, which aſcribe theſe laws to God, are uninſpired, perhaps interpolated, but undoubtedly falſe; or we muſt impute to the Author of nature what we are forced to own unjuſt and cruel according to the laws of nature.

BOLINGBROKE.

THE INCONVENIENCE OF TRANSPLANTING A RELIGION FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER.

THERE are many local laws in various religions; and when Montezuma with ſo much obſtinacy inſiſted, that the religion of the Spaniards was good for their country, and his for Mexico, he did not aſſert an abſurdity; becauſe, in fact, legiſlators could never help having a regard to what nature had eſtabliſhed before them.—The opinion of the Metempſychoſis is adapted to the climate of India. An exceſſive heat burns all the country; they can breed but very few cattle; they are always in danger of wanting them for tillage; their black cattle multiply but indifferently; and they are ſubject to many diſtempers: a law of religion that preſerves them is therefore more ſuitable to the policy of the country.

When the meadows are ſcorched up, rice and pulſe, by the aſſiſtance of water, are brought to perfection: a law of religion which permits only this kind of nouriſhment muſt therefore be extremely uſeful to men in thoſe climates.

The fleſh of cattle in that country is inſipid, but the milk and butter which they receive from them ſerves for a part of their ſubſiſtence: therefore

fore the law which prohibits the eating and killing of cows is in India not unreaſonable.

Athens contained a prodigious multitude of people, but its territory was barren. It was therefore a religious maxim with this people, that thoſe who offered ſome ſmall preſents to the gods, honoured them more than thoſe who ſacrificed an ox.

It follows from hence, that there are frequently many inconveniences attending the tranſplanting a religion from one country to another. "The "hog (ſays M. de Boulainvilliers) muſt be very "ſcarce in Arabia, where there are almoſt no "woods, and hardly any thing fit for the nouriſh-"ment of thoſe animals: beſides, the ſaltneſs of "the water and food renders the people moſt "ſuſceptible of cutaneous diſorders." This local law could not be good in other countries as in China, where the hog is almoſt an univerſal, and in ſome ſort a neceſſary nouriſhment.

Sanctorius has obſerved, that pork tranſpires but little, and that this kind of meat greatly hinders the tranſpiration of other food; he has found that this diminution amounts to a third. Beſides, it is known that the want of tranſpiration forms or increaſes the diſorders of the ſkin. The feeding on pork ought therefore to be prohibited, in climates where the people are ſubject to theſe diſ-

diſorders; as in Paleſtine, Arabia, Egypt, and Libya.

Sir John Chardin ſays, that there is not a navigable river in Perſia except the Kur, which is at the extremity of the empire. The ancient law of the Gaurs, which prohibited ſailing on rivers, was not therefore attended with any inconveniences in this country, though it would have ruined the trade of another.

Frequent bathings are extremely uſeful in hot countries. On this account they are ordained in the Mahometan law, and in the Indian religion. In India it is a meritorious act to pray to God in the running ſtream: But how could theſe things be performed in other climates?

When a religion adapted to the climate of one country claſhes too much with the climate of another, it cannot be there eſtabliſhed; and whenever it has been introduced, it has been afterwards diſcarded. It ſeems to all human appearance, as if the climate had *preſcribed the bounds* of the Chriſtian and Mahometan religions.

It follows from hence, that it is almoſt always proper for a religion to have particular doctrines and a general worſhip. In laws concerning religious worſhip, there ought to be but few particulars: for inſtance, they ſhould command mortification in general, and not a certain kind of mortification. Chriſtianity is full of good ſenſe: abſtinence

ſtinence is of divine inſtitution; but a particular kind of abſtinence is ordained by human authority, and may therefore be changed.

MONTESQUIEU.

OF THE MOTIVES OF ATTACHMENT TO DIFFERENT RELIGIONS.

THE different religions of the world do not give to thoſe who profeſs them equal motives of attachment: this depends greatly on the manner in which they agree with the turn of thought and perceptions of mankind. We are extremely addicted to idolatry, and yet have no great inclination for the religion of idolaters: we are not very fond of ſpiritual ideas, and yet are moſt attached to thoſe religions which teach us to adore a ſpiritual being. This proceeds from the ſatisfaction we find in ourſelves at having been ſo intelligent as to chooſe a religion which raiſes the Deity from that baſeneſs in which he had been placed by others. We look upon idolatry as the religion of an ignorant people; and the religion which has a Spiritual Being for its object, as that of the moſt enlightened nations.

When, with a doctrine that gives the idea of a ſpiritual Supreme Being, we can ſtill join thoſe of a ſenſible nature, and admit them into our worſhip, we contract a greater attachment to religion; becauſe

caufe thofe motives which we have juft mention-*ed* are added to our natural inclination for the objects of fenfe. Thus the Catholics, who have more of this kind of worfhip than the Proteftants, are more attached to their religion than the Proteftants are to theirs, and more zealous for its propagation.

When the people of Ephefus were informed, that the fathers of the council had declared they might call the Virgin Mary the *Mother* of God, they were tranfported with joy; they kiffed the hands of the bifhops, they embraced their knees, and the whole city refounded with acclamations.

When an intellectual religion fuperadds a choice made by the Deity, and a preference of thofe who profefs it to thofe who do not, this greatly attaches us to religion. The Mahometants would not be fo good Muffelmans if, on the one hand, there were not idolatrous nations who make them imagine themfelves champions of the unity of God; and, on the other, Chriftians to make them believe that they are the objects of his prefence.

A religion burthened with many ceremonies attaches us to it more ftrongly than that which has a fewer number. We have an extreme propenfity to things in which we are continually employed; witnefs the obftinate prejudices of the Mahometans and the Jews, and the readinefs with which barbarous and favage nations change their religion;

religion; who, as they are employed entirely in hunting or war, have but few religious ceremonies.

Men are extremely inclined to the paſſions of hope and fear; a religion, therefore, that had neither a heaven nor a hell would hardly pleaſe them. This is proved by the caſe with which foreign religions have been eſtabliſhed in Japan, and the zeal and fondneſs with which they were received.

In order to raiſe an attachment to religion, it is neceſſary that it ſhould inculcate pure morals. Men who are knaves by retail, are extremely honeſt in the groſs: they love morality. This appears remarkably evident in our theatres: we are ſure of pleaſing the people by moral ſentiments; we are ſure of ſhocking them by thoſe it diſapproves.

When external worſhip is attended with great magnificence, it flatters our minds, and ſtrongly attaches us to religion. The riches of temples and thoſe of the clergy greatly affect us. Thus even the miſery of the people is a motive that renders them fond of a religion, which has ſerved as a pretext to thoſe who were the cauſe of their miſery.

MONTESQUIEU.

THE

THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF A DOCTRINE IN RELIGION ARE NOT OF SO MUCH CONSEQUENCE TO GOVERNMENT AS THE USE OR ABUSE OF IT.

THE moſt true and holy doctrines may be attended with the very worſt conſequences, when they are not connected with the principles of ſociety; and, on the contrary, doctrines the moſt falſe may be attended with excellent conſequences, when contrived ſo as to be connected with theſe principles. The religion of Confucius diſowns the immortality of the ſoul; and the ſect of Zeno did not believe it. Theſe two ſects have drawn from their bad principles conſequences, not juſt indeed, but moſt admirable as to their influence on ſociety. Thoſe of the religion of Tao, and of Fo, believe the immortality of the ſoul; but from this ſacred doctrine they draw the moſt frightful conſequences. The doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul falſely underſtood, has almoſt in every part of the globe, and in every age, engaged women, ſlaves, ſubjects, friends, to murder themſelves, that they might go and ſerve in the other world the object of their reſpect or love in this. Thus it was in the Weſt Indies; thus it was among the Danes; thus it is at preſent in Japan, in Macaſſar, and many other places.

These cuſtoms do not ſo directly proceed from the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul, as from that of the reſurrection of the body; from whence they have drawn this conſequence, that, after death, the ſame individual will have the ſame wants, the ſame ſentiments, the ſame paſſions. In this point of view, the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul has a prodigious effect on mankind; becauſe the idea of only a ſimple change of habitation, is more within the reach of the human underſtanding, and more adapted to flatter the heart, than the idea of a new modification. It is not enough for religion to eſtabliſh a doctrine, it muſt alſo direct its influence. This the Chriſtian religion performs in the moſt admirable manner; particularly with regard to the doctrines of which we have been ſpeaking. It makes us hope for a ſtate which is the object of our belief; not for a ſtate which we have already experienced or known: Thus every article, even the reſurrection of the body, leads us to ſpiritual ideas.

The ſacred books of the ancient Perſians, ſay, *If you would be holy, inſtruct your children; becauſe all the good actions which they perform will be imputed to you.* They adviſe them to marry betimes; becauſe children at the day of judgment will be as a bridge, over which thoſe who have none cannot paſs. Theſe doctrines were falſe, but extremely uſeful. MONTESQUIEU.

THE ONE TRUE RELIGION NOT TO BE DISCOVERED WITHOUT AN EXAMINATION OF ALL RELIGIONS.

AMONG the many different religions, each of which profcribes and excludes the other, one only can be true: if, indeed, there be fuch a one among them all. Now, to difcover which this is, it is not enough to examine that one: it is neceffary to examine them all; as we fhould not, on any occafion whatever, condemn without a hearing. It is neceffary to compare objections with proofs, and to know what each objects to in the reft, as well as what the others have to offer in their defence. The more clearly any fentiment or opinion appears demonftrated, the more narrowly it behoves us to inquire what are the reafons which prevent its opponents from fubfcribing to it. To form a proper judgment of any religion, we are not to deduce its tenets from the books of its profeffors; we muft go and learn it among the people. Each fect have their peculiar traditions, their cuftoms, prejudices, and modes of acceptation, which conftitute the peculiar mode of their faith; all which fhould be taken into confideration when we form a judgment of their religion.

We have three principal religions in Europe; one admits only of one revelation, another of two, and

and the third of three. Each holds the other in deteſtation; anathematizes its profeſſors, accuſes them of ignorance, obſtinacy, and falſehood. What impartial perſon will preſume to decide between them, without having firſt examined their proofs, and heard their reaſons? That which admits of only one revelation is the moſt ancient, and ſeems the leaſt diſputable: that which admits of three is the moſt modern, and ſeems to be the moſt conſiſtent: that which admits of two, and rejects the third, may poſſibly be the beſt, but it hath certainly every prepoſſeſſion againſt it; its inconſiſtency ſtares one full in the face.

In all theſe three revelations, the ſacred books are written in languages unknown to the people who believe in them. The Jews no longer underſtand Hebrew; the Chriſtians neither Greek nor Hebrew; the Turks and Perſians underſtand no Arabic; and even the modern Arabs themſelves ſpeak not the language of Mahomet. Is not this a very ſimple manner of inſtructing mankind, by talking to them always in a language which they do not comprehend? But theſe books, it will be ſaid, are tranſlated; but who can aſſure us they are faithfully tranſlated, or that it is even poſſible they ſhould be ſo? Who can give us a ſufficient reaſon why God, when he hath a mind to ſpeak to mankind, ſhould ſtand in need of an interpreter?

Among the doctors of the Sorbonne, it is as clear as day-light, that the predictions concerning the Messiah relate to Jesus Christ. Among the Rabbins of Amsterdam, it is just as evident they have no relation at all to him. At Constantinople, the Turks make known their reasons, and we durst not publish ours; there it is our turn to submit. Two thirds of mankind are neither Jews, Mahometans, nor Christians; how many millions of men, therefore, must there be who never heard of Moses, of Jesus Christ, or of Mahomet!

If there be in the world but one true religion, and every man be obliged to adopt it, it is necessary to spend our lives in the study of all religions, to visit the countries where they have been established, and examine and compare them with each other. No man is exempted from the principal duty of his species; and no one hath a right to confide in the judgment of another. The artisan who lives only by his industry, the husbandman who cannot read, the timid and delicate virgin, the feeble valetudinarian; all without exception must study, meditate, dispute, and travel the world over in search of truth: there would be no longer any settled inhabitants in a country; the face of the earth being covered with pilgrims, going from place to place at great trouble and expence, to verify, examine, and compare the several different systems and modes of worship to be

be met with in various countries. We muſt in ſuch a caſe bid adieu to arts and ſciences, to trade, and all the civil occupations of life. Every other ſtudy muſt give place to that of religion; while the man who ſhould enjoy the greateſt ſhare of health and ſtrength, and make the beſt uſe of his time and his reaſon, for the greateſt term of years allotted to human life, would, in the extreme of old age, be ſtill perplexed where to fix; and it would be a great thing after all, if he ſhould learn before his death, what religion he ought to have believed and practiſed during life.

ROUSSEAU.

THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION FOUNDED ON FAITH.

IF we examine the miracles in the Pentateuch according to reaſon, and not as the word or teſtimony of God himſelf, but as the production of a mere human writer and hiſtorian, we ſhall find that book preſented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were ſtill more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts which it relates; corroborated by no concurring teſtimony, and reſembling thoſe fabulous accounts which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we ſhall find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an ac-

count of a ſtate of the world and of human nature entirely different from the preſent: of our fall from that ſtate: of the age of man extended to near 1000 years: of the deſtruction of the world by a deluge: of the arbitrary choice of one people as the favourites of heaven; and that people the countrymen of the author: of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the moſt aſtoniſhing imaginable. Would not the falſehood of ſuch a book, ſupported by ſuch a teſtimony, be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates? Upon the whole, we may conclude, that the *Chriſtian religion* not only was at firſt attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reaſonable perſon without one. Mere reaſon is inſufficient to convince us of its veracity: and whoever is moved by faith to aſſent to it, is conſcious of a continued miracle in his own perſon, which ſubverts all the principles of his underſtanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is moſt contrary to cuſtom and experience.

HUME.

NATURAL RELIGION.

AS a knowledge of the eſſential differences of things may lead men, who know not God, to a knowledge of the morality of actions; ſo do theſe eſſential

effential differences ferve as fo many clues, by which the Theift may guide himfelf through all the intricacies of error and difputation, to a knowledge of the will of God. Since infinite wifdom, that muft always proportion means to ends, has made happinefs the end or inftinctive object of all his human creatures; and has fo conftituted them, and the fyftem in which he has placed them, that they can neither attain to this happinefs, nor be fecure in the poffeffion of it, by any other means than the practice of morality or the focial virtues; it is demonftrated, that God wills we fhould purfue thefe means to arrive at this end. We know more certainly the will of God in this way, than we can know it in any other. We may take the word of men for the word of God; and, in fact, this has been, and is ftill the cafe of many. But we can never miftake the works of God for the works of men; and may be therefore affured that a revelation, evidently manifefted in them, is a divine revelation. But though natural religion is an object of knowledge, and all other religions, even that of the Gofpel, can reft on nothing more than probability; yet may that probability be fuch as will and ought to force our affent. There are fanctions implied in the religion of nature, becaufe it affumes, and to be fure very juftly, that the general happinefs or mifery depends on the obfervation of its precepts; and that the degrees

of

of one and the other bear always a proportion to the exercife, and to the neglect, of public and private virtue in every community. But thefe motives are fuch as particular men will be apt to think do not immediately, nor directly, concern them; becaufe they are apt to confider themfelves as individuals, rather than as members of fociety, and to catch at pleafure without any regard to happinefs. To give an additional ftrength, therefore, to thefe motives, that are determining in their own nature, but not fo according to the imperfection of ours; decifive to our reafon, but not fo to our appetites and paffions; the ancient Theifts and Polytheifts, philofophers or legiflators, invented another; that, I mean, of future rewards and punifhments, reprefented under various forms, but always directed to the fame purpofe.

This motive, every man who believes it, may, and muft apply to himfelf, and hope the reward and fear the punifhment, for his fecret as well as public actions; *nay, for his thoughts* as well as his actions. What effect this motive had in remote antiquity we cannot fay; but it had loft its force long before the inftitution of Chriftianity. The fear of hell, particularly, was ridiculed by fome of the greateft moralifts; and to fhow how little it was kept up in the minds of the vulgar, we may obferve, that Tully treated it in fome of his public pleadings as he would have avoided fcrupu-

ſcrupulouſly to do, whatever he thought of it himſelf, if this fear had been at that time prevalent even among the vulgar. Human reaſon, ſays Mr Locke, unaſſiſted by revelation, in its great and proper buſineſs of morality, never made out an entire body of the law of nature from unqueſtionable principles, or by clear deductions. Scattered ſayings—incoherent apophthegms of philoſophers and wiſe men—could never make a morality—could never riſe to the force of a law. Theſe aſſertions now are in part, and in part only, true.

But when he comes to contraſt this ſuppoſed imperfect knowledge of the religion of nature, which the heathen had, with that ſuppoſed perfect know-knowledge which is communicated by the Goſpel, what he advances ſtands in direct contradiction to truth. It is not true, that Chriſt revealed an entire body of ethics, proved to be the law of nature from principles of reaſon, and reaching all the duties of life. If mankind wanted ſuch a code, to which recourſe might be had on every occaſion as to an unerring rule in every part of the moral duties, ſuch a code is ſtill wanting; for the Goſpel is not ſuch a code. Moral obligations are occaſionally recommended and commanded in it, but no where proved from principles of reaſon, and by clear deductions, unleſs alluſions, parables, and compariſons, and promiſes, and threats, are to paſs for ſuch. Were all the precepts

cepts of this kind, that are ſcattered about in the whole New Teſtament, collected, like the ſhort ſentences of ancient ſages in the memorials we have of them, and put together in the very words of the ſacred writers, they would compoſe a very ſhort, as well as unconnected ſyſtem of ethics. A ſyſtem thus collected from the writings of ancient heathen moraliſts; of Tully, of Seneca, of Epictetus, and others; *would be more full, more entire, more coherent, and more clearly deduced from unqueſtionable principles of knowledge.* If there was any thing like a complete ſyſtem of morality in the Goſpel, we ſhould find it in the Sermon on the Mount, preached by Chriſt himſelf, not on any particular doctrine, but on the whole duty of man. What now do we find in this ſermon? Many excellent precepts of morality, no doubt, intermingled with, and enforced by ſeveral conſiderations drawn from his own revelations; and yet ſuch as the religion of nature enjoins, or implies, and as *have been practiſed by philoſophers, and other good men among the heathen.* Some of theſe, and ſome others which are interſperſed in the Goſpel, require great purity and perfection. Thus, for inſtance, wherever marriage has been inſtituted, adultery has been forbid. It was ſo by the Moſaic law, and it is ſo by the religion of nature; for though marriage is not directly inſtituted by the religion of nature, yet

yet every wrong, every invaſion of another man's property, and every injuſtice, is forbid by it. Now the Goſpel carries this duty much further; and declares, that whoſoever looketh on a woman to luſt after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. The law that forbids a crime, does certainly imply that we ſhould not deſire to commit it: for to want the deſire, or to be able to extinguiſh it, is the beſt ſecurity of our obedience; though he who is unable to extinguiſh it, and yet abſtains from the ſin, has in the eye of reaſon a greater degree of merit. Reaſon commands what a man may by the force of reaſon perform. Revelation commands what it is impoſſible to obey, without an aſſiſtance unknown to reaſon. Thus, again, murder is forbid by the law of nature; but even anger is forbid by this; and univerſal benevolence, that great principle of the firſt, is ſtrained by the laſt to the love of our enemies and perſecutors: a precept ſo ſublime, that I doubt whether it was ever exactly obſerved any more under the law of grace than under the religion of nature; though ſome appearances of it may be found, perhaps, under both; and at leaſt as many under one as under the other. Theſe ſublime precepts have not been obſerved by the profeſſors of Chriſtianity, either ancient or modern. The Quaker, who ſays, Yea, yea, and Nay, nay, and doth not ſwear at all, does not willingly part

part with his coat as well as his cloak, nor give away one becaufe the other has been taken from him; neither does the good man neglect to lay up fome treafures on earth, where moth and ruft corrupt, and where thieves break through and fteal.

There are befides thefe general duties, and others of the fame kind commanded or recommended by the Gofpel, fome that feem directed to the Jews only, and fome that feem directed more immediately to the difciples of Chrift. Of the firft fort, is that injunction which reftrains divorces to the cafe of adultery; whereas by the law of Mofes, as well as by thofe of other legiflators, a man who did not like his wife, nor care to cohabit with her, might give her a letter of divorce, and turn her out of his doors; for which exprefs leave is given in the xxivth chapter of Deuteronomy. Of the fame fort are thofe directions which tend to render the worfhip of God more intellectual, and the practice of good works lefs oftentatious. Of the fecond fort, are certain duties which feem fit enough for an order of men like the Effenians, but are by no means practicable in the general fociety of mankind. To refift no injury, to take no care for to-morrow, to neglect providing for the common neceffaries of life, and to fell all to follow Chrift, might be properly exacted from thofe who were his companions, and his difciples in a ftricter fenfe, like the fcho-

lars of Pythagoras, admitted within the curtain; but reafon and experience both fhow, that, confidered as general duties, they are impracticable, inconfiftent with natural inftinct, and quite deftructive of fociety. The religion of nature is therefore the plaineft of all laws; and if the heavens do not declare the will as well as the glory of God, the earth and the inhabitants of it declare both. The will of God has been revealed in his works to all thofe who have applied themfelves to the contemplation of them; even to thofe who did not difcover him in them, from the time that men have ufed their reafon: and where reafon improved, and knowledge increafed, morality was carried as high in fpeculation, and in practice too, by fome of the heathen worthies, as by any of the Chriftian faints.

BOLINGBROKE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

BY natural religion, I mean the principles of morality common to mankind. Newton believed, that God having given the fame fenfes to all men, the fame wants, the fame fentiments; confequently the fame rude notions, every where the foundation of fociety, prevail among all mankind. It is certain, that God has given to bees and ants fomething to induce them to live in common,

which he has not given to wolves nor falcons. It is certain, from all mens living in ſociety, there is in their eſſence a ſecret tie, by which God intended to connect them together. Now, if at a certain age, the ideas flowing from the ſenſes to men, all organized in the ſame manner, did not gradually give them the ſame principles neceſſary to ſociety, it is certain that ſuch ſociety could not ſubſiſt. This is the reaſon why truth, gratitude, friendſhip, &c. are eſteemed from Siam to Mexico.

It has always ſeemed ſtrange to me, that ſo wiſe a man as Locke ſhould have advanced, that there is no notion of good and evil common to all men. This is a miſtake. It is founded on the narratives of travellers; who ſay, that in ſome countries it is cuſtomary for parents to eat their children, and to eat women when paſt child-bearing; that in others, certain enthuſiaſts, who make uſe of ſhe-aſſes inſtead of women, are honoured with the name of ſaints. *But there is nothing more common than for them to ſee through* a falſe medium, give a falſe account of what they have ſeen; to miſtake the intention, eſpecially in a nation to whoſe language they are ſtrangers; and, in fine, to judge of the manners of a whole people by a particular fact, whoſe circumſtances are to them unknown.

Were a Perſian at Liſbon, at Madrid, at Goa, on

on the day of an Auto-da-Fe, he would think, and not without an appearance of reaſon, that the Chriſtians ſacrificed men to God. Let him look into the almanacks, ſold all over Europe among the lower claſs, and he will conclude, that we all believe in the effects of the moon; though this is ſo far from being true, that we laugh at them. Thus, ſhould a traveller tell me, for inſtance, that the ſavages eat their parents from filial affection; I ſhould anſwer, that, firſt, the fact is dubious; ſecondly, if it be true, it will be ſo far from deſtroying the idea of reſpect due to parents, that it is probably a barbarous manner of ſhowing tenderneſs; a horrible miſtake of the law of nature. For poſſibly they kill their parents from mere duty, to free them from the troubles of old age, or the fury of an enemy: and if they thus give their parents a tomb within their own bodies, inſtead of being devoured by ſavage conquerors, this cuſtom, however ſhocking it may appear to human nature, neceſſarily flows from a goodneſs of heart. Natural religion is nothing more than this law known through the world, *Do as you would be done by*. Now the ſavage who kills his father to ſave him from the enemy, and who buries him in his breaſt, that he may not find a grave in the bowels of his enemy, wiſhes that his ſon may treat him in the ſame manner if reduced to the ſame exigency. This law of treating our

 neigh-

neighbour as ourſelves, flows naturally from the rudeſt notions, and ſooner or later is heard in the hearts of all men; for having all the ſame reaſon, the fruits of that tree muſt have a reſemblance: and they do, in reality, reſemble each other; for in every ſociety, the name of virtue is given to whatever is thought uſeful to the ſociety.

Name me a country upon earth, or a ſociety of ten perſons, where, what tends to promote the common good, is not eſteemed; and when you have done this, I will allow there is no natural law. This law is doubtleſs infinitely varied; but can we infer from thence any thing more than that it exiſts? Matter every where receives different forms; yet every where retains its nature. It is in vain to ſay, that theft was enjoined at Lacedemon; it is nothing more than an abuſe of words. What we call theft, was not enjoined at Lacedemon; but in a city where every thing was common, a permiſſion to take dexterouſly what private perſons appropriated to themſelves contrary to law, was a method of puniſhing the ſpirit of appropriation prohibited among that people. *Meum* and *tuum* was a crime, for which what we call theft was the puniſhment; and among them, as among us, there was ſome order made by God for us all, as he made for the ants to live in ſociety. The diſpoſition which we all have for living

ving in ſociety, is the foundation of the law of nature. VOLTAIRE.

THE RELIGION OF THE FIRST MEN.

AFTER the formation of ſocieties, it is credible that there was ſome religion, a kind of ruſtic worſhip. Man entirely occupied with his wants, could not ſoar to the Author of *life*. He could not be acquainted with thoſe cauſes and effects, which to the wiſe proclaim an eternal Architect.

The knowledge of a God, creator, requiter, and avenger, is the fruit of cultivated reaſon, or of revelation.

All people were for ages what the inhabitants of the ſeveral coaſts of Africa, of ſeveral iſlands, and half the Americans, are at preſent. Thoſe people have no idea of a ſole God, creator of all things, omnipreſent, and exiſting of himſelf from all eternity. They ſhould not, however, be called Atheiſts in the uſual ſenſe; for they do not deny a Supreme Being; they are not acquainted with him; they have no idea of him. The Caffres take an inſect for their protector, the Negroes a ſerpent. Among the Americans, ſome adore the moon, others a tree. Several have no worſhip whatever.

The Peruvians, when they became poliſhed, adored the ſun. Either Mango Capac had

made them believe that he was the ſun of that planet, or a dawn of reaſon made them think they owed ſome acknowledgment to the planet which animated nature. In order to know how theſe different doctrines and ſuperſtitions gained ground, it ſeems to me neceſſary to follow the career of human underſtanding left alone without a guide.—The inhabitants of a *village*, who are little better than ſavages, perceive the fruits which ſhould nouriſh them periſh: an inundation carries away ſome cabins; others are deſtroyed by thunder. Who has done them this miſchief? It could be none of their fellow-citizens, for they have all equally ſuffered. It is therefore ſome ſecret power that has afflicted them, and muſt therefore be appeaſed. How is it to be effected? By uſing it as they do thoſe whom they are deſirous of pleaſing; in making it ſome ſmall preſents. There is a ſerpent in the neighbourhood; it is very likely the ſerpent: they offer him milk near the cavern whither he retires; from that time he becomes ſacred: he is invoked when they are at war with the neighbouring village, who, on their ſide, have choſen another protector.

Other little colonies find themſelves in the ſame ſituation. But there being no object near them to excite their terror and adoration, they call in general the being whom they ſuſpect has done them

them miſchief, the Maſter, the Lord, the Chief, the Ruler.

This idea being more conformable than the others to the dawn of reaſon, which increaſes and ſtrengthens with time, poſſeſſes every one's head when the nation is become more numerous. Thus we find that many nations have had no other god than their maſter, their lord. Such was Adonai among the Phenicians; Baal, Milkom, and Adad, with the people of Syria. All theſe names ſignify nothing more than, The lord, The powerful.

This was doubtleſs the origin of that opinion, which ſo generally and ſo long prevailed, that every people was really protected by the divinity they had choſen. This idea was ſo deeply rooted in men, that in after-times it was adopted by the Jews themſelves.

Nothing was more common than to adopt ſtrange gods. The Greeks acknowledged thoſe of the Egyptians; not Apis's bull and Anubis's dog, but Ammon, and the twelve great gods. The Romans adored all the gods of the Greeks. Except in the time of war and bloody fanaticiſm, all nations were well ſatisfied that their neighbours had their own particular gods, and imitated frequently the worſhip and ceremonies of ſtrangers. The Jews themſelves imitated the circumciſion of the Arabs and Egyptians; they often adored the Baal and Belphegor of their neighbours.

The

The moſt poliſhed people of Aſia, on this ſide the Euphrates, adored the planets. The Chaldeans, before the time of Zoroaſter, paid homage to the ſun; as did afterwards the Peruvians in another hemiſphere. This error muſt be very natural to man, as it has had ſo many followers in Aſia and America. A ſmall and half ſavage tribe has but one protector. Does it become more numerous? The number of its gods is increaſed. The Egyptians began by adoring Iſheth or Iſis, and they at laſt adored cats. The firſt homage the ruſtic Romans paid was to Mars; that of the Romans, maſters of Europe, was to the goddeſs of marriage and the god of thieves. Yet Cicero, *all the* philoſophers, and thoſe initiated, acknowledge a Supreme and Omnipotent God. They were all brought back to that point of reaſon from whence ſavage men had departed by inſtinct.

The Apotheoſis could not have been deviſed till long after the firſt kinds of worſhip. *It is not natural immediately to make* a god of a man whom we ſaw born like ourſelves; ſuffer like us maladies, chagrin, the miſeries of humanity; ſubject to the ſame humiliating wants; die, and become food for worms. But this is what happened to all nations after the revolutions of ſeveral ages.

A man who had done great things, who had been ſerviceable to human nature, could not in truth

truth be looked upon as a god by thoſe who had ſeen him tremble with the ague, and ſeek for clothing: but enthuſiaſts perſuaded themſelves, that, being poſſeſſed of eminent qualities, he had them from a god, and that he was the ſon of a god. In the ſame manner gods produced children all over the world; Bacchus, Perſeus, Hercules, Caſtor and Pollux, were ſons of gods. Romulus was a ſon of god; Alexander was proclaimed a ſon of god in Egypt; Odin, with us northern nations, was a ſon of god; Mango Capac was ſon of the ſun in Peru. The hiſtorian of the Moguls, Abulgazi, relates, that one of the grandmothers of Gingiſkan, named Alanku, when a girl, was impregnated by a celeſtial ray. Gingiſkan himſelf paſſed for the ſon of God. And when Pope Innocent ſent brother Aſulin to Batoukan, grandſon to Gengis, this monk, who could not be preſented but to one of the viziers, ſaid he came from the vicar of God; the miniſter replied, "*Is this vicar ignorant that he ſhould* "pay homage and tribute to the ſon of God, the "great Batoukan his maſter?"

With men fond of the marvellous, there is no great diſtance between a ſon of god and god. After two or three generations, the ſon partakes of the father's dominion. Thus temples were raiſed to all thoſe who were ſuppoſed to be born from

from the ſupernatural correſpondence of the Divinity with our wives and daughters.

From hence we may conclude, that the majority of mankind were for a long time in a ſtate of inſenſibility and imbecillity; and that, perhaps, the moſt inſenſible of all were thoſe who wanted to diſcover a ſignification in thoſe abſurd fables, and to ingraft reaſon upon folly.

VOLTAIRE.

THE RELIGION AND TOLERATION OF THE ROMANS.

THE Romans adopted or allowed the doctrines of every other people, after the example of the Greeks; and, in reality, the Senate and the Emperors always acknowledged one ſupreme God, as well as the greateſt part of the philoſophers and poets of Greece.—The toleration of all religions was a natural law, engraven on the hearts of all men. For what right can one created being have to compel another to think as he does? But when a people are united, when religion is become a law of the ſtate, we ſhould ſubmit to that law. Now the Romans, by their law, adopted all the gods of the Greeks, who themſelves had altars for the gods unknown.—The twelve tables ordained, *Separatim nemo haberet deos neve advenas niſi publice adſcitos;* "That no one ſhould have foreign "or

"or new gods without the public ſanction." This ſanction was given to many doctrines; and all the others were tolerated. This aſſociation of all the divinities in the world, this kind of divine hoſpitality, was the law of nations from all antiquity, except one or two ſmall nations.

As there were no dogmas, there was no religious war. It is alſo very remarkable, that, amongſt the Romans, no one was ever perſecuted for his way of thinking. There is not a ſingle example, from the time of Romulus down to Domitian; and amongſt the Greeks Socrates is the only exception.—It is inconteſtable that the Romans, as well as the Greeks, adored one ſupreme God, *Deus optimus maximus*. With this knowledge of one God, with this univerſal indulgence, which are every where the fruits of cultivated reaſon, were blended innumerable ſuperſtitions; which were the ancient fruits of reaſon, erroneous and in its dawn. The ſacred fowls, the goddeſs Pertunda, and the goddeſs Cloacina, were ridiculous.—Why did not the conquerors and legiſlators of ſo many nations aboliſh ſuch nonſenſe? Becauſe, being ancient, it was dear to the people, and was no way prejudicial to the government. The Scipios, the Paulus Emilius's, the Ciceros, the Catos, the Cæſars, had other employment than that of combating popular ſuperſtition. When an ancient error is eſtabliſhed, policy avails itſelf

itſelf of it, as a bit which the vulgar have put into their own mouth, till ſuch time as another ſuperſtition ariſes to deſtroy it; and policy profits of this ſecond error, as it did of the firſt.

VOLTAIRE.

THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIONS ON THE MORAL CONDUCT OF MANKIND.

MEN, of more piety than knowledge, have imagined, that the virtues of a nation, its humanity, and the refinements of its manners, depend on the purity of its worſhip. The hypocrites, intereſted in propagating this opinion, have publiſhed without believing it; and the common people have believed it without examination. This error, once aſſerted, has been almoſt every where received as a certain truth. Experience and hiſtory teach us, however, that the proſperity of a people does not depend on the purity of their worſhip, but on the excellence of *their legiſlation*. Of *what importance, in fact*, is their belief? That of the Jews was pure; and the Jews were the dregs of nations: they have never been compared either to the Egyptians or the ancient Perſians.—It was under Conſtantine that Chriſtianity became the ruling religion. It did not, however, reſtore the Romans to their primitive virtues. There was not then ſeen a Decius who de-

voted himſelf for the good of his country; or a Fabricius, who preferred ſeven acres of land to all the riches of the empire.—At what period did Conſtantinople become the ſink of all the vices? At the very time the Chriſtian religion was eſtabliſhed. Its worſhip did not change the manners of its ſovereigns; their piety did not make them better. The moſt Chriſtian kings have not been the greateſt of monarchs. Few of them have diſplayed on the throne the virtues of Titus, Trajan, or Antoninus. There are in every country a great many ſound believers, and but few virtuous men. Why? Becauſe religion is not virtue. All belief, and all ſpeculative opinions, have not commonly any influence on the conduct and probity of man. The dogma of fatality is almoſt the general opinion of the Eaſt: it was that of the Stoics. This dogma, it is ſaid, is deſtructive of all virtue. The Stoics, however, were not leſs virtuous than the philoſophers of other ſects; nor are the Mahometan princes leſs faithful to their treaties than the Catholic; nor the fataliſt Perſian leſs honeſt in his commerce than the French or Portugueſe Chriſtian. Purity of manners is therefore independent of purity of doctrines. The Pagan religion, with regard to its morality, was founded, like every other, on what they call the law of nature. With regard to its theologic or mythologic part, it was not very edifying. We

cannot read the hiſtory of Jupiter and his loves, and eſpecially the treatment of his father Saturn, without allowing that the gods did not preach virtue by example. Yet Greece and ancient Rome abounded in heroes and virtuous citizens; while modern Greece and Rome produce, like Brazil and Mexico, none but vile ſlothful wretches, without talents, virtue, or induſtry. Now if, ſince the eſtabliſhment of Chriſtianity in the monarchies of Europe, the ſovereigns have not been *more valiant* or intelligent; if the people have not had more knowledge and humanity; if the number of patriots has not been in any degree augmented; of what uſe, then, are religions? Why place, then, ſo *much importance in the belief of certain revelations*, that are frequently conteſtable, and always conteſted? What does the hiſtory of religions teach us? That they have every where lighted up the torch of intolerance, ſtrewed the plains with carcaſes, embrued the fields with blood, burned cities, and laid waſte empires; but *that they have never made men better*. Their goodneſs is the work of the laws. Puniſhment and contempt reſtrain vice. Religion regulates our belief, and the laws our manners and our virtues. What is it that diſtinguiſhes the Chriſtian from the Jew, the Guebar, and the Muſſulman? Is it an equity, a courage, an humanity, a beneficence, particular to one and not known to the others?

No;

No; they are known by their ſeveral profeſſions of faith.

Let not, therefore, honeſty be ever confounded with orthodoxy. In every country the orthodox is he that believes ſuch particular doctrines; and throughout the whole earth, the virtuous man is he that does ſuch actions as are humane, and conformable to the general intereſt. The evils that ariſe from falſe religions are real; the good imaginary. Of what uſe, in fact, can they be? Their precepts are either contrary, or conformable, to the law of nature; that is, to what mature reaſon dictates to ſocieties for their greateſt happineſs. In the firſt caſe, the precepts of ſuch religion muſt be rejected as contrary to the public welfare. In the ſecond, they muſt be admitted. But then, of what uſe is a religion which teaches nothing that ſound ſenſe does not teach without it? The precepts of reaſon, it may be ſaid, when conſecrated by a revelation, will at leaſt appear more reſpectable. Yes, in the firſt moments of fervor; for then maxims believed to be true, becauſe they are ſuppoſed to be revealed, act more forcibly on the imagination: but that enthuſiaſtic ſpirit is ſoon diſſipated. A revelation merely from its being uncertain and conteſtable, far from fortifying the demonſtration of a moral principle, muſt, in time, obſcure its evidence. Truth and falſehood are two heterogeneous be-

ings: They never go together. Befide, all men are not actuated by religion; all have not faith. An honeft man will always obey his reafon in preference to revelation; for it is, he will fay, more certain that God is the author of human reafon, that is, of the faculty in man of diftinguifhing the true from the falfe, than that he is the author of any particular book. It is more criminal in the eyes of a wife man to deny our own reafon, than to deny any revelation whatever. The conduct of men and nations is rarely confiftent with their belief, or even their fpeculative principles. Duelling was for a long time fafhionable in Europe, efpecially in France. Religion forbade it, yet they fought every day. Luxury has fince foftened the manners of the French: Duelling is punifhed with death. The delinquents are almoft all obliged to fly their country. There is no longer any duelling. From whence arifes the prefent fecurity of Paris? From the devotion of its inhabitants? No; but from the *regularity and vigilance of the police*. The Parifians of the laft age were more devout and greater thieves. Virtue, therefore, is the work of the laws and not of religion.—Suppofe we would increafe the number of thieves, what muft be done? Augment the taxes and the wants of the people; oblige every tradefman to travel with a purfe of gold; place fewer patroles on the highways; and, laftly, abolifh

abolish the punishment for robbery. We should then soon see impunity multiply transgressions. It is not, therefore, on the truth of a revelation, or the purity of a worship, but solely on the sagacity or absurdity of the laws, that the virtues or vices of the citizens depend. In short, it is reason improved by experience, that alone can demonstrate to nations the interests they have to be just, humane, and faithful to their promises. Superstition does not in this case produce the effects of reason. The religious system destroys all proportion between the rewards decreed for the actions of men, and the utility of those actions to the public.

HELVETIUS.

THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES ON THE CONDUCT OF MANKIND.

IT is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence has more *effect* on mens *conduct*, than the *most pompous* views suggested by theological theories and systems.—A man's natural inclination works incessantly upon him; it is for ever present to the mind; and mingles itself with every view and consideration: Whereas, religious *motives*, where they act at all, operate only by starts and bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether habitual to the mind.—Another advan-

tage of inclination, it engages on its ſide all the wit and ingenuity of the mind; and when ſet in oppoſition to religious principles, ſeeks every method and art of eluding them: in which it is almoſt always ſucceſsful.—Who can explain the heart of man, or account for thoſe ſtrange ſalvos and excuſes with which people ſatisfy themſelves when they follow their inclinations in oppoſition to their religious duty? This is well underſtood in the world; and none but fools ever repoſe leſs truſt in a man, becauſe they hear, that, from ſtudy and philoſophy, he has entertained ſome ſpeculative doubts with regard to theological ſubjects.—And when we have to do with a man who makes a great profeſſion of religion and devotion, has this any other effect upon ſeveral, who paſs for prudent, than to put them on their guard, leſt they be cheated and deceived by him? We muſt further conſider, that philoſophers, who cultivate reaſon and reflection, ſtand in leſs need of ſuch motives to keep them under the reſtraint of morals: and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are utterly incapable of ſo pure a religion as repreſents the Deity to be pleaſed with nothing but virtue in human behaviour.—The recommendations to the Divinity are generally ſuppoſed to be either frivolous obſervances, or rapturous ecſtaſies, or a bigotted credulity.—We need not run back into antiquity, or wander into remote

remote regions, to find inſtances of this degeneracy.—Amongſt ourſelves, ſome have been guilty of that atrocioufneſs unknown to the Grecian and Egyptian ſuperſtitions, of declaiming, in expreſs terms, againſt morality; and repreſenting it as a ſure forfeiture of the divine favour, if the leaſt truſt or reliance be laid upon it. But even though ſuperſtition or enthuſiaſm ſhould not put itſelf in direct oppoſition to morality, the very diverting of the attention, the raiſing up a new and frivolous ſpecies of merit, the prepoſterous diſtribution which it makes of praiſe and blame, muſt have the moſt pernicious conſequences, and weaken extremely mens attachment to the natural motives of juſtice and humanity. Such a principle of action likewiſe, not being any of the familiar motives of human conduct, acts only by intervals on the temper; and muſt be rouſed by continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot ſatisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil his devotional taſk.—Many religious exerciſes are entered into with ſeeming fervour, where the heart at the time feels cold and languid: A habit of diſſimulation is by degrees contracted; and fraud and falſehood become the predominant principle. —Hence the reaſon of that vulgar obſervation, That the higheſt zeal in religion and the deepeſt hypocriſy, ſo far from being inconſiſtent, are often, or commonly united in the ſame individual charac-

character.—The ſteady attention alone to ſo important an intereſt as that of eternal ſalvation, is apt to extinguiſh the benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, contracted ſelfiſhneſs. And when ſuch a temper is encouraged, it eaſily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence.

Thus the motives of vulgar ſuperſtition have no great influence on general conduct; nor is their operation very favourable to morality, in the inſtances where they predominate.

HUME.

THE STATE OF RELIGION IN PENSYLVANIA.

IN Penſylvania there is no religion eſtabliſhed by government: each one adopts that he likes beſt. The prieſt is no charge to the ſtate. The individuals provide them as they find it convenient, and tax themſelves accordingly. The prieſt is there, like the merchant, maintained at the expence of the conſumer. He who has no prieſt, and conſumes no part of the commodity he deals in, pays no part of his expence. Penſylvania is a proper model for other nations.

HELVETIUS.

THE

THE RELIGIONS OF THE ANCIENTS.

WHEN we confider the compound nature of man, neither a merely fenfitive being, nor yet a merely intellectual or moral agent; it will afford no fmall entertainment to let our thoughts wander over the various ways that the different religions of the Greeks, Romans, and other nations of antiquity, were calculated to act upon and occupy all the fenfes and the imagination, as well as the underftanding, of the people. Even the ancient Jewifh religion was not ill conftructed for this purpofe, by its pompous and magnificent feafts, its mufic, its facrifices, its numerous ceremonies, and their frequency. The ancients feem to have grounded themfelves upon a perfuafion, that all this external of things, this feafting, and occupation of the fenfes, was indifpenfably neceffary for the bulk of mankind; whofe fituations in life utterly difqualified them for philofophy, fubtile calculations and deductions; and who could be but little affected, and that but for a very fhort time, by any fet of abftract fpeculative opinions; which, by defpifing the toys and puppet-fhow work of fuperftition and weaknefs, would leave nothing to amufe the weak and ignorant, who are very numerous, and not always confined to the lower clafs. Their religions were accordingly con-

ftructed

ſtructed in ſuch a manner, as to afford a ſort of general purſuit and occupation, which grew up with every man, at the ſame time as he was purſuing his particular avocation of life; and thoſe who were diſappointed in theſe particular purſuits, found an aſylum and reſource in the matter with which religion was amply ſtored, and with which they could fill up the vacuity of their minds, thus ſickened and forſaken by its other proſpects.

* *

UNIVERSAL RELIGION.

AN univerſal religion cannot be founded but on *principles eternal and invariable, that* are drawn from the nature of man and things; and that, like the propoſitions of geometry, are capable of the moſt rigorous demonſtration. Are there ſuch principles, and can they be equally adapted to all nations? Yes, doubtleſs: or if they vary, it will be *only* in ſome *of their applications to thoſe different countries where* chance has placed the different nations. Heaven requires that man by his reaſon ſhould co-operate to his own happineſs, and that of the numerous ſocieties of the earth.

God has ſaid to man, I have created thee, I have given thee ſenſations, memory, and conſequently reaſon. It is my will that thy reaſon, ſharp-

ſharpened at firſt by want, and afterward enlightened by experience, ſhall provide thee food, teach thee to cultivate the land, to improve the inſtruments of labour, of agriculture; in a word, of all the ſciences of the firſt neceſſity. It is alſo my will, that by cultivating this ſame reaſon, thou mayeſt come to the knowledge of *my moral will*; that is, of thy duties towards ſociety, of the means of maintaining order, and, laſtly, of the beſt legiſlation poſſible.

This is the only natural religion to which mankind ſhould elevate their minds, that only which can become univerſal, that which is alone worthy of God, *which is marked with his* ſeal, and that of the truth. All others muſt bear the *impreſſion* of man, of fraud and falſehood. The will of God, juſt and good, is, that the children of the earth ſhould be happy, and enjoy every pleaſure compatible with the public welfare.

HELVETIUS.

IN RELIGIOUS OPINIONS EVERY MAN THINKS HIMSELF RIGHT.

WE meet every day with people ſo ſceptical with regard to hiſtory, that they aſſert it impoſſible for any nation ever to believe ſuch abſurd principles as thoſe of Greek and Egyptian Paganiſm: and at the ſame time ſo dogmatical with regard

regard to religion, that they think the ſame abſurdities are to be found in no other communion. Cambyſes entertained like prejudices, and very impiouſly ridiculed, and even wounded, Apis, the great god of the Egyptians, who appeared to his profane ſenſes nothing but a large ſpotted bull. But Herodotus judiciouſly aſcribes this ſally of paſſion to a real madneſs or diſorder of the brain. Otherwiſe, ſays the *hiſtorian*, he never would have openly affronted any eſtabliſhed worſhip. For on that head, continues he, every nation are beſt ſatisfied with their own, and think they have the advantage over every other nation.—It muſt be allowed that the Roman Catholics are a very learned ſect; and that no one communion, but that of the church of England, can diſpute their being the moſt learned of all the Chriſtian churches: yet Averroes, the famous Arabian, who, no doubt, had heard of the Egyptian ſuperſtitions, declares, that of all religions, the moſt abſurd and nonſenſical *is that, whoſe* votaries *eat, after having* created, their deity.—There is, indeed, no tenet in all Paganiſm, which can give ſo fair a ſcope to ridicule as this of the *real preſence.* It is ſo abſurd, that it eludes the force of all arguments. But to theſe doctrines we are ſo accuſtomed, that we never wonder at them; though in a future age, it will probably become difficult to perſuade ſome nations that any human

two-legged creature could ever embrace ſuch principles. And it is a thouſand to one but theſe nations themſelves ſhall have ſomething full as abſurd in their own creed, to which they will give a moſt implicite and moſt religious aſſent.—I lodged once at Paris, in the ſame hotel with an ambaſſador from Tunis, who, having paſſed ſome years at London, was returning home that way. One day I obſerved his Mooriſh excellency diverting himſelf under the porch with ſurveying the ſplendid equipages that drove along; when there chanced to paſs that way ſome *Capuchin* friars, who had never ſeen a Turk; as he, on his part, though accuſtomed to the European dreſſes, had never ſeen the groteſque figure of a Capuchin: and there is no expreſſing the mutual admiration with which they inſpired each other. Had the chaplain of the embaſſy entered into a diſpute with theſe Franciſcans, their reciprocal ſurpriſe had been of the ſame nature. Thus all mankind ſtand ſtaring at one another; and there is no beating it out of their heads, that the turban of the African is not juſt as good or as bad a faſhion as the cowl of the European. *He is a very honeſt man,* ſaid the prince of Sallee, ſpeaking of De Ruyter; *it is a pity he were a Chriſtian.*—How can you worſhip leeks and onions? we ſhall ſuppoſe a *Sorbonniſt* to ſay to a prieſt of Sais. If we worſhip them, replies the latter, at leaſt we do

not eat them at the ſame time. But what ſtrange objects of adoration are cats and monkies? ſays the learned doctor. They are at leaſt as good as the relicts and rotten bones of martyrs, anſwers his no leſs learned antagoniſt. Are you mad, inſiſts the Catholic, to cut one another's throats about the preference of a cabbage or cucumber? Yes, ſays the Pagan, I allow it, if you will confeſs that thoſe are ſtill madder, who fight about the preference among volumes of ſophiſtry, ten thouſand of which are not equal in value to one cabbage or cucumber.

Every by-ſtander will eaſily judge (but unfortunately the by-ſtanders are few), that if nothing more were requiſite to eſtabliſh any popular ſyſtem, but expoſing the abſurdities of other ſyſtems, every votary of every ſuperſtition could give a ſufficient reaſon for his blind and bigotted attachment to the principles in which he has been educated. It is with our religion, as with our watches; thoſe of others go either too faſt or too ſlow, ours only gives the true hour of the day.

HUME.

ABSURDITY ESSENTIAL TO POPULAR RELIGIONS.

POPULAR theology, eſpecially the ſcholaſtic, has a kind of appetite for abſurdity and contradiction.

tion. If that theology went not beyond reaſon and common ſenſe, her doctrines would appear too eaſy and familiar. Amazement muſt of neceſſity be raiſed; myſtery affected; darkneſs and obſcurity ſought after; and a foundation of merit afforded the devout votaries who deſire an opportunity of ſubduing their rebellious reaſon.—Eccleſiaſtical hiſtory ſufficiently confirms theſe reflections. When a controverſy is ſtarted, ſome people pretend always with certainty to foretel the iſſue. Whichever opinion, ſay they, is moſt contrary to plain ſenſe, is ſure to prevail; even where the general intereſt of the ſyſtem requires not that deciſion. Though the reproach of hereſy for ſome time be bandied about among the diſputants, it always reſts at laſt on the ſide of reaſon. Any one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough of this kind to know the definition of Arian, Pelagian, Eraſtian, Socinian, Sabellian, Eutychian, Neſtorian, Monothelite, &c. not to mention Proteſtants, whoſe fate is yet uncertain, will be convinced of the truth of this obſervation.—To oppoſe the torrent of ſcholaſtic religion by ſuch feeble maxims as theſe, That *it is impoſſible* for *the ſame thing to be and not to be*, that *the whole is greater than a part*, that *two and three make five*, is pretending to ſtop the ocean with a bullruſh. Will you ſet up profane reaſon againſt ſacred myſtery? No puniſhment is

great enough for your impiety. And the ſame fires which were kindled for heretics, will ſerve alſo for the deſtruction of philoſophers.

HUME.

THE BAD INFLUENCE OF MOST POPULAR RELIGIONS ON MORALITY.

IT is certain, that, in every religion, however ſublime the verbal definition which it gives of its divinity, many of the votaries, perhaps the greater number, will ſtill ſeek the Divine favour, not by virtue and good morals, which alone can be acceptable to a perfect Being, but either by frivolous obſervances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous ecſtaſies, or by the belief of myſterious and abſurd opinions. The leaſt part of the Sadder, as well as the Pentateuch, conſiſts in precepts of morality; and we may be aſſured always, that that part was alſo the leaſt obſerved and regarded. When the old Romans were attacked with a peſtilence, they never aſcribed their ſufferings to their vices, or dreamed of repentance and amendment. They never thought that they were the general robbers of the world, whoſe ambition and avarice made deſolate the earth, and reduced opulent nations to want and beggary. They only created a dictator *clavis figendæ cauſa*, in order to drive a nail into a door; and by that means, they

they thought that they had ſufficiently appeaſed their incenſed deity.—If we ſhould ſuppoſe, what ſeldom happens, that a popular religion were found, in which it was expreſsly declared, that nothing but morality could gain the Divine favour; if an order of prieſts were inſtituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily ſermons, and with all the arts of perſuaſion; yet ſo inveterate are the people's prejudices, that, for want of ſome other ſuperſtition, they would make the very attendance on thoſe ſermons the eſſentials of religion, rather than place them in virtue and good morals. The ſublime prologue of Zaleucus's laws inſpired not the Locrians, ſo far as we can learn, with any ſounder notions of the meaſures of acceptance with the Deity than were familiar to the other Greeks.

This obſervation, then, holds univerſally: but ſtill one may be at ſome loſs to account for it. It is not ſufficient to obſerve, that the people every where degrade their deities into a ſimilitude with themſelves. This will not remove the difficulty. For there is no man ſo ſtupid, as that, judging by his natural reaſon, he would not eſteem virtue and honeſty the moſt valuable qualities which any perſon could poſſeſs. Why not aſcribe the ſame ſentiment to his deity? Why not make all religion, or the chief part of it, to conſiſt in theſe attainments?—Nor is it ſatisfactory to

ſay, *that* the practice of morality is more difficult than that of ſuperſtition; and is therefore rejected. For, not to mention the exceſſive penances of the Brachmans and Talapoins, it is certain, that the Rhamadan of the Turks, the four lents of the Muſcovites, and the auſterities of ſome Roman Catholics, muſt be more ſevere than the practice of any moral duty, even to the moſt vicious and depraved of mankind. In ſhort, all virtues, when men are reconciled to it by ever ſo little practice, is agreeable. All ſuperſtition is for ever odious and burdenſome.—Perhaps the following account may be received as a true ſolution of the difficulty. The duties which a man performs as a friend or parent, ſeem merely owing to his benefactor or children; nor can he be wannting to theſe duties, without breaking through all the ties of nature and morality. A ſtrong inclination may prompt him to the performance: a ſentiment of order and moral beauty joins its force to theſe natural ties: *and the whole man, if truly virtuous, is drawn to his duty without* any effort or endeavour. Even with regard to the virtues which are more auſtere, and more founded on reflection, ſuch as public ſpirit, filial duty, temperance, or integrity; the moral obligation, in our apprehenſion, removes all pretence to religious merit; and the virtuous conduct is deemed no more than what we owe to ſociety and

and ourfelves. In all this a fuperftitious man finds nothing which he has properly performed for the fake of his Deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to the Divine favour and protection. He confiders not, that the moft genuine method of ferving the Divinity is by promoting the happinefs of his creatures. He ftill looks out for fome more immediate fervice of the Supreme Being, in order to allay thofe terrors with which he is haunted. And any practice, recommended to him, which either ferves to no purpofe in life, or offers the ftrongeft violence to his natural inclinations; that practice he will more readily embrace, on account of thofe very circumftances which fhould make him abfolutely reject it. It feems the more purely religious, becaufe it proceeds from no mixture of any other motive or confideration; and if, for its fake, he facrifices much of his eafe and quiet, his claim of merit appears ftill to rife upon him in proportion to the zeal and devotion which he difcovers. In reftoring a loan, or paying a debt, his Divinity is nowife beholden to him; becaufe thefe acts of juftice are what he was bound to perform, and what many would have performed, were there no God in the univerfe. But if he faft a day, or give himfelf a found whipping; this has a direct reference, in his opinion, to the fervice of God. No other motives could engage him to fuch au-

fterities.

ſterities.—Hence the greateſt crimes have been found, in many inſtances, compatible with a ſuperſtitious piety and devotion. Hence it is juſtly regarded as unſafe to draw any certain inference in favour of a man's morals from the fervour or ſtrictneſs of his religious excerciſes, even though he himſelf believes them ſincere. The greateſt and trueſt zeal gives us no ſecurity againſt hypocriſy. HUME.

BARBARITY AND CAPRICE, ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY IN POPULAR RELIGIONS.

BARBARITY and caprice; theſe qualities, however nominally diſguiſed, we may univerſally obſerve, form the ruling character of the Deity in popular religions. How is the Deity disfigured in our repreſentations of him! What abſurdity and immorality are attributed to him! How much is he degraded even below the character, which we ſhould naturally, in common life, aſcribe to a man of ſenſe and virtue. Even prieſts, inſtead of correcting theſe depraved ideas of mankind, have often been found ready to foſter and encourage them. The more tremendous the Divinity is repreſented, the more tame and ſubmiſſive do men become to his miniſters. And the more unaccountable the meaſures of acceptance required by him, the more neceſſary does it become to abandon our

our natural reafon, and to yield to their ghoftly guidance and direction. Thus it may be allowed, that the artifices of men aggravate our natural infirmities and follies of this kind, but never originally beget them. Their root ftrikes deeper into the mind, and fprings from the effential and univerfal properties of human nature. After the commiffion of crimes, there arife remorfes and fecret horrors, which give no reft to the mind, but make it have recourfe to religious rites and ceremonies as expiations of its offences. Whatever weakens or diforders the internal frame, promotes the interefts of fuperftition. While we abandon ourfelves to the natural undifciplined fuggeftions of our timid and anxious hearts, every kind of barbarity is afcribed to the Supreme Being from the terrors with which we are agitated; and every kind of caprice from the methods which we embrace in order to appeafe him. HUME.

THE TERRORS OF RELIGION PREVAIL ABOVE ITS COMFORTS.

IT is allowed that men never have recourfe to devotion fo readily as when dejected with grief or depreffed with ficknefs. Is not this a proof, that the religious fpirit is not fo nearly allied to joy as to forrow?

Men

Men may ſometimes find conſolation in religion when they are afflicted; but it is natural to imagine, that they will form a notion of thoſe unknown beings ſuitable to the preſent gloom and melancholy of their temper, when they betake themſelves to the contemplation of them. Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to predominate in all religions; and we ourſelves, after having *employed the moſt exalted* expreſſion in our deſcriptions of the Deity, fall into the flatteſt contradiction, in affirming, that the damned are infinitely ſupperior in number to the elect.

There never was a popular religion which repreſented the ſtate of departed ſouls in ſuch a light, as would render it eligible for human kind that there ſhould be ſuch a ſtate. Theſe fine models of religion are the mere product of philoſophy. For as death lies between the eye and the proſpect of futurity, that event is ſo ſhocking to nature, that it muſt *throw a gloom on all the* regions *that lie behind* it; and ſuggeſt to the generality of mankind the idea of Cerberus and furies, devils and torrents of fire and brimſtone.

It is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; becauſe both theſe paſſions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them forms a ſpecies of divinity ſuitable to itſelf. But when a man is in a cheerful diſpoſition, he

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is fit for businefs, or company, or entertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies himfelf to thefe, and thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to do but brood upon the terrors of the invifible world, and to plunge himfelf deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, that after he has in this manner engraved the religious opinions deep into his thoughts and imagination, there may arrive a change of health and circumftances which may reftore his good-humour; and raifing cheerful profpects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and triumph. But ftill it muft be acknowledged, that as terror is the primary principle of religion, it is the paffion which always predominates in it, and admits but of fhort intervals of pleafure.

Not to mention, that thefe fits of exceffive, enthufiaftic joy, by exhaufting the fpirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of fuperftitious terror and dejection; nor is there any ftate of mind fo happy as the calm and equable. But this ftate it is impoffible to fupport, where a man thinks that he lies in fuch profound darknefs and uncertainty, between an eternity of happinefs and an eternity of mifery. No wonder that fuch an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind, and throws it into the utmoft confufion. And though that opinion is feldom fo fteady in its operation

ration as to influence all the actions; yet it is apt to make a confiderable breach in the temper, and to produce that gloom and melancholy fo remarkable in all devout people.

HUME.

REMORSE.

IS a man without fear and above the law, he feels no remorfe from the commiffion of a *wicked* action; provided, however, that he has not previoufly contracted a virtuous habit; for then he will not purpofe a contrary conduct, without feeling an uneafinefs, a fecret inquietude; to which is alfo given the name of remorfe. Experience tells us, that every action which does not expofe us to legal punifhment or to difhonour, is an action performed, in general, without remorfe. Solon and Plato loved women and even boys, and avowed it. Theft was not punifhed in Sparta; and the *Lacedæmonians* robbed without remorfe. The Gauls were anciently divided into a great number of particular focieties, that were compofed of about a dozen families; the women of which were in common. They lived among themfelves without remorfe; but no one dared to have a paffion for a woman belonging to another fociety: the law forbade it; and remorfe begins where impunity ends. The in-

quiſitor can with impunity burn whoever does not think as he does on certain metaphyſical points; and it is without remorſe that he gluts his vengeance by hideous torments for a mere dif ference in opinion. Remorſe, therefore, owes its exiſtence to the fear of puniſhment, or of ſhame. HELVETIUS.

REPUTATION.

WHATEVER indifference we affect to ſhow for the good opinion of mankind, every one ſeeks for eſteem, and believes himſelf more worthy of it in proportion as he finds himſelf generally eſteemed: he conſiders *the public ſuffrage* as a ſurety for the high opinion he has of himſelf. The pretended contempt, therefore, for reputation, and the ſacrifice ſaid to be made of it to fortune and reflection, is always inſpired by the deſpair of rendering ourſelves illuſtrious. We boaſt of what we *have*, and *deſpiſe* what we *have not*. This is the neceſſary effect of pride; and we ſhould rebel againſt it were we not its dupes.

HELVETIUS.

RESENTMENT.

TO render reſentment completely commendable, the provocation muſt firſt of all be ſuch

that we ſhould become contemptible, and be expoſed to perpetual inſults, if we did not in ſome meaſure reſent it. Smaller offences are always better neglected; nor is there any thing more deſpicable than that froward and captious humour which takes fire upon every ſlight occaſion of quarrel. We ſhould reſent more from a ſenſe of the propriety of reſentment, from a ſenſe that mankind expect and require it of us, than becauſe we feel in ourſelves the furies of that diſagreeable paſſion. There is no paſſion of which the human mind is capable, concerning whoſe juſtneſs we ought to be ſo doubtful; concerning whoſe indulgence we ought ſo carefully to conſult our natural ſenſe of propriety; or ſo diligently to conſider what will be the ſentiments of the cool and impartial ſpectator. Magnanimity, or a regard to maintain our own rank and dignity in ſociety, is the only motive which can ennoble the expreſſions of this diſagreeable paſſion. This motive muſt characteriſe our whole ſtyle and deportment. Theſe muſt be plain, open, and direct; determined without poſitiveneſs, and elevated without inſolence; not only free from petulance and low ſcurrility, but generous, candid, and full of all proper regards, even for the perſon who has offended us. It muſt appear, in ſhort, from our whole manner, without our labouring affectedly to expreſs it, that paſſion has not

not extinguiſhed our humanity; and that if we yield to the dictates of revenge, it is with reluctance, from neceſſity, and in conſequence of great and repeated provocations. When reſentment is guarded and qualified in this manner, it may be admitted, it is even generous and noble; an oppoſite conduct would be mean-ſpiritedneſs.

A. SMITH.

REVELATION.

THERE is one ſort of propoſitions that challenge the higheſt degree of our aſſent upon bare teſtimony, whether the thing propoſed agree or diſagree with common experience and the ordinary courſe of things, or no. The reaſon whereof is, becauſe the teſtimony is of ſuch an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived; and that is, of God himſelf. This carries with it an aſſurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar name, *revelation;* and our aſſent to to it, *faith;* which as abſolutely determines our minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our knowledge itſelf; and we may as well doubt of our own being, as we can whether any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a ſettled and ſure principle of aſſent and aſſurance, and leaves no manner of room for doubt or heſitation. Only we muſt be ſure that it be a divine revela-

tion, and that we underſtood it right; elſe we *ſhall* expoſe ourſelves to all the extravagancy of enthuſiaſm, and all the error of wrong principles, if we have faith and aſſurance in what is not divine revelation. And therefore, in thoſe caſes, our aſſent can be rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is the meaning of the expreſſions it is delivered in. If the evidence of its being a revelation, or that this is its true ſenſe, be only on probable proofs, our aſſent can reach no higher than an aſſurance or diffidence, ariſing from the more or leſs apparent probability of the proofs.

LOCKE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IF revelation be as liable to be miſunderſtood as arguments drawn from reaſon, it is no ſurer guide to mankind. If it need reaſon's aſſiſtance to explain it, it is weaker. *If it do not open* our underſtandings, ſo as to make us argue more clearly and on better grounds, it is not a greater light. If it confound reaſon, it can never produce rational conviction. If it have not plainly the advantage of reaſon, when compared with that alone, it is not ſuperior to reaſon; or if reaſon have the advantage of revelation, when compared, revelation is inferior to reaſon. If we can know

know nothing truly by revelation without reafon, revelation is no true light at all. Revelation muft be entirely true, perfectly plain and eafy to be underftood; intrinfically pure, juft, confiftent, and harmonious: its precepts and doctrines muft all tend to make men wifer, better, and happier: without thefe qualifications, it wants the proofs of a divine original; it feems to be given in vain, and cannot be the revelation of perfect wifdom: and men of fenfe, devoid of the prejudices of education, will conclude it to be no extraordinary light; and that nothing more is neceffary to direct the faith and practice of mankind, than adhering in judgment to reafon only, freed from all enthufiafm and impofture; and, in practice, to virtue alone, freed from all fuperftition. * *

REVELATION NOT ADMISSIBLE AGAINST REASON.

IN propofitions whofe certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement or difagreement of our ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in felf-evident propofitions, or by evident deductions of reafon in demonftrations, we need not the affiftance of revelation, as neceffary to gain our affent, and introduce them into our minds; becaufe the natural ways of know-

ledge could ſettle them there, or had done it already; which is the greateſt aſſurance we can poſſibly have of any thing, unleſs where God immediately reveals it to us; and there, too, our aſſurance can be no greater than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, ſhake or over-rule plain knowledge, or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction *to the clear evidence of his own* underſtanding. For ſince no evidence of our own faculties, by which we receive ſuch revelations, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive for a truth any thing *that is directly contrary to our clear and diſtinct knowledge*: *v. g.* the ideas of one body and one place do ſo clearly agree, and the mind has ſo evident a perception of their agreement, that we can never aſſent to a propoſition that affirms the ſame body to be in two diſtant places at once, however it ſhould pretend to *the authority of a divine revelation: ſince the evidence, firſt, that we deceive not ourſelves in aſcribing* it to God, ſecondly, that we underſtand it right, can never be ſo great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we diſcern it impoſſible for the ſame body to be in two places at once. *And therefore no propoſition can* be received for divine revelation, or obtain the aſſent

ſent due to all ſuch, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge; becauſe this would be to ſubvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and aſſent whatſoever; and there would be left no difference between truth and falſehood, no meaſures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propoſitions ſhall take place before ſelf-evident; and what we certainly know, give way to what we may poſſibly be miſtaken in. In propoſitions, therefore, contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or diſagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our aſſent, under that or any other title whatſoever. *For faith can never* convince us of any thing that contradicts our knowledge: becauſe though faith be founded on the teſtimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any propoſition to us; yet we cannot have an aſſurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation, greater than our knowledge; ſince the whole ſtrength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which, in this caſe, where the propoſition ſuppoſed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reaſon, will always have this objection hanging to it, *viz*. that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful Author of our Being, which, if received for true, muſt overturn all the principles and foundations of

of knowledge he has given us, render all our faculties uſeleſs, wholly deſtroy the moſt excellent part of his workmanſhip, our underſtandings, and put a man in a condition wherein he will have leſs light, leſs conduct, than the beaſt that periſheth. For if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not ſo clear) evidence of any thing to be a divine revelation, as it has of the principles of its own reaſon, it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reaſon, to give a place to a propoſition whoſe revelation has not a greater evidence than thoſe principles have.

Thus far a man has uſe of reaſon, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original revelation, where it is ſuppoſed to be made to himſelf: but to all thoſe who pretend not to immediate revelation, but are required to pay obedience and to receive the truths revealed to others, which, by the tradition of writings or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them; reaſon has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only divine revelation, and nothing elſe, faith, as we uſe the word, (called commonly divine faith), has to do with no propoſitions but thoſe which are ſuppoſed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not ſee how thoſe who make revelation alone the ſole object of faith, can ſay, that it

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is a matter of faith, and not of reafon, to believe that fuch or fuch a propofition, to be found in fuch or fuch a book, is of divine infpiration; unlefs it be revealed, that that propofition, or all in that book, was communicated by divine infpiration. Without fuch a revelation, the believing or not believing that propofition or book to be of divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but matter of reafon; and fuch as I muft come to an affent to only by the ufe of my reafon; which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary to itfelf: it being impoffible for reafon ever to procure any affent to that which to *itfelf appears unreafonable.*

In all things therefore, *where we have* clear evidence from our ideas, and thofe principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, reafon is the proper judge; and revelation, though it may in confenting with it confirm its dictates, yet cannot *in* fuch cafes invalidate its decrees: nor can we be *obliged, where we have* the clear and evident fentence of reafon, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith; which can have no authority againft the plain and clear dictates of reafon.

LOCKE.

REVENUES OF THE STATE.

THE revenues of the ſtate are ſacred; it is not only the moſt infamous theft, but actual treaſon, to miſapply them or pervert them from their original deſtination. It reflects a great diſhonour on Rome, that the integrity of Cato the cenſor was ſomething ſo very remarkable; and that an emperor, on rewarding the talents of a ſinger with a few crowns, thought it neceſſary to obſerve, that the money came from his own private purſe, and not from the public treaſury. But if we find few Galbas, where ſhall we look for a Cato? For when vice is no longer diſhonourable, what chiefs will be ſo ſcrupulous as to abſtain from touching the public revenues left to their diſcretion, and even not to affect in time to confound their own expenſive and ſcandalous diſſipations with the glory of the ſtate, and the means of extending their own influence with that of augmenting its power? It is particularly with regard to this delicate part of the adminiſtration that virtue alone is the only efficacious inſtrument, and that the integrity of the miniſter is the only rein capable of reſtraining his avarice. Books of accounts, inſtead of ſerving to expoſe frauds, tend only to conceal them; for prudence is never ſo ready to conceive new precautions as knavery is to elude them.

them. Never mind account-books and papers, therefore; but place the management of the finances in honeſt hands: this is the only way to have them well employed, however they are accounted for. ROUSSEAU.

REVENUES OF THE CHURCH.

THE revenue of every eſtabliſhed church, ſuch parts of it excepted as may ariſe from particular lands or manors, is a branch, it ought to be obſerved, of the general revenue of the ſtate, which is thus diverted to a purpoſe very different from the defence of the ſtate. The tithe, for example, is a real land-tax, which puts it out of the power of the proprietors of land to contribute ſo largely towards the defence of the ſtate as they otherwiſe might be able to do. The rent of land, however, is, according to ſome, the ſole fund, and, according to others, the principal fund, from which, in all great monarchies, the exigences of the ſtate muſt be ultimately ſupplied. The more of this fund that is given to the church, the leſs, it is evident, can be ſpared to the ſtate. It may be laid down as a certain maxim, that, all other things being ſuppoſed equal, the richer the church, the poorer muſt neceſſarily be, either the ſovereign on the one hand, or the people on the other; and, in all caſes, the leſs able muſt the ſtate be

to

to defend itſelf. In ſeveral Proteſtant countries, particularly in all the Proteſtant cantons of Switzerland, the revenue which anciently belonged to the Roman-Catholic church, the tithes and church-lands, has been found a fund ſufficient not only to afford competent ſalaries to the eſtabliſhed clergy, but to defray, with little or no addition, all the other expences of the ſtate. The magiſtrates of the powerful canton of Berne, in particular, have accumulated out of the ſavings from this fund a very large ſum, ſuppoſed to amount to ſeveral millions; part of which is depoſited in a public treaſure, and part is placed at intereſt in what are called the public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe; chiefly in thoſe of France and Great Britain. What may be the amount of the whole expence which the church either of Berne or of any other Proteſtant canton, coſts the ſtate, I do not pretend to know. By a very exact account it appears, that, in 1755, the whole revenue of the clergy of the church of Scotland, including their glebe or church lands, and the rent of their manſes or dwelling-houſes, eſtimated according to a reaſonable valuation, amounted only to 68,514l. 1s. $5\frac{1}{12}$d. This very moderate revenue affords a decent ſubſiſtence to nine hundred and forty-four miniſters. The whole expence of the church, including what is occaſionally laid out for the building and reparation

of churches, and of the manses of ministers, cannot well be supposed to exceed eighty or eighty-five thousand pounds a-year. The most opulent church in Christendom does not maintain better the uniformity of faith, the fervour of devotion, the spirit of order, regularity, and austere morals in the great body of the people, than this very poorly-endowed church of Scotland. All the good effects, both civil and religious, which an established church can be supposed to produce, are produced by it as completely as by any other. The greater part of the Protestant churches of Switzerland, which in general are not better endowed than the church of Scotland, produce those effects in a still higher degree. In the greater part of the Protestant cantons, there is not a single person to be found who does not profess himself to be of the established church. If he professes himself to be of any other, indeed, the law obliges him to leave the canton. But so severe, or rather indeed so oppressive a law, could never have been executed in such free countries, had not the diligence of the clergy before-hand converted to the established church the whole body of the people, with the exception of perhaps a few individuals only. In some parts of Switzerland, accordingly, where, from the accidental union of a Protestant and Roman-Catholic country, the conversion has not been so complete:

both religions are not only tolerated, but eſtabliſhed by law.

The proper performance of every ſervice ſeems to require that its pay or recompence ſhould be, as exactly as poſſible, proportioned to the nature of the ſervice. If any ſervice is very much underpaid, it is very apt to ſuffer by the meanneſs and incapacity of the greater part of thoſe who are employed in it. If it is very much overpaid, it is apt to ſuffer perhaps ſtill more by their negligence and idleneſs. A man of a large revenue, whatever may be his profeſſion, thinks he ought to live like other men of large revenues; and to ſpend a great part of his time in feſtivity, in vanity, and in diſſipation. But, in a clergyman, this train of life not only conſumes the time which ought to be employed in the duties of his function; but in the eyes of the common people deſtroys almoſt entirely that ſanctity of character which can alone enable him to perform thoſe duties with proper weight and authority.

A. SMITH.

THE INHUMANITY OF THE RICH AND POWERFUL.

THE rich and powerful generally paſs for men without feeling. In fact, whether men are naturally cruel, whenever they can be ſo with impu-

nity;

nity; whether the rich and powerful consider the miseries of others as a reproach for their own happiness; or, in short, whether they desire to be delivered from the importunate requests of the unhappy; it is certain that they almost constantly treat the miserable with inhumanity. The least fault a man in distress commits, is a sufficient pretence for the rich to refuse him all assistance: they would have the unhappy entirely perfect.

HELVETIUS.

RICHES, AND THEIR ENJOYMENT.

WITH the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which, in their eyes, is never so complete as when they appear to possess those decisive marks of opulence which nobody can possess but themselves. In their eyes, the merit of an object, which is in any degree either useful or beautiful, is greatly enhanced by its scarcity, or by the great labour which it requires to collect any considerable quantity of it; a labour which nobody can afford to pay but themselves. Such objects they are willing to purchase at a higher price than things much more beautiful and useful, but more common. These qualities of utility, beauty, and scarcity, are the original foundation of the high price of the precious metals, or of the great quan-

tity of other goods for which they can every where be exchanged. This value was antecedent to and independent of their being employed as coin, and was the quality which fitted them for that employment. That employment, however, by occasioning a new demand, and by diminishing the quantity which could be employed in any other way, may have afterwards contributed to keep up or increase their value.

A. SMITH.

THE ACQUISITION OF RICHES.

TO make a fortune, it requires nothing more than a *strongly determined resolution to succeed by patience* and boldness: perhaps it is the only success which affords no proof of any kind of genius; for a genius of intrigue and dexterity is not worthy of that name; it is the genius of those who have no other, and wish for none beside. It is by making a long and successful use of this so very common a *talent*, that persons without merit and without name, are able to arrive at very large fortunes and considerable employments.

D'ALEMBERT.

WHAT-

WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT.

TO deny that there is any evil in the world, may be ſaid as a banter by a Lucullus, full of health, and feaſting in his ſaloon with his miſtreſs; but only let him look out of the window, and he will ſee ſome unhappy people, and a fever will make the great man himſelf ſo.

Lactantius, in his 13th chapter on the Divine anger, puts the following words in the mouth of Epicurus: "Either God would remove evil out "of this world, and cannot; or he can, and will "not; or he has neither the power nor will; "or, laſtly, he has both the power and will. If "he has the will and not the power, this ſhows "weakneſs, which is contrary to the nature of "God: If he has the power and not the will, it "is malignity; and this is no leſs contrary to "his nature. If he is neither able nor willing, "it is both weakneſs and malignity: If he be "both willing and able (which alone is conſo-"nant to the nature of God) how came it "that there is evil in the world?" To this argument Lactantius replies, "That God wills "evil, but that he has given us wiſdom for ac-"quiring good." This anſwer muſt be allowed to fall very ſhort of the objection; as ſuppoſing that God, without producing evil, could

not have given us wiſdom: if ſo, our wiſdom is a dear bargain.

The origin of evil has ever been an abyſs; the bottom of which lies beyond the reach of human eyes: and many philoſophers, in their perplexity, had recourſe to two principles; one good, the other evil. Typhon was the evil principle among the Egyptians, and Arimanus among the Perſians. This divinity is well known to have been eſpouſed by the Manicheans.

Amidſt the abſurdities which ſwarm in the world, and may be claſſed among its evils, it is no ſlight error to have ſuppoſed two almighty beings ſtruggling for the maſtery, and making an agreement together, like Moliere's two phyſicians, Allow me the puke, and I will allow you the bleeding.

Baſilides, from the Platonics, affirmed, ſo early as the firſt century of the church, that God gave our world to be made by the loweſt angels; and that by their ignorance things are as they are. This theological fable falls to pieces before the terrible objection, that it is not in the nature of an infinitely wiſe and powerful God to cauſe a world to be conſtructed by ignorant architects, who know not how to conduct ſuch a taſk. Simon, aware of this objection, obviates it by ſaying, that the angel who acted as ſurveyor is damned

damned for his bungling: But this bungling of the angel does not mend our caſe.

Neither does the Grecian ſtory of Pandora ſolve the objection any better. The box with all evils in it, and Hope remaining in the bottom, is indeed a charming allegory; but this Pandora was made by Vulcan purely to be revenged of Prometheus, who had formed a man of mud.

The Indians are not in any reſpect nearer the mark: God, they ſay, in creating man gave him a drug, by which he was to enjoy perpetual health: the man put this drug on his aſs; the aſs being thirſty, the ſerpent ſhowed it the way to a ſpring; and whilſt the aſs was drinking, the ſerpent made off with the drug.

The Syrians had a conceit, that the man and the woman having been created in the fourth heaven, they took a fancy to eat a bit of cake inſtead of ambroſia their natural regale. Ambroſia perſpired through the pores: but after eating the cake, they had a motion to go to ſtool; and aſked an angel the way to the privy. Do you ſee, ſaid the angel, yon little planet, ſcarce viſible? That is the privy of the univerſe; make the beſt of your way thither. They marched; and there they were left to continue; and ever ſince this our world has been what it is.

But the Syrians know not what to anſwer, when they are aſked, Why God permitted man to

eat of the cake, and why it ſhould be productive of ſuch dreadful evils to us?

The hypotheſis, That *whatever is, is right*, is favoured and ſupported by Bolingbroke, Pope, and Shaftſbury. In the treatiſe of Shaftſbury, intitled The Moraliſt, are theſe words: "Much "is alleged in anſwer, to ſhow why nature errs, "and how ſhe came thus impotent and erring "from an unerring hand. But I deny ſhe errs— "it is, on the contrary, from this order of in-"ferior and ſuperior things, that we admire the "world's beauty, founded thus on contrarities; "whilſt from ſuch various and diſagreeing prin-"ciples an univerſal concord is eſtabliſhed.

"Thus in the ſeveral orders of terreſtrial forms "a reſignation is required, a ſacrifice and yielding "of natures one to another. The vegetables by "their death ſuſtain the animals; and animal "bodies diſſolved enrich the earth, and raiſe again "the vegetable world. Numerous inſects are "reduced again by the ſuperior kinds of birds "and beaſt; and theſe again are checked by "man; who in his turn ſubmits to other natures, "and reſigns his form a ſacrifice in common to "the reſt of things. And if in natures ſo little "exalted and pre-eminent above each other, the "ſacrifice of intereſt can appear ſo juſt; how "much more reaſonably may all inferior natures "be ſubjected to the ſuperior nature of the

"world!

"world! The central powers, which hold the "lasting orbs in their just poise and movement, "must not be controlled to save a fleeting form, and "rescue from the precipice a puny animal, whose "brittle frame, however protected, must of itself "so soon dissolve. The ambient air, the inward "vapours, the impending meteors, or whatever "else is nutrimental or preservative of the earth, "must operate in a natural course; and other "constitutions must submit to the good habit and "constitution of the all-sustaining globe."—— This hypothesis is not more satisfactory than the others. Their *whatever is, is right*, imports no more than that all is directed by immutable laws; and who knows not that? Flies are produced to be devoured by spiders, by swallows, &c. &c. We see a clear and stated order throughout every species of creatures; in short, there is order in all things.

Had we no feeling, no objection would lie against such a system: but that is not the point; what we ask is, Whether there are no sensible evils, and whence they have originated? Pope, in his 4th epistle, on *Whatever is, is right*, says, "There is no evil, or partial evil is universal "good." An odd general good, indeed, composed of the gout, the stone, pains, afflictions, crimes, sufferings, death and damnation!

This system of, *whatever is, is right*, represents the

the Author of nature merely as powerful; as a cruel king, who, if he does but compaſs his deſigns, is very eaſy about the death, diſtreſſes, and afflictions of his ſubjects.

Were our firſt parents to be driven out of paradiſe, where they were to have lived for ever had they not eaten an apple? Were they in wretchedneſs to beget children loaded with a variety of wretchedneſs, and making others as wretched as themſelves? Were they to undergo ſuch diſeaſes? to feel ſuch vexations? to expire in pain? and, by way of refreſhment, to be burned through all the ages of eternity? Will theſe ſufferings prove, that *whatever is, is right?* So very far is the opinion of the beſt world poſſible from being conſolatory, that it puzzles thoſe very philoſophers who embrace it; and the queſtion of good and evil remains an inexplicable chaos to candid inquirers. VOLTAIRE.

ORIGIN OF RIGHT AND DUTY.

THAT may be ſaid to be my duty to do (underſtand political duty) which you (or ſome other perſon or perſons) have a right to have me made to do. I have then a duty towards you: you have a right as againſt me. What you have a right to have me made to do (underſtand a political right) is that which I am liable, accor-

ding to law, upon a requiſition made on your behalf, to be puniſhed for not doing.—I ſay puniſhed: for without the notion of puniſhment (that is, of pain annexed to an act, and accruing on a certain account, and from a certain ſource) no notion can we have of either right or duty.—One may conceive three ſorts of duties; *political*, moral, and religious; correſpondent to the three ſorts of ſanctions by which they are enforced: or the ſame point of conduct may be a man's duty on theſe three ſeveral accounts.—Political duty is created by puniſhment; or at leaſt by the will of perſons who have puniſhment in their hands; perſons ſtated and certain—political ſuperiors.—Religious duty is *alſo* created by puniſhment; by puniſhment expected at the hands of a perſon certain—the Supreme Being.—Moral duty is created by a kind of motive, which from the uncertainty of the perſons to apply it, and of the ſpecies and degree in which it will be applied, has hardly yet got the name of puniſhment: by various mortifications reſulting from the ill-will of perſons uncertain and variable—the community in general; that is, ſuch individuals of that community as he, whoſe duty is in queſtion, ſhall happen to be connected with.—When in any of theſe three ſenſes a man aſſerts a point of conduct to be a duty, what he aſſerts is the exiſtence, actual or probable, of an external event, viz. of

a punishment issuing from one or other of these sources in consequence of a contravention of the duty: an event extrinsic to, and distinct from, as well the conduct of the person spoken of as the sentiment of him that speaks. If he persists in asserting it to be a duty, but without meaning it should be understood that it is on any of these three accounts that he looks upon it as such, all he then asserts is his own internal sentiment; all he means then is, that he feels himself pleased or displeased at the thoughts of the point of conduct in question, but without being able to tell why. J. BENTHAM.

STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

THE different principles sought for in different times by different men as standards of right and wrong, may be reduced to the following.

1. The principle of the Monks; or, as it is commonly called, Asceticism, or the Ascetic Principle. *See the article* MONKS.

2. The principle of sympathy and antipathy. *See the article* SYMPATHY.

3. The principle of utility. *See the article* UTILITY.

The *theological* principle; meaning that principle which professes to recur for the standard of right and wrong to the revealed will of God,

more clofely examined, feems to be never any thing more or lefs than one or other of the three before-mentioned principles, prefenting itfelf under another fhape.

The happinefs of the individuals, of whom a community is compofed, that is, their pleafures and their fecurity, being the end, and the fole end, which the legiflator ought to have in view; and the fole ftandard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legiflator, to be *made* to fafhion his behaviour, none but the principle of utility, as the only one which is capable of being conftantly purfued, can be the proper ftandard of right and wrong, and the true foundation of a wife code of laws.

J. BENTHAM.

RIGHT AND WRONG.

THE various fyftems that have hitherto been formed concerning the ftandard of *right and wrong*, may all be reduced to the principle of fympathy and antipathy. One account may ferve for all of them. They confift all of them in fo many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external ftandard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author's fentiment or opinion as a reafon for itfelf. The phrafes different, but the principle the fame.

It is curious enough to obferve the variety of

inventions men have hit upon, and the variety of phrafes they have brought forward, in order to conceal from the world, and, if poffible, from themfelves, this very general, and therefore very pardonable, felf-fufficiency.

1. One man fays, he has a thing made on purpofe to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called a *moral fenfe:* and then he goes to work at his eafe; and fays, fuch a thing is right, and fuch a thing is wrong—Why? " be-" caufe my moral fenfe tells me it is."

2. Another man comes and alters the phrafe; leaving out *moral*, and putting in *common*, in the room of it. He then tells you, that his common fenfe teaches him what is right and wrong, as furely as the other's moral fenfe did: meaning, by common fenfe, a fenfe of fome kind or other, which, he fays, is poffeffed by all mankind; the fenfe of thofe, whofe fenfe is not the fame as the author's, being ftruck out of the account as not worth taking. This contrivance does better than the other: for a moral fenfe being a new thing, a man may feel about him a good while without being able to find it out; but common fenfe is as old as the creation, and there is no man but would be afhamed to be thought not to have as much of it as his neighbours. It has another great advantage; by appearing to fhare power, it leffens envy: for when a man gets up upon this ground, in order

der to anathematize thoſe who differ from him, it is not by a *ſic volo ſic jubeo,* but by a *velitis jubeatis.*

3. Another man comes, and ſays, that as to a moral ſenſe indeed, he cannot find that he has any ſuch thing; that however he has an *underſtanding*, which will do quite as well. This underſtanding, he ſays, is the ſtandard of right and wrong: it tells him ſo and ſo. All good and wiſe men underſtand as he does: if other mens underſtandings differ in any point from his, ſo much the worſe for them; it is a ſure ſign they are either defective or corrupt.

4. Another man ſays, that there is an eternal and immutable rule of right; that that rule of right dictates ſo and ſo: and then he begins giving you his ſentiments upon any thing that comes uppermoſt; and theſe ſentiments (you are to take for granted) are ſo many branches of the eternal rule of right.

5. Another man, or perhaps the ſame man (it is no matter) ſays, that there are certain practices conformable, and others repugnant, to the fitneſs of things: and then he tells you, at his leiſure, what practices are conformable, and what repugnant; juſt as he happens to like a practice or diſlike it.

6. A great multitude of people are continually talking of the law of nature, and then they go on

giving you their ſentiments about what is right and what is wrong; and theſe ſentiments, you are to underſtand, are ſo many chapters and ſections of the law of nature.

7. Inſtead of the phraſe, law of nature, you have ſometimes, law of reaſon, right reaſon, natural juſtice, natural equity, good order. Any of them will do equally well. This latter is moſt uſed in politics. The three laſt are *much* more tolerable than the others, becauſe they do not very explicitly claim to be any thing more than phraſes: they inſiſt but feebly upon being looked upon as ſo many poſitive ſtandards of themſelves, and ſeem content to be taken, upon occaſion, for phraſes expreſſive of the conformity of the thing in queſtion to the proper ſtandard, whatever that may be. On moſt occaſions, however, it will be better to ſay *utility*: *utility* is clearer, as refering more explicitly to pain and pleaſure.

8. We have one philoſopher who ſays, there is no harm in any thing in the world but in telling a lie: and that if, for example, you were to murder your own father, this would only be a particular way of ſaying he was not your father. Of courſe, when this philoſopher ſees any thing that he does not like, he ſays, it is a particular way of telling a lie. It is ſaying, that the act ought to be done, or may be done, when, *in truth*, it ought not to be done.

9. The

9. The faireſt and openeſt of them all is that ſort of man who ſpeaks out, and ſays, I am of the number of the elect: now God himſelf takes care to inform the elect what is right; and that with ſo good effect, that let them ſtrive ever ſo, they cannot help not only knowing it but practiſing it. If therefore a man wants to know what is right and what is wrong, he has nothing to do but to come to me.

It is upon the principle of antipathy that ſuch and ſuch acts are often reprobated on the ſcore of their being *unnatural:* the practice of expoſing children, eſtabliſhed among the Greeks and Romans, was an unnatural practice. Unnatural, when it means any thing, it means unfrequent: and there it means ſomething, although nothing to the preſent purpoſe. But here it means no ſuch thing: for the frequency of ſuch acts is perhaps the great complaint. It therefore means nothing; nothing, I mean, which there is in the act itſelf. All it can ſerve to expreſs is, the diſpoſition of the perſon who is talking of it; the diſpoſition he is in to be angry at the thoughts of it. Does it merit his anger? Very likely it may: but whether it does or no is a queſtion, which, to be anſwered rightly, can only be anſwered upon the principle of utility.

Unnatural, is as good a word as *moral ſenſe,* or *common ſenſe:* and would be as good a foun-

dation for a ſyſtem. Such an act is unnatural; that is, repugnant to nature: for I do not like to practiſe it; and conſequently do not practiſe it. It is therefore repugnant to what ought to be the nature of every body elſe.

The miſchief common to all theſe ways of thinking and arguing (which, in truth, as we have ſeen, are but one and the ſame method couched in different forms of words) is their ſerving as a cloak, and pretence, and aliment, to deſpotiſm: if not a deſpotiſm in practice, a deſpotiſm however in diſpoſition; which is but too apt, when pretence and power offers, to ſhow itſelf in practice. The conſequence is, that with intentions very commonly of the pureſt kind, a man becomes a torment either to himſelf or his fellow-creatures. If he be of the melancholy caſt, he ſits in ſilent grief, bewailing their blindneſs or depravity: if of the iraſcible, he declaims with fury and virulence againſt all who differ from him; blowing up the coals of fanaticiſm, and branding, with the charge of corruption and inſincerity, every man who does not think, or profeſs to think, as he does.

If ſuch a man happens to poſſeſs the advantages of ſtyle, his book may do a conſiderable deal of miſchief before the nothingneſs of it is underſtood.

Theſe principles, if ſuch they can be called, it is

is more frequent to ſee applied to morals than to politics; but their influence extends itſelf to both. In politics, as well as morals, a man will be at leaſt equally glad of a pretence for deciding any queſtion in the manner that beſt pleaſes him, without the trouble of inquiry. If a man is an infallible judge of what is right and wrong in the actions of private individuals, why not in the meaſures to be obſerved by public men in the direction of ſuch actions of thoſe individuals? Accordingly (not to mention other chimeras) I have more than once known the pretended law of nature ſet up in legiſlative debates, in oppoſition to arguments derived from the principle of utility.

" But is it never, then, from any other conſide-" rations than thoſe of utility, that we derive our " notions of right and wrong?" I do not know: I do not care. Whether a moral ſentiment can be originally conceived from any other ſource than a view of utility, is one queſtion; whether upon examination and reflection it can, in point of fact, be actually perſiſted in and juſtified on any other ground, by a perſon reflecting within himſelf, is another; whether in point of right it can properly be juſtified on any other ground, by a perſon addreſſing himſelf to the community, is a third. The two firſt are queſtions of ſpeculation; it matters not, comparatively ſpeaking, how they are decided. The laſt is a queſtion of practice; the deciſion of it

it is of as much importance as that of any can be.

" I feel in myfelf," fay you, " a difpofition to " approve of fuch or fuch an action in a moral " view: but this is not owing to any notions I " have of its being a ufeful one to the commu- " nity. I do not pretend to know whether it be " an ufeful one or not: it may be, for aught I " know, a mifchievous one." " But is it then," fay I, " a mifchievous one? examine; and if you " can make yourfelf fenfible that it is fo, then, if " duty means any thing, that is, moral duty, it is " your *duty* at leaft to abftain from it; and more " than that, if it is what lies in your power, and " can be done without too great a facrifice, to " endeavour to prevent it. It is not your cherifh- " ing the notion of it in your bofom, and giving " it the name of virtue, that will excufe you."

" I feel in myfelf," fay you again, " a difpofi- " tion to deteft fuch or fuch an action in a moral " view; but this is not owing to any notions I " have of its being a *mifchievous* one to the com- " munity. I do not pretend to know whether it " be a mifchievous one or not: it may be not a " mifchievous one; it may be, for aught I know, " an ufeful one."—" May it indeed," fay I, " an " ufeful one? But let me tell you then, that un- " lefs duty, and right and wrong, be juft what " you pleafe to make them, if it really be not a

" a

"a mischievous one, and any body has a mind to
"do it, it is no duty of your's; but, on the con-
"trary, it would be very wrong in you to take
"upon you to prevent him: detest it within your-
"self as much as you please; that may be a very
"good reason (unless it be also a useful one) for
"your not doing it yourself; but if you go about,
"by word or deed, to do any thing to hinder him,
"or make him suffer for it, it is you, and not he,
"that have done wrong: it is not your setting
"yourself to blame his conduct, or branding it
"with the name of vice, that will make him cul-
"pable, or you blameless. Therefore, if you can
"make yourself content that he shall be of one
"mind, and you of another, about *that* matter,
"and so continue, it is well; but if nothing will
"serve you, but that you and he must needs be
"of the same mind, I'll tell you what you have
"to do; it is for you to get the better of your an-
"tipathy, not for him to truckle to it."

J. BENTHAM.

THE DECLINE OF ROMAN LEARNING, AND THE REVIVAL OF LETTERS.

THOSE who cast their eye on the general revolutions of society, will find, that as all the improvements of the human mind had reached nearly to their state of perfection about the age of

of Auguſtus, there was a ſenſible decline from that point or period; and men thenceforth relapſed gradually into ignorance and barbariſm. The unlimited extent of the Roman empire, and the conſequent deſpotiſm of the monarchs, extinguiſhed all emulation, debaſed the generous ſpirits of men, and depreſſed that noble flame by which all the refined arts muſt be cheriſhed and enlivened. The military government, which ſoon ſucceeded, and rendered even the lives and properties inſecure and precarious, proved deſtructive to thoſe vulgar and more neceſſary arts of agricuture, manufactures, and commerce; and, in the end, to the military art and genius itſelf, by which alone the immenſe fabric of the empire could be ſupported. The irruption of the barbarous nations, which ſoon followed, overwhelmed all human knowledge, which was already far in its decline; and men ſunk every age deeper into ignorance, ſtupidity, and ſuperſtition; till the light of ancient ſcience and hiſtory had very nearly ſuffered a total extinction in all the European nations.

But there is an ultimate point of depreſſion, as well as of exaltation, from which human affairs naturally return in a contrary progreſs, and beyond which they ſeldom paſs, either in their advancement or decline.—The period in which the people of Chriſtendom were the loweſt ſunk in igno-

ignorance, and conſequently in diſorders of every kind, may juſtly be fixed at the eleventh century, about the age of William the Conqueror; and from that æra, the ſun of ſcience beginning to reaſcend, threw out many gleams of light, which preceded the full morning when letters were revived in the fifteenth century. The Danes and other northern people, who had ſo long infeſted the coaſts, and even the inland parts of Europe, by their depredations, having now learned the arts of tillage and agriculture, found a ſettled ſubſiſtence at home, and were no longer tempted to deſert their induſtry, in order to ſeek a precarious livelihood by rapine, and by the plunder of their neighbours.——The *feudal governments* alſo, among the more ſouthern nations, were reduced to a kind of ſyſtem; and though that ſtrange ſpecies of civil polity was ill fitted to enſure either liberty or tranquillity, it was preferable to univerſal licence and diſorder, which had every where preceded it.—But perhaps there was no event which tended further to the improvement of the age, than one which has not been much remarked, the accidental finding a copy of Juſtinian's Pandects, about the year 1130, in the town of Amalfi in *Italy*. It is eaſy to ſee what advantages Europe muſt have reaped by its inheriting at once from the ancients ſo complete an art, which was of itſelf ſo neceſſary for giving ſecurity to all other

arts;

arts; and which by refining, and ſtill more by beſtowing ſolidity on the judgment, ſerved as a model to further improvements. The ſenſible utility of the Roman law, both to public and private intereſt, recommended the ſtudy of it, at a time when the more exalted and ſpeculative ſciences carried no charms with them: and thus the laſt branch of ancient literature, which remained uncorrupted, was, happily, the firſt tranſmitted to the modern world. For it is remarked, that, in the decline of Roman learning, when the philoſophers were univerſally infected with ſuperſtition and ſophiſtry, and the poets and hiſtorians with barbariſm, the lawyers, who in other countries are ſeldom models of ſcience and politeneſs, were yet able, by the conſtant ſtudy and cloſe imitation of their predeceſſors, to maintain the ſame good ſenſe in their deciſions and reaſonings, and the ſame purity in their language and expreſſion.

HUME.

THE CAUSE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC.

WHEN the intereſt of a ſtate is changed, and the laws, which, at the firſt foundation, were uſeful, are become prejudicial; thoſe very laws, by the reſpect conſtantly preſerved for them, muſt neceſſarily draw the ſtate to its ruin. Who doubts that the deſtruction of the Roman republic was

the effect of a ridiculous veneration for the ancient laws, and that this blind respect forged the fetters with which Cæsar loaded his country? After the destruction of Carthage, when Rome attained the summit of her glory, the Romans, from the opposition they then found between their interests, their manners, and their laws, ought to have foreseen the revolution with which the empire was threatened; and to have been sensible, that, to save the state, the republic in a body ought to have pressed the making those reformations which the times and circumstances required; and above all, to hasten the prevention of those changes that personal ambition, the most dangerous to the legislature, might introduce. The same laws which had raised the Romans to the highest elevation, could not support them in that state: an empire, like a vessel which the winds have driven to a certain latitude, where, being opposed by other winds, it is in danger of being lost, if, to avoid shipwreck, the pilot does not speedily change his course. This political truth was well known to Mr Locke, who, on the establishment of the legislature of Georgia, proposed that his laws should be in force only one century; and at that time being expired, they should become void if they were not afresh examined and confirmed. He was sensible that a military or commercial government supposed very different laws; and that a legislation

proper to favour commerce and induſtry, might one day become fatal to that colony, if its neighbours entered into a war among themſelves, and circumſtances made it neceſſary for that people to become more warlike than commercial.

HELVETIUS.

THE INHUMANITY OF THE ROMANS.

A LOVE for their country, popularity, and generoſity, were virtues common to the ancients; but true philanthropy, a regard for public welfare and general order, are ſentiments to which the paſt ages were abſolutely ſtrangers. And how, indeed, could ſuch ſentiments have exiſted amongſt men, accuſtomed from their infancy to behold thouſands of gladiators mutually ſlaughtering one another, and periſhing even amidſt the acclamations of the women?—Such exalted feelings as theſe could never have animated a people, who ſo frequently ſaw priſoners of war, chiefs, and kings publicly conducted, in purſuance of a decree, to execution, and completing by their deaths the feſtivity of a triumph. The Romans were ſo rigorous in all their criminal proſecutions, as never to ſuppoſe that the number of the guilty could ſuggeſt a reaſon why any ſhould be pardoned. Amidſt all the atrocious actions of which the Romans were guilty, the greateſt reproach which

which they have incurred, is on account of their having never treated man, in general, as a kind of fellow-creature. The extreme rigour of their puniſhments might, perhaps, have been excuſable, had it been founded on a love of order, and had it been extended with equal ſeverity againſt all. But who will not be ſurpriſed, at perceiving, that theſe ſanguinary judges inflicted no other puniſhment, but the puniſhment of ſending into exile, on a Roman citizen, even although he might have committed a thouſand aſſaſſinations. It muſt be confeſſed, that virtue hath been, in every æra, what beauty ſtill is amongſt different nations; not that which nature hath produced the moſt perfect, but the greateſt perfection of features which ſhe may have given to each nation, and in each climate. As in the antique ſtatues, the countenances of a Venus or an Helen preſerve a certain expreſſion of auſterity in our eyes, extremely inconſiſtent with thoſe graces diffuſed through other forms; ſo the virtues of the ancients were continually tinged with the vices of their age.

CHATTELUR.

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF THE ROMANS.

THE Romans well underſtood that policy which teaches the ſecurity ariſing to the chief govern-

ment from ſeparate ſtates among the governed, when they reſtored the liberty of the ſtates of Greece (oppreſſed, but united, under Macedon) by an edict that every ſtate ſhould live under its own laws. They did not even name a governor. Independence of each other, and ſeparate intereſts, (though, among a people united by common manners, language, and I may ſay religion, inferior neither in wiſdom, bravery, nor the love of liberty, to the Romans themſelves), was all the ſecurity the ſovereigns wiſhed for their ſovereignty. It is true they did not call themſelves ſovereigns. They ſet no value on the title: they were contented with poſſeſſing the thing; and poſſeſs, as they did, even without a ſtanding army. (What can be a ſtronger proof of the ſecurity of their poſſeſſion?) And yet, by a policy ſimilar to this throughout, was the Roman world ſubdued and held; a world compoſed of above an hundred languages and ſet of manners different from thoſe of their maſters. When the Romans had ſubdued Macedon and Illyricum, they were both formed into republics by a decree of the Senate; and Macedon was thought ſafe from the danger of a revolution by being divided into a diviſion common among the Romans; as we learn from the accounts of the tetrarchs in Scripture. In the firſt inſtance, it was their pleaſure that the Macedonians and Illyrians ſhould be free; that it might

might be clear to all nations that the arms of the Roman people did not bring ſlavery upon the free, but, on the contrary, freedom to thoſe who were enſlaved. Nations in a ſtate of liberty were to feel that liberty, ſafe and perpetual, under the patronage of the people of Rome: thoſe that lived under kings were to find their kings milder and juſter at the inſtant, out of reſpect to the Roman people; and if war ſhould at any time take place between the Roman people and their kings, they were to belive that it muſt end in victory to the Romans, and liberty to themſelves. It was their pleaſure alſo, that Macedon ſhould be divided into four diſtricts, and each have a ſeparate council of its own; and that it ſhould pay the Roman people only half the tribute it had been uſed to pay to their kings. Their determinations were of the ſame temper reſpecting Illyricum. *Livy, b.* 45. *c.* 18.——All the Greek ſtates, whether in Europe or Aſia, had their liberty and their own laws. *Livy, b.* 33. *c.* 30. FRANKLIN.

THE POLICY OF THE ROMAN CHURCH.

THE policy of the court of Rome has been commonly much admired; and men, judging by ſucceſs, have beſtowed the higheſt eulogies on that prudence by which a power, from ſuch ſlender beginnings, could advance, without force of arms, to eſtabliſh an univerſal and almoſt abſolute

monarchy in Europe. But the wiſdom of ſuch a long ſucceſſion of men who filled the Papal throne, and who were of ſuch different ages, tempers, and intereſts, is not intelligible, and could never have place in nature. The inſtrument, indeed, with which they wrought, the ignorance and ſuperſtition of the people, is ſo groſs an engine, of ſuch univerſal prevalence, and ſo little liable to accident or diſorder, that it may be ſucceſsful even in the moſt unſkilful hand; and ſcarce any indiſcretion can fruſtrate its operations. While the court of Rome was openly abandoned to the moſt flagrant diſorders, even while it was torn with ſchiſms and factions, the power of the church made daily a ſenſible progreſs in Europe. The clergy, feeling the neceſſity of protection againſt the violence of princes or the vigour of the laws, were well pleaſed to adhere to a foreign head, who, being removed from the fear of the civil authority, could freely employ the power of the whole church in defending their ancient or uſurped properties and privileges, when invaded in any particular country. The monks, deſirous of an independence on their dioceſans, profeſſed ſtill a more devout attachment to the triple crown; and the ſtupid people poſſeſſed no ſcience or reaſon which they could oppoſe to the moſt exorbitant pretenſions. Nonſenſe paſſed for demonſtration: the moſt cri-

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minal means were ſanctified by the piety of the end. Treaties were ſuppoſed not to be binding where the intereſts of God were concerned: the ancient laws and cuſtoms of ſtate had no authority againſt a divine right: impudent forgeries were received as ancient monuments of antiquity: and the champions of the holy church, if ſucceſsful, were celebrated as heroes; if unfortunate, were worſhipped as martyrs: and all events thus turned out equally to the advantage of clerical uſurpations. HUME.

THE ROMAN CHURCH.

FEW eccleſiaſtical eſtabliſhments have been fixed upon a worſe foundation than that of the church of Rome, or have been attended with circumſtances more hurtful to the peace and happineſs of mankind. The large revenues, privileges, immunities, and power of the clergy, rendered them formidable to the civil magiſtrate, and armed with too extenſive authority an order of men who always adhere cloſely together, and who never want a plauſible pretence for their encroachments and uſurpations. The higher dignities of the church ſerved indeed to the ſupport of gentry and nobility; but, by the eſtabliſhment of monaſteries, many of the loweſt vulgar were taken from the uſeful arts, and maintained in thoſe

thoſe receptacles of ſloth and ignorance. The ſupreme head of the church was a foreign potentate, who was guided by intereſts always different, ſometimes contrary, to thoſe of the community. And as the hierarchy was neceſſarily ſolicitous to preſerve an unity of faith, rites, and ceremonies, all liberty of thought ran a manifeſt riſk of being extinguiſhed; and violent perſecutions, or, what was worſe, a ſtupid and abject credulity, took place every where. To increaſe theſe evils, the church, though ſhe poſſeſſed large revenues, was not contented with her acquiſitions, but retained a power of practiſing further on the ignorance of mankind. She even beſtowed on each individual prieſt a power of enriching himſelf by the voluntary oblations of the faithful, and left him ſtill a powerful motive for diligence and induſtry in his calling. And thus that church, though an extenſive and burthenſome eſtabliſhment, was liable to many of the inconveniences which belong to an order of prieſts, who truſted entirely to their own art and invention for attaining a ſubſiſtence. The advantages attending the Romiſh hierarchy were but a ſmall compenſation for its inconveniences. The eccleſiaſtical privileges during barbarous times, had ſerved as a check to the deſpotiſm of kings: The union of all the weſtern churches under the ſupreme Pontiff facilitated the intercourſe of nations, and tended to bind

bind all the parts of Europe into a cloſe connection with each other: And the pomp and ſplendour of worſhip which belonged to ſo opulent an eſtabliſhment, contributed in ſome reſpects to the encouragement of the fine arts, and began to diffuſe a general elegance of taſte, by uniting it with religion. HUME.

THE POWER OF THE ROMAN CHURCH, AND ITS DECLINE.

IN the ancient conſtitution of the Chriſtian church, the biſhop of each dioceſe was elected by the joint votes of the clergy and of the people of the epiſcopal city. The people did not long retain their right of election; and while they did retain it, they almoſt always acted under the influence of the clergy, who in ſuch ſpiritual matters appeared to be their natural guides. The clergy, however, ſoon grew weary of the trouble of managing them, and found it eaſier to elect their own biſhops themſelves. The abbot, in the ſame manner, was elected by the monks of the monaſtery, at leaſt in the greater part of abbacies. All the inferior eccleſiaſtical benefices comprehended within the dioceſe were collated by the biſhop, who beſtowed them upon ſuch eccleſiaſtics as he thought proper. All church-preferments were in this manner in the diſpoſal of the church.

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The ſovereign, though he might have ſome indirect influence in thoſe elections, and though it was ſometimes uſual to aſk both his conſent to elect, and his approbation of the election, yet had no direct or ſufficient means of managing the clergy. The ambition of every clergyman naturally led him to pay court, not ſo much to his ſovereign, as to his own order, from which only he could expect preferment.

Through the greater part of Europe the Pope gradually drew to himſelf, firſt, the collation of almoſt all biſhoprics and abbacies, or of what were called conſiſtorial benefices, and afterwards, by various machinations and pretences, of the greater part of inferior benefices comprehended within each dioceſe; little more being left to the biſhop than what was barely neceſſary to give him a decent authority with his own clergy. By this arrangement the condition of the ſovereign was ſtill worſe than it had been before. The clergy of all the different countries of Europe were thus formed into a ſort of ſpiritual army; diſperſed in different quarters indeed, but of which all the movements and operations could now be directed by one head, and conducted upon one uniform plan. The clergy of each particular country might be conſidered as a particular detachment of that army, of which the operations could eaſily be ſupported and ſeconded by all the other detachments

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quartered in the different countries round about. Each detachment was not only independent of the ſovereign of the country in which it was quartered, and by which it was maintained, but dependent upon a foreign ſovereign, who could at any time turn its arms againſt the ſovereign of that particular country, and ſupport them by the arms of all the other detachments.

Thoſe arms were the moſt formidable that can well be imagined. In the ancient ſtate of Europe, before the eſtabliſhment of arts and manufactures, the wealth of the clergy gave them the ſame ſort of influence over the common people, which that of the great barons gave them over their reſpective vaſſals, tenants, and retainers. In the great landed eſtates, which the miſtaken piety both of princes and private perſons had beſtowed upon the church, juriſdictions were eſtabliſhed of the ſame kind with thoſe of the great barons; and for the ſame reaſon. In thoſe great landed eſtates, the clergy, or their bailiffs, could eaſily keep the peace without the ſupport or aſſiſtance either of the king or of any other perſon; and neither the king nor any other perſon could keep the peace there without the ſupport and aſſiſtance of the clergy. The juriſdictions of the clergy, therefore, in their particular baronies or manors, were equally independent, and equally excluſive of the authority of the king's courts, as thoſe of the great

tempo-

temporal lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like thofe of the great barons, almoft all tenants at will, entirely dependent upon their immediate lords, and therefore liable to be called out at pleafure, in order to fight in any quarrel in which the clergy might think proper to engage them. Over and above the rents of thofe eftates, the clergy poffeffed, in the tythes, a very large portion of the rents of all the other eftates in every kingdom of Europe. The revenues arifing from both thofe fpecies of rents were, the greater part of them, paid in kind; in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, &c. The quantity exceeded greatly what the clergy could themfelves confume; and there were neither arts nor manufactures for the produce of which they could exchange the furplus. The clergy could derive advantage from this immenfe furplus in no other way than by employing it, as the great barons employed the like furplus of their revenues, in the moft profufe hofpitality, and in the moft extenfive charity. Both the hofpitality and the charity of the ancient clergy, accordingly, are faid to have been very great. They not only maintained almoft the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and gentlemen had frequently no other means of fubfiftence than by travelling about from monaftery to monaftery, under pretence of devotion, but in reality to enjoy the hofpitality of the clergy. The retainers of fome

particular prelates were often as numerous as thofe of the greateft lay-lords; and the retainers of all the clergy taken together were, perhaps, more numerous than thofe of all the lay-lords. There was always much more union among the clergy than among the lay-lords. The former were under a regular difcipline and fubordination to the papal authority. The latter were under no regular difcipline or fubordination, but almoft always equally jealous of one another, and of the king. Though the tenants and retainers of the clergy, therefore, had both together been lefs numerous than thofe of the great lay-lords, and their tenants were probably much lefs numerous, yet their union would have rendered them more formidable. The hofpitality and charity of the clergy too, not only gave them the command of a great temporal force, but increafed very much the weight of their fpiritual weapons. Thofe virtues procured them the higheft refpect and veneration among all the inferior ranks of people, of whom many were conftantly, and almoft all occafionally, fed by them. Every thing belonging or related to fo popular an order, its poffeffions, its privileges, its doctrines, neceffarily appeared facred in the eyes of the common people; and every violation of them, whether real or pretended, the higheft act of facrilegious wickednefs and profanenefs. In this ftate of things, if the fove-

reign frequently found it difficult to refiſt the confederacy of a few of the great nobility, we cannot wonder that he ſhould find it ſtill more ſo to refiſt the united force of the clergy of his own dominions, ſupported by that of the clergy of all the neighbouring dominions. In ſuch circumſtances the wonder is, not that he was ſometimes obliged to yield, but that he was ever able to refiſt.

The privileges of the clergy in thoſe ancient times (which to us who live in the preſent times appear the moſt abſurd) their total exemption from the ſecular juriſdiction, for example, or what in England was called the benefit of clergy, were the natural or rather the neceſſary conſequences of this ſtate of things. How dangerous muſt it have been for the ſovereign to attempt to puniſh a clergyman for any crime whatever, if his own order were diſpoſed to protect him, and to repreſent either the proof as inſufficient for convicting ſo holy a man, or the puniſhment as too ſevere to be inflicted upon one whoſe perſon had been rendered ſacred by religion. The ſovereign could, in ſuch circumſtances, do no better than leave him to be tried by the eccleſiaſtical courts; who, for the honour of their own order, were intereſted to reſtrain, as much as poſſible, every member of it from committing enormous crimes, or even from

from giving occafion to fuch grofs fcandal as might difguft the minds of the people.

In the ftate in which things were through the greater part of Europe during the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and for fome time both before and after that period, the conftitution of the church of Rome may be confidered as the moft formidable combination that ever was formed againft the authority and fecurity of civil government, as well as againft the liberty, reafon, and happinefs of mankind; which can flourifh only where civil government is able to protect them. In that conftitution the groffeft delufions of fuperftition were fupported in fuch a manner by the private interefts of fo great a number of people, as put them out of all danger from any affault of human reafon: becaufe, though human reafon might perhaps have been able to unveil, even to the eyes of the common people, fome of the delufions of fuperftition; it could never have diffolved the ties of private intereft. Had this conftitution been attacked by no other enemies but the feeble efforts of human reafon, it muft have endured for ever. But that immenfe and well-built fabric, which all the wifdom and virtue of man could never have fhaken, much lefs have overturned, was by the natural courfe of things, firft weakened, and afterwards in part deftroyed; and is now likely, in the courfe of a few

centuries more, perhaps, to crumble into ruins altogether.

The gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the ſame cauſes which deſtroyed the power of the great barons, deſtroyed in the ſame manner, through the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal power of the clergy. In the produce of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found ſomething for which they could exchange their rude produce, and thereby diſcovered the means of ſpending their whole revenues upon their own perſons, without giving any conſiderable ſhare of emth to other people. Their charity became gradually leſs extenſive, their hoſpitality leſs liberal or leſs profuſe. Their retainers became conſequently leſs numerous, and by degrees dwindled away altogether. The clergy too, like the great barons, wiſhed to get a better rent from their landed eſtates, in order to ſpend it in the ſame manner, upon the gratification of their own private vanity and folly. But this increaſe of rent could be got only by granting leaſes to their tenants, who thereby became in a great meaſure independent of them. The ties of intereſt, which bound the inferior ranks of people to the clergy, were in this manner gradually broken and diſſolved. They were even broken and diſſolved ſooner than thoſe which bound the ſame ranks of people

to

to the great barons; becaufe the benefices of the church being, the greater part of them, much fmaller than the eftates of the great barons, the poffeffor of each benefice was much fooner able to fpend the whole of its revenue upon his own perfon. During the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of Europe, in full vigour. But the temporal power of the clergy, the abfolute command which they had once had over the great body of the people, was very much decayed. The power of the church was by that time very nearly reduced, through the greater part of Europe, to what arofe from her fpiritual authority; and even that fpiritual authority was much weakened when it ceafed to be fupported by the charity and hofpitality of the clergy. The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order, as they had done before, as the comforters of their diftrefs, and the relievers of their indigence. On the contrary, they were provoked and difgufted by the vanity, luxury, and expence of the richer clergy, who appeared to fpend upon their own pleafures what had always before been regarded as the patrimony of the poor. A. SMITH.

S.

THE INHUMANITY OF SAVAGES.

IN every part of the deportment of man in his ſavage ſtate, whether towards his equals of the human ſpecies, or towards the animals below him, we recogniſe the ſame character, and trace the operations of a mind intent on its own gratifications, and regulated by its own caprice, without much attention or ſenſibility to the ſentiments and feelings of the beings around him. So little is the breaſt of a ſavage ſuſceptible of thoſe ſentiments which prompt men to that feeling attention which mitigates diſtreſs, that, in ſome provinces of America, the Spaniards found it neceſſary to enforce the common duties of humanity by poſi-

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tive laws, and to oblige hufbands and wives, parents and children, under fevere penalties, to take care of each other during their ficknefs.

ROBERTSON.

THE CONNECTION OF SCIENCE AND VIRTUE.

GOOD morals and knowledge are almoft infeparable in every age, though not in every individual. Whatever we may imagine concerning the ufual truth and fincerity of men who live in a rude and barbarous ftate, there is much more falfehood, and even perjury, among them than among civilized nations; and virtue, which is nothing but a more enlarged and more cultivated reafon, never flourifhes to any degree, nor is founded on fteady principles of honour, except where a good education becomes general; and men are taught the pernicious confequences of vice, treachery, and immorality. Even fuperftition, though more prevalent among ignorant nations, is but a poor fupply for the defects of knowledge and education; and our European anceftors, who employed every moment the expedient of fwearing on extraordinary croffes and relics, were lefs honourable in all engagements than their pofterity, who from experience have omitted thofe ineffectual fecurities.

HUME.

POLI-

POLITICAL SECURITY.

A GOVERNMENT which excludes all perfons except one, or a very few, from having accefs to the chief magiftracy, or from having votes in the choice of magiftrates, and which keeps all the power of the ftate in the fame hands, or the fame families, is eafily marked out, and is the extreme of political flavery. For fuch is the ftate of mankind, that perfons poffeffed of unbounded power will generally act as if they forgot the proper nature and defign of their ftation, and purfue their own intereft, though it be oppofite to that of the community at large. Provided thofe who make laws fubmit to them themfelves, and, with refpect to taxes in particular, fo long as thofe who impofe them bear an equal fhare with the reft of the community, there will be no complaint. But in all cafes, when thofe who lay the tax upon others exempt *themfelves*, there is tyranny; and the man who fubmits to a tax of a penny, levied in this manner, is liable to have the laft penny extorted from him. Men of equal rank and fortune with thofe who compofe the Britfh Houfe of Commons, have nothing to fear from the impofition of taxes, fo long as there is any thing like rotation in that office; becaufe thofe who impofe them are liable to pay them them-

themſelves, and are no better able to bear the burden. But perſons of lower rank, and eſpecially thoſe who have no votes in the election of members, may have reaſon to fear, becauſe an unequal part of the burden may be laid upon them: They are neceſſarily a diſtinct order in the community, and have no direct method of controuling the meaſures of the legiſlature. Our increaſing game-laws have all the appearance of the haughty decrees of a tyrant, who ſacrifices every thing to his own pleaſure and caprice. Upon theſe principles, it is evident, that there muſt have been a groſs inattention to the very firſt principles of liberty, to ſay no worſe, in the firſt ſcheme of taxing the inhabitants of America in the Britiſh parliament. PRIESTLEY.

SELF-LOVE.

THOSE who have affirmed ſelf-love to be the baſis of all our ſentiments and all our actions are much in the right. There is no occaſion to demonſtrate that men have a face; as little need is there of proving to them that they are actuated by ſelf-love. This ſelf-love is the means of our preſervation; and, like the inſtrument of the perpetuation of the ſpecies, it is neceſſary, it is dear to us; it gives us pleaſure, but ſtill is to be concealed. VOLTAIRE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IF our felfifh principles were fo much predominant above our focial, as is afferted by fome philofophers, we ought undoubtedly to entertain a contemptible notion of human nature.

There is much of a difpute of words in all this controverfy. When a man denies the fincerity of *all* public fpirit or affection to a country and community, I am at a lofs what to think of him. Perhaps he never felt this paffion in fo clear and diftinct a manner as to remove all his doubts concerning its force and reality: but when he proceeds afterwards to reject all private friendfhip, if no intereft or felf-love intermixes itfelf, I am then confident that he abufes terms, and confounds the ideas of things; fince it is impoffible for any one to be fo felfifh, or rather ftupid, as to make no difference between one man and another, and give no preference to qualities which engage his approbation and efteem. Is he alfo, fay I, as infenfible to anger as he pretends to be to friendfhip? And does injury and wrong no more affect him than kindnefs or benefits? Impoffible; he does not know himfelf. He has forgot the movements of his mind; or rather he makes ufe of a different language from the reft of his countrymen, and calls not things by their pro-

proper names. What ſay you of natural affection? (I ſubjoin); is that alſo a ſpecies of ſelf-love? Yes; all is ſelf-love. *Your* children are loved only becauſe they are yours; *your* friend, for a like reaſon; and *your* country engages you only ſo far as it has connection with *yourſelf*. Were the idea of ſelf removed, nothing would affect you: you would be altogether inactive and inſenſible: or if you ever gave yourſelf any movement, it would only be from vanity, and a deſire of fame and reputation to this ſame ſelf. I am willing (reply I) to receive your interpretation of human actions, provided you admit the facts. That ſpecies of ſelf-love, which diſplays itſelf in kindneſs to others, you muſt allow to have great influence over human actions, and even greater, on many occaſions, than that which remains in its original ſhape and form. For how few are there, who, having a family, children, and relations, do not ſpend more on the maintenance and education of theſe than on their own pleaſures? This, indeed, you juſtly obſerve, may proceed from ſelf-love, ſince the proſperity of their family and friends is one, or the chief of their pleaſures, as well as their chief honour. Be you alſo one of thoſe ſelfiſh men, and you are ſure of every one's good opinion and good will; or, not to ſhock your nice ears with theſe expreſſions, the ſelf-love of every one,

one, and mine among the reſt, will then incline us to ſerve you and ſpeak well of you.

In my opinion, there are two things which have led aſtray thoſe philoſophers that have inſiſted ſo much on the ſelfiſhneſs of man. In the firſt place, they found that every act of virtue or friendſhip was attended with a ſecret pleaſure; whence they concluded, that friendſhip and virtue could not be diſintereſted. But the fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous ſentiment and paſſion produces the pleaſure, and does not ariſe from it. I feel a pleaſure in doing good to my friend, becauſe I love him; but do not love him for the ſake of that pleaſure.

In the ſecond, it has always been found that the virtuous are far from being indifferent to praiſe; and therefore they have been repreſented as a ſet of vain-glorious men, who had nothing in view but the applauſes of others. But this alſo is a fallacy. It is very unjuſt in the world, when they find any tincture of vanity in a *laudable* action, to depreciate it upon that account, or aſcribe it entirely to that motive. The caſe is not the ſame with vanity as with other paſſions. Where avarice, or revenge, enter into any ſeemingly virtuous action, it is difficult for us to determine how far it enters; and it is natural to ſuppoſe it the ſole actuating principle. But vanity is ſo cloſely allied to virtue, and to love the fame of

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laudable actions approaches ſo near the love of laudauble actions for their own ſake, that the paſſions are more capable of mixture than any other kinds of affection; and it is almoſt impoſſible to have the latter without ſome degree of the former. Accordingly we find, that this paſſion for glory is always warped and varied according to the particular taſte or ſentiment of the mind on which it falls. Nero had the ſame vanity in driving a chariot that Trajan had in governing the empire with juſtice and ability. To love the glory of virtuous actions is a ſure proof of the love of virtuous actions.

HUME.

SELF-SATISFACTION.

SELF-SATISFACTION, at leaſt in ſome degree, is an advantage which equally attends the *fool* and the *wiſe man*. But it is the only one; nor is there any other circumſtance in the conduct of life where they are upon an equal footing. Buſineſs, books, converſation; for all of theſe a fool is totally incapacitated; and, except condemned by his ſtation to the coarſeſt drudgery, remains a uſeleſs burden upon the earth. Accordingly, it is found, that men are extremely jealous of their character in this particular; and many inſtances are ſeen of profligacy and treachery, the

moſt avowed and unreſerved; none of bearing patiently the imputation of ignorance and ſtupidity. Dicearchus the Macedonian general, who, as Polybius tells us, openly erected one altar to Impiety, another to Injuſtice, in order to bid defiance to mankind; even he, I am well aſſured, would have ſtarted at the epithet *of fool*, and have meditated revenge for ſo injurious an appellation. Except the affection of parents, the ſtrongeſt and moſt indiſſoluble bond in nature, no connection has ſtrength ſufficient to ſupport the diſguſt ariſing from this character. Love itſelf, which can ſubſiſt under treachery, ingratitude, malice, and infidelity, is immediately extinguiſhed by it, when perceived and acknowledged; nor are deformity and old age more fatal to the dominion of that paſſion. So dreadful are the ideas of an utter incapacity for any purpoſe or undertaking, and of continued error and miſconduct in life.

When it is aſked, Whether a quick or ſlow apprehenſion be moſt valuable? Whether one that at firſt view penetrates far into a ſubject, but can perform nothing upon ſtudy; or a contrary character, which muſt work out every thing by dint of application? Whether a clear head or a copious invention? Whether a profound genius or a ſure judgment? in ſhort, What character or particular turn of judgment is more excellent than another? it is evident we can anſwer none

of

of thefe queftions, without confidering which of thofe qualities capacitates a man beft for the world, and carries him further in any undertaking.

If refined and exalted fenfe be not ufeful as common, their rarity, their novelty, and the noblenefs of their objects, make fome compenfation, and render them the admiration of mankind: As gold, though lefs ferviceable than iron, acquires, from its fcarcity, a value which is much fuperior.——The defects of judgment can be fupplied by no art or invention: but thofe of memory frequently may, both in bufinefs and in ftudy, by method and induftry, and by diligence in committing every thing to writing; and we fcarcely ever hear of fhort memory given as a reafon for a man's want of fuccefs in any undertaking. But, in ancient times, when no man could make a figure without the talent of fpeaking, and when the audience were too delicate to bear fuch crude, undigefted harangues as our extemporary orators offer to public affemblies; it was of the utmoft confequence, and was accordingly much more valued than at prefent. Scarce any great genius is mentioned in antiquity, who is not celebrated for this talent; and Cicero enumerates it among the other fublime qualities of Cæfar himfelf. HUME.

SENSATION.

THOUGHTS ſeem to us ſomething ſtrange; but ſenſation is no leſs wonderful; a divine power equally ſhows itſelf in the ſenſation of the meaneſt inſect as in Newton's brain.—We receive our firſt knowledge from our ſenſations, and our memory is no more than a continued ſenſation: a man born without any of his five ſenſes would, could he live, be totally void of any ideas. It is owing to our ſenſes that we have even our metaphyſical notions: for how ſhould a circle or a triangle be meaſured, without having ſeen or felt a triangle? How can we form an idea, imperfect as it is, of infinitude, but by enlarging boundaries? And how can we throw down boundaries, without having ſeen or felt them? An eminent philoſopher in his *Traité des Senſations, tom.* ii. *p.* 128. ſays, Senſation includes all our faculties.

VOLTAIRE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

WE find in bodies two ſorts of properties; the exiſtence of one of which is permanent and unalterable; ſuch are its impenetrability, gravity, mobility, &c. Theſe qualities appertain to phyſics in general. There are in the ſame bodies other pro-

properties whose transient and fugitive existence is by turns produced and destroyed by certain combinations, analyses, or motions, in their interior parts. These sorts of properties form the different branches of natural history, chemistry, &c. and belong to particular parts of physics. —Iron, for example, is a composition of phlogiston and a particular earth. In this composite state it is subject to the attractive power of the magnet. When this iron is decomposed, that property vanishes: the magnet has no influence over a ferruginous earth deprived of its phlogiston.

When a metal is combined with another substance, as a vitriolic acid, this union likewise destroys in iron the property of being attracted by the magnet.——Fixed alkali and nitrous acid have each of them separately an infinity of different qualities; but when they are united, there does not remain any vestige of those qualities.—In the common heat of the atmosphere, nitrous acid will disengage itself from all other bodies to combine with fixed alkali.—If this combination be exposed to a degree of heat proper to put the nitre into a red fusion, and any inflammable matter be added to it, the nitrous acid will abandon the fixed alkali to unite with the inflammable substance; and in the act of this union arises the elastic force, whose effects are so sur-

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priſing in gunpowder.——All the properties of fixed alkali are deſtroyed when it is combined with ſand and formed into glaſs; whoſe tranſparency, indiſſolubility, electric power, &c. are, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, ſo many new creations, that are produced by this mixture, and deſtroyed by the decompoſition of the glaſs.——Now, in the animal kingdom, why may not organiſation produce in like manner that ſingular quality we call the faculty of ſenſation? All the phenomena that relate to medicine and natural hiſtory prove, that this power is in animals nothing more than the reſult of the ſtructure of their bodies; that this power begins with the formation of their organs, laſts as long as they ſubſiſt, and is at laſt deſtroyed by the diſſolution of the ſame organs.——What then becomes of the *faculty of ſenſation* in an animal? That which becomes of the quality of attracting the magnet in iron decompoſed. HELVETIUS.

SENSATION AND JUDGMENT DISTINCT QUALITIES OF THE HUMAN MIND.

TO perceive, is only to feel or be ſenſible of things; to compare them, is to judge of their exiſtence: to judge of things, and to be ſenſible of them, are very different. Things preſent themſelves to our ſenſations as ſingle and detached from

from each other, ſuch as they barely exiſt in nature; but in our intellectual compariſon of them they are removed from place to place, diſpoſed on and beſide each other, to enable us to pronounce concerning their difference and ſimilitude. The characteriſtic faculty of an intelligent, active being, is that of giving a ſenſe to the word Exiſt. In beings merely ſenſitive, there is not the like force of intellect. Such paſſive beings perceive every object ſingle, or by itſelf; or if two objects preſent themſelves, they are perceived as united into one. Such beings having no power to place one in competition with, beſide, or upon the other, they cannot compare them, or judge of their ſeparate exiſtence.

To ſee two objects at once, is not to ſee their relations to each other, nor to judge of their difference; as to ſee many objects, though diſtinct from one another, is not to reckon their number. I may poſſibly have in my mind the ideas of a great ſtick and a little one, without comparing thoſe ideas together, or judging that one is leſs than the other; as I may look at my hand without counting my fingers. The comparative ideas of *greater* and *leſs*, as well as the numerical ideas of *one*, *two*, &c. are certainly no ſenſations, altho' the underſtanding produces them only from our ſenſations.

It has been pretended, that ſenſitive beings diſtinguiſh

ſtinguiſh ſenſations one from the other, by the actual difference there is between thoſe ſenſations: this, however, demands an explanation. When ſuch ſenſations are different, a ſenſitive being is ſuppoſed to diſtinguiſh them by their difference: but when they are alike, they can then only diſtinguiſh them becauſe they perceive one without the other; for otherwiſe, how can two objects exactly alike be diſtinguiſhed in a ſimultaneous ſenſation? Such objects muſt neceſſarily be blended together, and taken for one and the ſame.

When two comparative ſenſations are perceived, they make both a joint and ſeparate impreſſion; but their relation to each other is not neceſſarily perceived in conſequence of either. If the judgement we form of this relation were indeed a mere ſenſation, excited by the objects, we ſhould never be deceived in it; for it can never be denied that I truly perceive what I feel.

How, therefore, can I be deceived in the relation between theſe two ſticks, particularly if they are not parallel? Why do I ſay, for inſtance, that the little one is a third part as long as the great one, when it is in reality only a fourth? Why is not the image, which is the ſenſation, conformable to its model, which is the object? It is becauſe I am active when I judge; the operation which forms the compariſon is defective, and my under-

underſtanding, which judges of relations, mixes its errors with the truth of thoſe ſenſations which are repreſentative of objects.

To this we may add, that if we were merely paſſive in the uſe of our ſenſes, there would be no communication between them; ſo that it would be impoſſible for us to *know*, that the body we touched with our hands, and the object we ſaw with our eyes, were one and the ſame. Either we ſhould not be able to perceive external objects at all, or they would appear to exiſt as five perceptible ſubſtances, of which we ſhould have no method of aſcertaining the identity.

Whatever name is given to that power of the mind which aſſembles and compares my ſenſations, call it Attention, Reflection, &c. certain it is, that it exiſts in me, and not in the objects of thoſe ſenſations: it is I alone who produce it, although it be diſplayed only in conſequence of the impreſſions made on me by thoſe objects.

ROUSSEAU.

COMMON SENSE.

THERE is ſometimes to be found in idiomatical and vulgar expreſſions, an image of what paſſes in the hearts of all mankind. *Senſus communis* ſignified among the ancient Romans, not only common ſenſe, but alſo humanity and ſenſibility.

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As we are much inferior to the Romans, it ſignifies with us only the half of its import with them. It means only common underſtanding, a ſimple capacity of reaſon, the mere comprehenſion of ordinary things, a kind of mean between ſtupidity and genius. To ſay that a man wants common ſenſe, is a groſs affront. To ſay that he does not want common ſenſe, is an affront alſo; as it is as much as to ſay, that although he is not altogether ſtupid, he has neither genius nor wit. But whence comes this expreſſion Common Senſe, if not from the ſenſes? In the invention and uſe of this term, mankind plainly confeſs, that nothing enters into the mind but through the ſenſes; would they, elſe, have uſed the word Senſe, to ſignify common underſtanding? We ſometimes ſay, that common ſenſe is very rare. What is the meaning of that phraſe? Certainly no more than that the progreſs or exerciſe of reaſon is interrupted in ſome men by their prejudices and prepoſſeſſions. Hence we ſee a man capable of reaſoning very juſtly on one ſubject, err moſt groſsly in arguing upon another. An Arabian, who may be an exact calculator, an ingenious chemiſt, and a good aſtronomer, believes nevertheleſs that Mahomet could put one-half of the moon in his ſleeve. Wherefore is it that he is ſuperior to mere common ſenſe in judging of theſe three ſciences, and inferior to it in his conception of the half-moon in Mahomet's ſleeve? In

the firſt place, he ſees with his own eyes, and judges with his own underſtanding; in the ſecond, he ſees with the eyes of others, ſhutting his own, and perverting that underſtanding which nature gave him.

In what manner can this ſtrange perverſion of reaſon be effected? How can thoſe ideas which ſucceed each other ſo regularly and conſtantly in our contemplations on numerous other objects, be ſo miſerably confuſed in our reflecting upon another a thouſand times more obvious and palpable? The capacity of the man, that is, his principles of intelligence, being ſtill the ſame, ſome of his organs, therefore, muſt be depraved: as we ſometimes ſee in the niceſt epicure, a vitiated taſte with regard to ſome ſpecies of viands. But how came the organ of the Arab, who ſees an half-moon in Mahomet's ſleeve, to be thus depraved? By *fear*. He hath been told, that, if he does not believe in this ſtory of the half-moon and ſleeve, his ſoul, in paſſing over the narrow bridge, immediately after his death, will be tumbled into the gulf beneath, there to periſh eternally. Again, he is further told, that if he ſhould doubt the truth of the ſleeve, one derviſe will accuſe him of impiety; a ſecond will prove him to be deſtitute of common ſenſe, in that having all poſſible motives of credibility laid before him, he yet refuſes to ſubmit his proud reaſon to the force of evidence; a third will have him

him brought before the petty divan of a petty province, and get him legally impaled.—All this ſtrikes a panic into the good Arabian. He does not want for ſenſe in judging of other matters; but his conceptions are hurt in regard to this particular. But does the Arab really believe this ſtory of Mahomet's ſleeve? No. He endeavours to believe it; he ſays to himſelf, It is impoſſible, but it is true; I believe what I do not believe. Thus a confuſed heap of ideas are formed in his brain, which he is afraid to unravel; and this cauſes him to want common ſenſe in reaſoning upon this ſubject. VOLTAIRE.

SENSIBILITY.

DISINTERESTED principles are of different kinds: conſequently the actions that flow from them are more or leſs beneficial, and more or leſs intitled to praiſe. We are moved by inconſiderate impulſe to the performance of beneficent actions; as we are moved by inconſiderate impulſe to the perpetration of guilt. You ſee an unhappy perſon; you diſcern the viſitation of grief in his features; you hear them in the plaintive tones of his voice; you are warmed with ſudden and reſiſtleſs emotion; you never inquire concerning the propriety of your feelings, or the merits of the ſufferer; and you haſten to relieve him. Your con-

duct proceeds from inconfiderate impulfe. It intitles you to the praife of fenfibility, but not of reflection. You are again in the fame fituation; but the fymptoms of diftrefs do not produce in you the fame ardent effects: you are moved with no violent agitation, and you feel little fympathy; but you perceive diftrefs; you are convinced that the fufferer fuffers *unjuftly*; you know you are bound to relieve him; and, in confequence of thefe convictions, you offer him relief. Your conduct proceeds from fenfe of duty; and though it intitles you to the credit of rational humanity, it does not intitle you in this inftance to the praife of fine fenfibility.

Thofe who perform beneficent actions, from immediate feeling or impetuous impulfe, have a great deal of pleafure. Their conduct, too, by the influence of fympathetic affection, imparts a pleafure to the beholder. The joy felt both by the agent and the beholder is ardent, and approaches to rapture. There is alfo an energy in the principle, which produces great and uncommon exertions; yet both the principle of action, and the pleafure it produces, are fhifting. "Beauteous "as the morning cloud or early dew;" like them too, they pafs away. The pleafure arifing from knowledge of duty, is lefs impetuous: it has no approaches to rapture; it feldom makes the heart throb, or the tear defcend; and as it produces no

tranſporting enjoyment, it ſeldom leads to uncommon exertion; but the joy it affords is uniform, ſteady, and laſting. As the conduct is moſt perfect, ſo our happineſs is moſt complete, when both principles are united: when our convictions of duty are animated with ſenſibility, and ſenſibility guided by convictions of duty.

Thoſe who are guided by inconſiderate feeling, will often appear variable in their conduct, and of courſe irreſolute. There is no variety of feeling to which perſons of great ſenſibility are more liable, than that of great elevation or depreſſion of ſpirits. The ſudden unaccountable tranſitions from the one to the other, are not leſs ſtriking, than the vaſt difference of which we are conſcious in the one mood or the other. In an elevated ſtate of ſpirits we form projects, entertain hopes, conceive ourſelves capable of great exertions, and, in this hour of tranſport, undervalue obſtacles and oppoſition. In a moment of depreſſion, the ſcene is altered; nature ceaſes to ſmile; or, if ſhe ſmiles, it is not for us; we feel ourſelves feeble, forſaken, and hopeleſs; and the ſpirit formerly ſo full of ardour, ſo enterpriſing and ſupercilious, becomes humble and paſſive.

Inconſiſtency of conduct, and of conſequence irreſolution, occaſioned by irregular and undirected feelings, proceed from other ſtates of mind than depreſſion of ſpirits, of which we have many examples

examples in hiſtory, and which illuſtrate the general poſition.

Lorenzo de Medicis had a lively fancy; he was a courtier, ambitious, and had his mind filled with ideas of pageantry. He wiſhed to enjoy pre-eminence: but his brother Alexander, the reigning prince, was an obſtacle to be removed; and this could only be done by ſpoiling him of his life. The difficulty was great; yet it figured leſs to his heated imagination, than the dignity and enjoyment he had in view. Elegant in his manners, accompliſhed in every pleaſing endowment of ſoft and inſinuating addreſs, he had, nevertheleſs, no ſecret counſellor in his breaſt to plead in behalf of juſtice. Thus prompted, and thus unguarded, he perpetrates the death of his brother. He ſees his blood ſtreaming; hears him groan in the agonies of death; beholds him convulſed in the pangs of departing life. A new ſet of feelings ariſe: the delicate accompliſhed courtier, who could meditate atrocious injury, cannot, without being aſhamed, witneſs the bloody object: he remains motionleſs, irreſolute, appalled at the deed; and in this ſtate of amazement, neither proſecutes his deſign, nor thinks of eſcaping. Thus, without ſtruggle or oppoſition, he is ſeized and puniſhed as he deſerves.

Voltaire gives a ſimilar account of his hero Lewis. After deſcribing in lively colours the de-

ſolation perpetrated by his authority in the Palatinate; the conflagration of cities, and the utter ruin of the inhabitants; he ſubjoins, that theſe orders were iſſued from Verſailles, from the midſt of pleaſures; and that, on a nearer view, the calamities he thus occaſioned would have filled him with horror. That is, Lewis, like all men of irregular ſenſibility, was governed by the influences of objects operating immediately on his ſenſes; and ſo, according to ſuch accidental mood as depended on preſent images, he was humane or inhuman. Lewis and Lorenzo, in thoſe inſtances, were men of feeling, but not of virtue. They were akin to Lady Macbeth, who adviſed and determined the murder of Duncan, and who would have executed the deed herſelf; but with the dagger lifted in act to ſtrike, of ſuch ſenſibility, ſo tender, ſhe could not proceed. "Had he not," ſays ſhe, "reſembled my father as he ſlept, I had "done it."

In minds where principles of regular and permanent influence have no authority, every feeling has a right to command; and every impulſe, how ſudden ſoever, is regarded, during the ſeaſon of its power, with entire approbation. All ſuch feelings and impulſes are not only admitted, but obeyed; and lead us, without heſitation or reflection, to a correſponding deportment. Great ſenſibility produces extravagant deſires: theſe lead to diſappointment;

pointment; and, in minds that are undifciplined, which are governed by irregular feelings, difappointment begets morofenefs and anger. Moved by an ardent mood, they regard the objects of their affection with extravagant tranfport. They transfer to them their own difpofitions; they make no allowance for differences of condition or ftate of mind; and expect returns fuitable to their own unreafonable warmth. Even fuppofe them fuccefsful, their enjoyments are not equal to their hopes. Their defires are exceffive; and no gratification whatever can allay the vehemence of their ardour. They are difappointed; they feel pain: in proportion to the violence of the difappointed paffion, is the pang of repulfe. This roufes a fenfe of wrong, and excites their refentment. The new feelings operate with as much force as the former. No inquiry is made concerning the reafonablenefs of the conduct they would produce. Refentment and indignation are felt; and merely becaufe they are felt, they are deemed juft and becoming. Thefe difpofitions are difplayed according to the condition or character of him who feels them. Men of feeble conftitutions, and without power over the fortunes of other men, under fuch malign influences, become fretful, invidious, and mifanthropical. Perfons of firmer ftructure, and unfortunately poffeffed of power, under fuch direction become inhuman. Herod

was a man of feeling: witnefs his conduct to Mariamne. At one time elegant, courteous, and full of tendernefs, his fondnefs was as unbounded as the virtues and graces of Mariamne were peerlefs. At other times, offended becaufe her expreffions of mutual affection were not as extravagant as the extravagance of his own emotions, he became fufpicious without caufe. Thus affectionate, fond, fufpicious, refentful, and powerful, in the frenzy of irregular *feeling* he put to death Mariamne.

Thus we fee mere fenfibility, undirected by reflection, leads men to an extravagant expreffion both of focial and unfocial feelings; renders them capricioufly inconftant in their affections; variable, and of courfe irrefolute in their conduct; and liable to the moft outrageous excefs. Tranfported by their own emotions, they mifapprehend the condition of others: they are prone to exaggeration; and even the good actions they perform excite amazement rather than *approbation*. Senfibility and the knowledge of duty fhould always be united; for unlefs an exquifite feeling be regulated by that knowledge of duty which arifes from reflection on our own condition, and an acquaintance with human nature, it may produce unhappinefs both to ourfelves and others, but chiefly to ourfelves.

RICHARDSON.

SEN-

SENSIBILITY AND COMPASSION.

MAN is rendered ſociable by his weakneſs: it is our common miſery which inclines our heart to humanity. Every attachment is a ſign of inſufficiency. If we ſtood in no need of aſſiſtance, we ſhould hardly think of uniting ourſelves to each other: ſo that human felicity, uncertain as it is, proceeds from our infirmities. A being abſolutely happy muſt be alone and independent. God only enjoys abſolute happineſs; but of that happineſs who can have any idea? If an imperfect being could be ſuppoſed to have an independent exiſtence, what, according to our ideas, would be his enjoyment? In being alone, he would be miſerable. He who wants nothing, will love nothing; and I cannot conceive that he who loves nothing, can be happy. Hence it follows, that our attachment to our fellow-creatures is rather owing to our ſympathiſing with their pains than with their pleaſures; for in the firſt we more evidently perceive the identity of our nature, and a ſecurity for their attachment to us. If our common neceſſities unite us from a principle of intereſt, our common miſeries unite us by affection. The ſight of a happy man is more apt to inſpire envy than love: we readily accuſe him of uſurping a privilege to which he has no excluſive right;

right; and our ſelf-love ſuffers in the idea that he has no need of our aſſiſtance.

Compaſſion is a grateful ſenſation; becauſe, though we ſympathiſe with the ſufferer, we ſecretly rejoice that his pains are not our own. Envy, on the contrary, is painful; becauſe, ſo far from ſympathiſing in the happineſs of others, we grudge them their enjoyments. The firſt ſeems to exempt us from the evil he ſuffers, and the latter to deprive us of the bleſſings he enjoys. It is not in the power of the human heart to ſympathiſe with thoſe who are happier than ourſelves, but with thoſe only who are more miſerable. If there are any exceptions to this maxim, they are rather apparent than real. We do not ſympathiſe with the rich or great to whom we are attached: even in our moſt ſincere attachment, we only appropriate a part of their well-being. Sometimes we really love people in their misfortunes; but ſo long as they are in proſperity, they have no ſincere friends, except ſuch as are not dupes to appearances, and who rather pity than envy them notwithſtanding their condition. We pity in others thoſe evils only from which we think ourſelves not exempt:

Non ignara mali, miſeris ſuccurrere diſco.

What can be more beautiful, more affecting, and more true, than this line!

Why have kings no compaſſion for their ſubjects?

jects? Becaufe they never intend to become men. Why are the rich fo obdurate to the poor? Becaufe they are not afraid of poverty. Why are the lower clafs of people defpifed by the nobility? Becaufe the nobles are in no danger of becoming plebeians. Why are the Turks in general more humane, more hofpitable, than we are? Becaufe their government being arbitrary, and confequently the fortune and grandeur of particulars precarious, they are not entirely out of the reach of poverty and diftrefs: he who is to-day the moft powerful, may to-morrow be in the fituation of the beggar he relieves. Our pity for the misfortunes of others is not meafured by the quantity of evil, but by the fuppofed fenfibility of the fufferer. We pity the wretched only in proportion as we believe them fenfible of their own wretchednefs. The mere phyfical fenfation of evil is not fo violent as it generally feems: it is the memory which makes us fenfible of its continuance; it is the imagination, extending it beyond the prefent moment, which makes it really deferving compaffion. Probably this may be the reafon why we are lefs affected at the fufferings of animals than of men. We do not pity a dray-horfe when we fee him in the ftable; becaufe we do not fuppofe, that, in eating his hay, he remembers the inhumanity of his driver, or is apprehenfive of the fatigues which he muft undergo. In

like manner, we never pity a ſheep in its paſture, though we know it to be doomed to ſlaughter; becauſe we ſuppoſe it to have no foreknowledge of its deſtiny. By extending theſe ideas, we alſo become indifferent to the ſufferings of our own ſpecies; and the rich excuſe their conduct towards the poor, by ſuppoſing them too ſtupid to be ſenſible of their own miſery.

It is generally remarked, that the ſight of blood or wounds, the ſound of cries and groans, the apparatus of painful operations, and all thoſe objects which excite the idea of ſuffering, make a more early and more general impreſſion upon mankind than that of death. The idea of final diſſolution being more complex, is not ſo ſtriking. The image of death impreſſes our minds later, and more faintly, becauſe we have no experience to aſſiſt our conception. To form any idea of the agonies of death, we muſt firſt have beheld the conſequence thereof in the lifeleſs body: but when once the image is perfectly formed in our minds, no ſpectacle can be more horrible; whether it proceeds from the appearance of total diſſolution, or from the reflection, that, death being inevitable, we ourſelves ſhall ſooner or later be in the ſame ſituation. Theſe impreſſions have their different modifications and degrees, according to the character and habits of each individual; but the impreſſions themſelves are univerſal.

ful. There are other impreffions which are flower and lefs general, and which are peculiar to perfons of great fenfibility; I mean thofe which are received from the mental fufferings, forrow and affliction, of our fellow-creatures. There are people who are incapable of being moved, except by cries and tears: the long and filent grief of a heart torn with diftrefs, never drew a figh from their breafts: they are not affected at the fight of a dejected countenance, pale complexion, and hollow eyes, exhaufted of their tears. On fuch hearts the fufferings of the mind have no effect. They are judges without feeling, from whom we have nothing to expect but inflexible rigour and cruelty. Poffibly they may be juft; but never humane, generous, and compaffionate. They may be juft, if it be poffible for a man to be juft without being merciful.

ROUSSEAU.

THE PECULIAR DESTINATION OF THE SEXES.

WOMAN and man were made for each other; but their mutual dependence is not the fame. The men depend on the women only on account of their defires; the women on the men both on account of their defires and their neceffities: we could fubfift better without them than they with-

out

out us. Their very ſubſiſtence and rank in life depend on us; and the eſtimation in which we hold them, their charms, and their merit. By the law of nature itſelf, both women and children lie at the mercy of the men: it is not enough they ſhould be really eſtimable; it is requiſite they ſhould be actually eſteemed: it is not enough they ſhould be beautiful; it is requiſite their charms ſhould pleaſe: it is not enough they ſhould be ſenſible and prudent; it is neceſſary they ſhould be acknowledged as ſuch: their glory lies not only in their conduct, but in their reputation; and it is impoſſible for any, who conſents to be accounted infamous, to be ever virtuous. A man ſecure in his own good conduct, depends only on himſelf, and braves the public opinion: but a woman in behaving well, performs but half her duty; as what is thought of her, is as important to her as what ſhe really is. Opinion is the grave of virtue among the men, but its throne among the women. ROUSSEAU.

SINGULARITY.

THE knowledge of little things ſuppoſes, generally, the ignorance of thoſe that are great: every man who lives like the reſt of the world, has no ideas but thoſe that are common to all. If they who are ſo curious in dreſſing, figuring, and

ſpeaking in aſſemblies, are generally incapable of any thing great; it is not only, becauſe by acquiring an infinity of minute talents and accompliſhments they loſe that time which they might employ in the diſcovery of intereſting ideas; but becauſe the very purſuit of ſuch trivial objects implies a debility and narrowneſs in their minds. Accordingly great men are ſeen for the moſt part utterly negligent of the minute obſervances neceſſary to attract reſpect; they are below their attention. "In that young man," ſaid Sylla ſpeaking of Cæſar, "who walks ſo unmannerly along "the ſtreets, I ſee ſeveral Marius's." Every man abſorbed in deep reflection, and employed about great and general ideas, lives in the forgetfulneſs of thoſe forms, and in the ignorance of thoſe cuſtoms, which compoſe the knowledge of a great part of the world. Every man who is concentred in the ſtudy of great objects, finds himſelf alone in the midſt of the world; he always acts like himſelf, and ſcarcely ever like any body elſe.

HELVETIUS.

THE LABOUR OF SLAVES DEARER TO THEIR MASTERS THAN THAT OF FREE MEN.

THE wear and tear of a ſlave, it has been ſaid, is at the expence of his maſter; but that of a free ſervant is at his own expence. The wear

and tear of the latter, however, is, in reality as much at the expence of his maſter as that of the former. The wages paid to journeymen, and ſervants of every kind, muſt be ſuch as may enable them, one with another, to continue the race of journeymen and ſervants, according as the increaſing, diminiſhing, or ſtationary demand of the ſociety may happen to require. But though the wear and tear of a free ſervant be equally at the expence of his maſter, it generally coſts him much leſs than that of a ſlave. The fund deſtined for replacing or repairing, if I may ſay ſo, the wear and tear of the ſlave, is commonly managed by a negligent maſter or careleſs overſeer. That deſtined for performing the ſame office with regard to the free man, is managed by the free man himſelf. The diſorders which generally prevail in the œconomy of the rich, naturally introduce themſelves into the management of the former: The ſtrict frugality and parſimonious attention of the poor, as naturally eſtabliſh themſelves in that of the latter. Under ſuch different management, the ſame purpoſe muſt require very different degrees of expence to execute it. It appears, accordingly, from the experience of all ages and nations, I believe, that the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end than that performed by ſlaves. It is found to do ſo even at Boſton, New York,

York, and Philadelphia, where the wages of common labour are ſo very high. A. SMITH.

CONSIDERATIONS ON SLAVES AND SLAVERY.

IN the ancient ſtate of Europe, the occupiers of land were all tenants at will. They were all, or almoſt all, ſlaves; but their ſlavery was of a milder kind than that known among the ancient Greeks and Romans, or even in our Weſt Indian colonies. They were ſuppoſed to belong more directly to the land than to their maſter. They could, therefore, be ſold with it, but not ſeparately. They could marry, provided it was with the conſent of their maſter; and he could not afterwards diſſolve the marriage by ſelling the man and wife to different perſons. If he maimed or murdered any of them, he was liable to ſome penalty, though generally but to a ſmall one. They were not, however, capable of acquiring property. Whatever they acquired was acquired to their maſter, and he could take it from them at pleaſure. Whatever cultivation and improvement could be carried on by means of ſuch ſlaves, was properly carried on by their maſter. It was at his expence. The ſeed, the cattle, and the inſtruments of huſbandry were all his. It was for his benefit. Such ſlaves could acquire nothing but

their daily maintenance. It was properly the proprietor himſelf, therefore, that in this caſe occupied his own lands, and cultivated them by his own bondmen. This ſpecies of ſlavery ſtill ſubſiſts in Ruſſia, Poland, Hungary, and other parts of Germany. It ſubſiſted in Bohemia and Moravia, till lately that it was aboliſhed by the preſent emperor Joſeph II. It is only in the weſtern and ſouth-weſtern provinces of Europe that it has gradually been aboliſhed altogether.

But if great improvements are ſeldom to be expected from great proprietors, they are leaſt of all to be expected when they employ ſlaves for their workmen. The experience of all ages and nations, I believe, demonſtrates that the work done by ſlaves, though it appears to coſt only their maintenance, is in the end the deareſt of any. A perſon who can acquire no property, can have no other intereſt but to eat as much, and to labour as little, as poſſible. Whatever work he does beyond what is ſufficient to purchaſe his own maintenance, can be ſqueezed out of him by violence only, and not by any intereſt of his own. In ancient Italy, how much the cultivation of corn degenerated, how unprofitable it became to the maſter, when it fell under the management of ſlaves, is remarked by both Pliny and Columella. In the time of Ariſtotle it had not been much better in ancient Greece. Speaking of the ideal re-

republic defcribed in the laws of Plato, to maintain five thoufand idle men (the number of warriors fuppofed neceffary for its defence) together with their women and fervants, would require, he fays, a territory of boundlefs extent and fertility, like the plains of Babylon.

The pride of man makes him love to domineer; and nothing mortifies him fo much as to be obliged to condefcend to perfuade his inferiors. Where-ever the law allows it, and the nature of the work can afford it, therefore, he will generally prefer the fervice of flaves to that of freemen. The planting of fugar and tobacco can afford the expence of flave-cultivation. The raifing of corn, it feems, in the prefent times, cannot. In the Englifh colonies, of which the principal produce is corn, the far greater part of the work is done by freemen. The late refolution of the Quakers in Pennfylvania to fet at liberty all their negro flaves, may fatisfy us that their number cannot be very great. Had they made any confiderable part of their property, fuch a refolution could never have been agreed to. In our fugar colonies, on the contrary, the whole work is done by flaves, and in our tobacco colonies a very great part of it. The profits of a fugar-plantation in any of our Weft Indian colonies are generally much greater than thofe of any other cultivation that is known either in Europe or America: And the

profits of a tobacco plantation, though inferior to thofe of fugar, are fuperior to thofe of corn, as has already been obferved. Both can afford the expence of flave-cultivation, but fugar can afford it ftill better than tobacco. The number of negroes accordingly is much greater, in proportion to that of whites, in our fugar than in our tobacco colonies.

To the flave cultivators of ancient times, gradually fucceeded a fpecies of farmers known at prefent in France by the name of Metayers. They are called in Latin, Coloni Partiarii. They have been fo long in difufe in England that at prefent I know no Englifh name for them. The proprietor furnifhed them with the feed, cattle, and inftruments of hufbandry; the whole ftock, in fhort, neceffary for cultivating the farm. The produce was divided equally between the proprietor and the farmer, after fetting afide what was judged neceffary for keeping up the ftock, which was reftored to the proprietor when the farmer either quitted, or was turned out of the farm.

Land occupied by fuch tenants is properly cultivated at the expence of the proprietor, as much as that occupied by flaves. There is, however, one very effential difference between them. Such tenants, being freemen, are capable of acquiring property, and having a certain proportion of the produce of the land, they have a plain intereft

that

that the whole produce ſhould be as great as poſſible, in order that their own proportion may be ſo. A ſlave, on the contrary, who can acquire nothing but his maintenance, conſults his own eaſe by making the land produce as little as poſſible over and above that maintenance. It is probable that it was partly upon account of this advantage, and partly upon account of the encroachments which the ſovereign, always jealous of the great lords, gradually encouraged their villains to make upon their authority, and which ſeem at laſt to have been ſuch as rendered this ſpecies of ſervitude altogether inconvenient, that tenure in villenage gradually wore out through the greater part of Europe. The time and manner, however, in which ſo important a revolution was brought about, is one of the moſt obſcure points in modern hiſtory. The church of Rome claims great merit in it; and it is certain that ſo early as the twelfth century, Alexander III. publiſhed a bull for the general emancipation of ſlaves. It ſeems, however, to have been rather a pious exhortation, than a law to which exact obedience was required from the faithful. Slavery continued to take place almoſt univerſally for ſeveral centuries afterwards, till it was gradually aboliſhed by the joint operation of the two intereſts above mentioned; that of the proprietor on the one hand, and that of the ſovereign on the other. A villain enfranchiſed,

franchifed, and at the fame time allowed to continue in poffeffion of the land, having no ftock of his own, could cultivate it only by means of what the landlord advanced to him, and muft therefore have been what the French call a Metayer.

In all European colonies the culture of the fugar-cane is carried on by negro flaves. The conftitution of thofe who have been born in the temperate climate of Europe, could not, it is fuppofed, fupport the labour of digging the ground under the burning fun of the Weft Indies; and the culture of the fugar-cane, as it is managed at prefent, is all hand labour, though, in the opinion of many, the drill plough might be introduced into it with great advantage. But, as the profit and fuccefs of the cultivation which is carried on by means of cattle, depend very much upon the good management of thofe cattle; fo the profit and fuccefs of that which is carried on by flaves, muft depend equally upon the good management of thofe flaves; and in the good management of their flaves, the French planters, I think it is generally allowed, are fuperior to the Englifh. The law, fo far as it gives fome weak protection to the flave againft the violence of his mafter, is likely to be better executed in a colony where the government is in a great meafure arbitrary, than in one where it is altogether free. In every country where the unfortunate law of flavery is eftablifhed, the

the magiſtrate, when he protects the ſlave, intermeddles in ſome meaſure in the management of the private property of the maſter; and, in a free country, where the maſter is perhaps either a member of the colony aſſembly, or an elector of ſuch a member, he dares not do this but with the greateſt caution and circumſpection. The reſpect which he is obliged to pay to the maſter, renders it more difficult for him to protect the ſlave. But in a country where the government is in a great meaſure arbitrary, where it is uſual for the magiſtrate to intermeddle even in the management of the private property of individuals, and to ſend them, perhaps, a lettre de cachet if they do not manage it according to *his liking*, it is much eaſier for him to give ſome protection to the ſlave; and common humanity naturally diſpoſes him to do ſo. The protection of the magiſtrate renders the ſlave leſs contemptible in the eyes of his maſter, who is thereby induced to conſider him with more regard, and to treat him with more gentleneſs. Gentle uſage renders the ſlave not only more faithful, but more intelligent, and therefore, upon a double account, more uſeful. He approaches more to the condition of a free ſervant, and may poſſeſs ſome degree of integrity and attachment to his maſter's intereſt; virtues which frequently belong to free ſervants, but which never can belong to a ſlave, who is treated as ſlaves commonly are

are in countries where the maſter is perfectly free and ſecure.

That the condition of a ſlave is better under an arbitrary than under a free government, is, I believe, ſupported by the hiſtory of all ages and nations. In the Roman hiſtory, the firſt time we read of the magiſtrate interpoſing to protect the ſlave from the violence of his maſter, is under the emperors. When Vedius Pollio, in the preſence of Auguſtus, ordered one of his ſlaves, who had committed a ſlight fault, to be cut into pieces and thrown into his fiſh-pond in order to feed his fiſhes, the emperor commanded him, with indignation, to emancipate immediately, not only that ſlave, but all the others that belonged to him. Under the republic no magiſtrate could have had authority enough to protect the ſlave, much leſs to puniſh the maſter.

A. SMITH.

SLEEP.

EVERY thing relating to ſleep is a very puzzling phenomenon, on the ſuppoſition of the diſtinction between the ſoul and the body; eſpecially on the little evidence that can be pretended of the ſoul being employed at all in a ſtate of really ſound ſleep, excluſive of dreaming. And ſurely, if there be a ſoul diſtinct from the body, and it be ſenſible

ſible of all the changes that take place in the corporeal ſyſtem to which it is attached, why does it not perceive that ſtate of the body which is termed Sleep; and why does it not contemplate the ſtate of the body and brain during ſleep, which might afford matter enough for reaſoning and reflection? If no new ideas could be tranſmitted to it at that time, it might employ itſelf upon the ſtock which it had acquired before, if they had really adhered in it and belonged to it. All this we ſhould naturally expect if the ſoul was a ſubſtance really diſtinct from the body, and if the ideas properly belonged to this ſubſtance, ſo that it was capable of carrying them all away with it, when the body was reduced to duſt. The ſoul, during the ſleep of the body, might be expected to approach to the ſtate in which it would be when the body was dead, death being often compared to a more ſound ſleep. For if it be capable of thinking and feeling when the powers of the body ſhall entirely ceaſe, it might be capable of the ſame kind of ſenſation and action when thoſe powers are only ſuſpended.

PRIESTLEY.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN SOCIETY.

WHETHER the propenſity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another, be one of thoſe ori-

original principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given; or whether, as ſeems more probable, it be the neceſſary conſequence of the faculties of reaſon and ſpeech, it belongs not to our preſent ſubject to inquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which ſeem to know neither this nor any other ſpecies of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the ſame hare, have ſometimes the appearance of acting in ſome ſort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himſelf. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their paſſions in the ſame object at that particular time. Nobody ever ſaw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever ſaw one animal by its geſtures and natural cries ſignify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain ſomething either of a man or of another animal, it has no other means of perſuaſion but to gain the favour of thoſe whoſe ſervice it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam; and a ſpaniel endeavours, by a thouſand attractions, to engage the attention of its maſter who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man ſometimes uſes the ſame arts with his brethren;

and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours, by every servile and fawning attention, to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civilized society he stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren; and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in their favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Who ever offers to another a bargain of any kind proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their

humanity, but to their ſelf-love; and never talk to them of our own neceſſities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooſes to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-diſpoſed people, indeed, ſupplies him with the whole fund of his ſubſiſtence: but though this principle ultimately provides him with all the neceſſaries of life which he has occaſion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occaſion for them. The greater part of his occaſional wants are ſupplied in the ſame manner as thoſe of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchaſe. With the money which one man gives him he purchaſes food; the old cloaths which another beſtows upon him he exchanges for other old cloaths which ſuit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, cloaths, or lodging, as he has occaſion.

As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchaſe, that we obtain from one another the greater part of thoſe mutual good offices which we ſtand in need of, ſo it is this ſame trucking diſpoſition which originally gives occaſion to the diviſion of labour. In a tribe of hunters or ſhepherds, a particular perſon makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readineſs and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle

cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or moveable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours; who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third becomes a smith or a brazier, a fourth a tanner or dresser of hides or skins, the principal part of the cloathing of savages. And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other mens labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of business.

The difference of natural talents in different men, is in reality much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears

to diſtinguiſh men of different profeſſions when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occaſions ſo much the cauſe as the effect of the diviſion of labour. The difference between the moſt diſſimilar characters, between a philoſopher and a common ſtreet-porter, for example, ſeems to ariſe not ſo much from nature, as from habit, cuſtom, and education. When they came into the world, and for the firſt ſix or eight years of their exiſtence, they were very much alike; and neither their parents nor play-fellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or ſoon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of; and widens by degrees, till at laſt the vanity of the philoſopher is willing to acknowledge ſcarce any reſemblance. But without the diſpoſition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man muſt have procured to himſelf every neceſſary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All muſt have had the ſame duties to perform, and the ſame work to do; and there could have been no ſuch difference of employment as could alone give occaſion to any great difference of talents.

As it is this diſpoſition which forms that difference of talents ſo remarkable among men of different profeſſions, ſo it is this ſame diſpoſition which renders that difference uſeful. Many tribes

of

of animals acknowledged to be all of the ſame ſpecies, derive from nature a much more remarkable diſtinction of genius than what, antecedent to cuſtom and education, appears to take place among men. By nature a philoſopher is not in genius and diſpoſition half ſo different from a ſtreet-porter as a maſtiff is from a greyhound, or a greyhound from a ſpaniel, or this laſt from a ſhepherd's dog. Thoſe different tribes of animals, however, though all of the ſame ſpecies, are of ſcarce any uſe to one another. The ſtrength of the maſtiff is not in the leaſt ſupported either by the ſwiftneſs of the greyhound, or by the ſagacity of the ſpaniel, or by the docility of the ſhepherd's dog. The effects of thoſe different geniuſes and talents, for want of the power or diſpoſition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common ſtock, and do not in the leaſt contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the ſpecies. Each animal is ſtill obliged to ſupport and defend itſelf ſeparately and independently, and derives no ſort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has diſtinguiſhed its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the moſt diſſimilar geniuſes are of uſe to one another: the different produces of their reſpective talents, by the general diſpoſition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common ſtock, where every man may purchaſe whatever

 part

part of the produce of other mens talents he has occaſion for. A. SMITH.

THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT.

MAN, thrown as it were by chance upon this globe; ſurrounded by all the evils of nature; obliged continually to defend and protect his life againſt the ſtorms and tempeſts of the air, againſt the inundations of water, againſt the fire of volcanos, againſt the intemperature of frigid and torrid zones, againſt the ſterility of the earth which refuſes him aliment, or its baneful fecundity which makes poiſons ſpring up beneath his feet: in ſhort, againſt the claws and teeth of ſavage beaſts, who diſpute with him his habitation and his prey; and, attacking his perſon, reſolved to render themſelves rulers of this globe, of which he thinks himſelf to be the maſter: Man, in this ſtate, alone and abandoned to himſelf, could do nothing for his preſervation. It was neceſſary therefore that he ſhould unite himſelf and aſſociate with his like, in order to bring together their ſtrength and intelligence in common ſtock. It is by this union that he has triumphed over ſo many evils, that he has faſhioned this globe to his uſe, reſtrained the rivers, ſubjugated the ſeas, inſured his ſubſiſtence, conquered a part of

of the animals, in obliging them to ſerve him; and driven others, far from his empire, to the depths of deſerts or of woods, where their number diminiſhes from age to age. What a man alone would not have been able to effect, men have executed in concert, and all together they preſerve their work. Such is the origin, ſuch the advantage, and the end of all ſociety.——Government owes its birth to the neceſſity of preventing and repreſſing the injuries which the aſſociated individuals had to fear from one another. It is the ſentinel who watches in order that the common labours be not diſturbed.—Thus ſociety originates in the wants of men; government in their vices. Society tends always to good, government ought always to tend to the repreſſing of evil. Society is the firſt, it is in its origin independent and free; government was inſtituted for it, and is but its inſtrument. It is for one to command, it is for the other to obey. Society created the public power; government, which has received it from ſociety, ought to conſecrate it entirely to its uſe. In ſhort, ſociety is eſſentially good; government, as is well known, may be, and is but too often, evil. It has been ſaid, that we were all born equal; that is not ſo: that we had all the ſame rights; that is unintelligible nonſenſe. What are rights where there is an inequality of talents or of ſtrength, and no ſecurity nor ſanction? It has

has been ſaid, that nature offered to us all the ſame dwelling and the ſame reſources; that is not ſo: that we were all endued with the ſame means of defence; that is not ſo: nor can it be true, in any ſenſe, that we all enjoy the ſame qualities of mind and body. There is amongſt men an original inequality which nothing can remedy. It muſt laſt for ever; and all that can be obtained by the beſt legiſlation, is, not to deſtroy it, but to prevent the abuſe of it. But in making diſtinctions between her children like a ſtepmother, in creating ſome children ſtrong and others weak, has not Nature herſelf formed the germ or principle of tyranny? I do not think it can be denied; eſpecially if we look back to a time anterior to all legiſlation; a time in which man will be ſeen as paſſionate and as void of reaſon as a brute.

What then have founders of nations, what have legiſlatures propoſed to themſelves, to obviate all the diſaſters ariſing from this germ, when it is expanded by a ſort of artificial equality, which might reduce all the members of a ſociety, without exception, under an impartial, ſole authority? It is a ſword which moves gently, equably, and indifferently over every head: but this ſword was ideal; it was neceſſary that there ſhould be a hand, a corporeal being, who ſhould hold it.—What has reſulted thence? Why, that the hiſtory of civilized man is but the hiſtory of his miſery. All the pages of it are ſtained with blood;

blood; ſome with the blood of the oppreſſors, others with the blood of the oppreſſed.—In this point of view, man appears more wicked and more miſerable than a beaſt. Different ſpecies of beaſts ſubſiſt on different ſpecies; but ſocieties of men have never ceaſed to attack each other. Even in the ſame ſociety, there is no condition but devours and is devoured, whatever may have been or are the forms of the government or artificial equality which have been oppoſed to the primitive and natural inequality.—But are theſe forms of government, ſuppoſing them made by the choice, and the free choice, of the firſt ſettlers in a country, and whatever ſanction they may have received, whether that of oaths, or of unanimous accord, or of their duration; are they obligatory upon their deſcendants? There is no ſuch thing: if the people are happy under their form of government, they will keep it; if they are unhappy, the impoſſibility of ſuffering more and longer will determine them to change it: that is the juſt exerciſe of a natural and unalienable right of the man who is oppreſſed, and even of the man who is not oppreſſed.—A man wills and chooſes for himſelf; he cannot will nor chooſe for another; and it would be a madneſs to will and to chooſe for him who is yet unborn, for him who will not exiſt for ages. There is no individual but who, diſcontented with the form of the government of his country,

country, may go elfewhere to feek a better. There is no fociety but which has the fame right to change as their anceftors had to adopt their form of government. Upon this point it is with focieties as if they were at the firft moment of their civilization. Without which there would be a great evil; nay, the greateft of evils would be without a remedy. Millions of men would be condemned to mifery without end.

The conclufions naturally following from thefe principles are, That there is no form of government which has the prerogative to be immutable:—No political authority, which, created yefterday or a thoufand years ago, may not be abrogated in ten years time or to morrow:—No power, however refpectable, however facred, that is authorifed to regard the ftate as its property.—All authority in this world has begun either by the confent of the fubjects or by the power of the mafter. In both one and the other cafe it may juftly end. There is no prefcription in favour of tyranny againft liberty.

The truth of thefe principles is fo much the more effential, becaufe all power by its very nature tends to defpotifm.——The public happinefs is the firft law of nations as the firft duty. The firft obligation of thefe great bodies is with themfelves; they owe, before all other things, liberty and juftice to the members which compofe them.

Every

Every child which is born to the ſtate, every new citizen who comes to breathe the air of the country he has choſen or nature given him, is intitled to the greateſt happineſs he can enjoy. Every obligation which cannot be reconciled with that is broken; every contrary claim is a wicked attempt upon his rights: Such a claim is oppoſite to all the ideas of policy and order, and violates every principle of morality. RAYNAL.

THE DUTIES OF A SOVEREIGN.

THE ſovereign is completely diſcharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he muſt always be expoſed to innumerable deluſions, and for the proper performance of which no human wiſdom or knowledge could ever be ſufficient; the duty of ſuperintending the induſtry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments moſt ſuitable to the intereſt of the ſociety. According to the ſyſtem of natural liberty, the ſovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common underſtandings: firſt, the duty of protecting the ſociety from the violence and invaſion of other independent ſocieties; ſecondly, the duty of protecting, as far as poſſible, every member of the ſociety from the injuſtice or oppreſſion of every other member

member of it, or the duty of eſtabliſhing an exact adminiſtration of juſtice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public inſtitutions, which it can never be for the intereſt of any individual, or ſmall number of individuals, to erect and maintain; becauſe the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or ſmall number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great ſociety.

A. SMITH.

THE ORIGIN OF THE POPULAR OPINIONS CONCERNING THE SOUL.

THE notion of the ſoul of man being a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body hath not been known to the writers of the Scriptures, and eſpecially thoſe of the Old Teſtament. According to the uniform ſyſtem of revelation, all our hopes of a future life are built upon another, and a ſeeming oppoſite foundation, viz. *that of the* reſurrection of ſomething belonging to us that dies and is buried; that is, the body, which is always conſidered as the man. This doctrine is manifeſtly ſuperfluous, on the idea of the ſoul being a ſubſtance ſo diſtinct from the body as to be unaffected by its death, and able to ſubſiſt, and even to be more free and happy, without the body. This opinion,

 therefore,

therefore, not having been known to the Jews, and being repugnant to the ſcheme of revelation, muſt have had its ſource in heatheniſm; but with reſpect to the date of its appearance, and the manner of its introduction, there is room for conjecture and ſpeculation.—This opinion is evidently not the growth of Greece and Rome; but was received by the philoſophers of thoſe countries either from Egypt, or the countries more to the Eaſt. The Greeks in general refer it to the Egyptians, but Pauſanias gives it to the Chaldeans or the Indians. Though every thing relating to ſo very obſcure a ſubject, muſt be in a great meaſure conjectural; yet it ſeems reaſonable to think with Mr Toland, that this doctrine was derived from the Egyptians, and that it might poſſibly have been ſuggeſted to them by ſome of their known cuſtoms reſpecting the dead, whom they preſerved with great care, and diſpoſed of with a ſolemnity unknown to other nations; though it might have ariſen among them from other cauſes, without the help of thoſe peculiar cuſtoms.—The authority of Herodotus, the old Greek hiſtorian, who had himſelf travelled in Egypt, is very expreſs to this purpoſe. He ſays, that "the Egyptians were the firſt who maintained that the ſoul of man is immortal; that "when the body dies, it enters into that of ſome "other animal; and when it has tranſmigrated

"through all terreſtrial, marine, and flying ani-"mals, it returns to the body of a man again. "This revolution is completed in three thouſand "years." He adds, that "ſeveral Greeks, whoſe "names he could not mention, had publiſhed "that doctrine as their own."

It is, however, probable, that the notion of there being ſomething in man diſtinct from his body, and the cauſe of his feeling, thinking, and willing, and his other mental operations and affections, might very well occur in theſe rude ages without ſuch a ſtep as this; though, no doubt, the cuſtom abovementioned would much contribute to it. Nothing is more common than to obſerve how very ready all illiterate perſons are to aſcribe the cauſe of any difficult appearance to an inviſible agent, diſtinct from the ſubject on which the operation is exerted: But the notion of a proper immaterial being, without all extenſion or relation to place, did not appear till of late years in compariſon; what the ancients meant by an immaterial ſubſtance being nothing more than an attenuated matter, like air, ether, fire, or light, conſidered as fluids, beyond which their idea of incorporiety did not go. Pſellus ſays, that the ancient Heathens, both Greeks and others, called only the groſſer bodies τα παχυτερα των σωματων corporeal.——Indeed the vulgar notion of a ſoul or ſpirit, wherever it has been found to exiſt, has been

been the ſame in all ages; and in this reſpect even the learned of ancient times are only to be conſidered as the vulgar. We gather from Homer, that the belief of his time was, that the ghoſt bore the ſhape of, and exactly reſembled, the deceaſed perſon to whom it belonged; that it wandered upon the earth, near the place where the body lay, till it was buried; at which time it was admitted to the ſhades below. In both theſe ſtates it was poſſeſſed of the entire conſciouſneſs, and retained the friendſhips and enmities of the man.——We learn from Oſſian, that it was the opinion of the times in which he lived, that the ſouls of heroes went immediately after death to the hills of their country, and the ſcenes which they had frequented in the moſt happy times of their lives. It was thought, too, that dogs and horſes ſaw the ghoſts of the deceaſed. They alſo imagined, that the ghoſts ſhrieked near the place where a death was to happen ſoon after: from which circumſtances, as well as ſeveral others, it is evident, that, in their idea, the ſoul was material, ſomething like the ειδωλον of the Greeks. All the Pagans of the Eaſt, ſays Loubiere, do truly believe that "there "remains ſomething of a man after his death, "which ſubſiſts independently and ſeparately "from his body. But they give extenſion and "figure to that which remains; and attribute to "it all the ſame members, all the ſame ſubſtan-

 "ces,

" ces, both ſolid and liquid, which your bodies
" are compoſed of. They only ſuppoſe, that ſouls
" are of a matter ſubtle enough to eſcape being
" ſeen or handled."—We find it alſo to be one of the oldeſt opinions in Heathen antiquity, that the heavenly bodies were animated as well as men. This opinion was held by Origen and other philoſophiſing Chriſtians.

Upon the whole, we may conjecture with ſome probability, that this doctrine was derived from the *Egyptians*; but how far the Egyptians really carried their notions concerning the ſtate of human ſouls before or after death, doth not diſtinctly appear, becauſe we have no Egyptian writings. But it is probable, that their ideas never ripened into ſuch a ſyſtem as was afterwards found in the Eaſt, on account of their empire and civil polity having been ſo ſoon overturned, and the country having undergone ſuch a number of revolutions. Accordingly we find, that thoſe who introduced as much of this ſyſtem as was received in Greece, did in general travel into the Eaſt for it.

PRIESTLEY.

THE SOUL.

THE powers of ſenſation or perception and thought, as belonging to man, have never been found but in conjunction with a certain organized

zed ſyſtem of matter. Had we formed a judgement, therefore, concerning the neceſſary ſeat of thought, by the circumſtances that univerſally accompany it, which is our rule in all other caſes, we could not but have concluded, that in man it is a property of the nervous ſyſtem, or rather of the brain; becauſe, as far as we can judge, the faculty of thinking, and a certain ſtate of the brain, always accompany and correſpond to one another; which is the very reaſon why we believe that any property is inherent in any ſubſtance whatever. There is no inſtance of any man retaining the faculty of thinking when his brain was deſtroyed; and whenever that faculty is impeded or injured, there is ſufficient reaſon to believe that the brain is diſordered in proportion; and therefore we are neceſſarily led to conſider the latter as the ſeat of the former.

Moreover, as the faculty of thinking in general ripens and comes to maturity with the body, it is alſo obſerved to decay with it; and if, in ſome caſes, the mental faculties continue vigorous when the body in general is enfeebled, it is evidently becauſe in thoſe particular caſes the brain is not much affected by the general cauſe of weakneſs: but, on the other hand, if the brain alone be affected, as by a blow on the head, by actual preſſure within the ſkull, by ſleep, or by inflammation, the mental faculties are univerſally affected

in proportion.—Likewiſe, as the mind is affected in conſequence of the affections of the body and brain, ſo the body is liable to be reciprocally affected by the affections of the mind, as is evident in the viſible effects of all ſtrong paſſions; hope or fear, love or anger, joy or ſorrow, exultation or deſpair. Theſe are certainly irreſragable arguments, that it is properly no other than one and the ſame thing that is ſubject to theſe affections, and that they are neceſſarily dependent upon one another. In fact, there is juſt the ſame reaſon to conclude, that the powers of ſenſation and thought are the neceſſary reſult of a particular organization, as that ſound is the neceſſary reſult of a particular concuſſion of the air; for in both caſes equally the one conſtantly accompanies the other, and there is not in nature a ſtronger argument for a neceſſary connection of any cauſe and any effect. ——Dr Haller has obſerved, in his diſcourſes, "That the powers of thought, ſpeech, and motion, " appear equally to depend upon the body, und " run the ſame fate in caſe of mens declining in " old age. When a man dies through old age, I " perceive his powers of ſpeech, motion, and " thought, decay and die together, and by the " ſame degrees. The moment he ceaſes to move " and breathe, he appears to ceaſe to think too.— " When I am left to mere reaſon, it ſeems to me " that my power of thought as much depends

" upon

" upon my body as my power of ſight or hear-
" ing. I could not think in infancy. My
" powers of thought, of ſight, and of feeling, are
" equally liable to be obſtructed by the body. A
" blow on the head has deprived a man of thought,
" who could yet ſee, and feel, and move: So that
" naturally the power of thinking ſeems as much
" to belong to the body as any power of man
" whatſoever. Naturally there appears no more
" reaſon to ſuppoſe that a man can think out of
" the body than he can hear ſounds or feel cold
" out of the body."

It is true, that we have a very imperfect idea of what the *power of perception* is; and it may be as naturally impoſſible that we ſhould have a clear idea of it as that the eye ſhould ſee itſelf: but this very ignorance ought to make us cautious in aſſerting with what other properties it may or may not exiſt. Nothing but a preciſe and definite knowledge of the nature of perception and thought can authoriſe any perſon to affirm, whether they may not belong to an extended ſubſtance, which has alſo the properties of attraction and repulſion. —It is very unaccountable in Mr Locke to ſuppoſe as he did, and as he largely contends, that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, the faculty of thinking may be a property of the body, and yet to think it more probable that this faculty inhered in an immaterial ſoul. A philoſopher ought

ought to have been apprifed, that we are to fuppofe no more *caufes* than are neceffary to produce the *effects;* and therefore that we ought to conclude that the whole man is material, unlefs it fhould appear that he has fome powers or properties abfolutely incompatible with matter.—— That the faculty of thinking neceffarily depends, for its exercife, at leaft, upon a ftock of ideas, about which it is always converfant, will hardly be queftioned by any perfon; but there is not a fingle idea of which the mind is poffeffed but what may be proved to have come to it from the bodily fenfes, or to have been confequent upon the perceptions of fenfe. Could we, for inftance, have any idea of colour, as red, blue, &c. without the eyes and optic nerves; of found, without the ears; of fmell, without the noftrils, &c. &c. It is even impoffible to conceive how the mind could have become poffeffed of any of its prefent ideas without juft fuch a body as we have; and confequently, judging from prefent appearances (and we have no other means of forming any judgment at all), without a body of fome kind or other, we could have had no ideas at all, any more than a man without eyes could have any particular ideas belonging to colours. The notion, therefore, of the *poffibility* of thinking in man without an organized body, is not only deftitute of all evidence from actual appearances, but is directly contrary

to

to them; and yet theſe appearances ought alone to guide the judgment of philoſophers.—It is a great advantage to the ſyſtem of materialiſm, that we thereby get rid of a great number of *difficulties;* ſuch, for inſtance, as theſe: *What becomes of the ſoul during ſleep;* in a *ſwoon;* when the body is *ſeemingly dead* (as by drowning or other accidents), and eſpecially *after* death?—alſo, *What was the condition of it before it became united to the body;* and at what time did that union take place? &c. &c. &c.

If the ſoul be immaterial and the body material, neither the generation nor the deſtruction of the body can have any effect with reſpect to it. This foreign principle muſt have been united to it either at the time of conception or at birth; and muſt either have been created at the time of ſuch union, or have exiſted in a ſeparate ſtate prior to that union. Muſt the divine power be neceſſarily employed to produce a ſoul whenever the human ſpecies copulate? Or muſt ſome of the pre-exiſtent ſpirits be obliged, immediately upon that event, to deſcend from the ſuperior regions to inhabit the new-formed embryo? Theſe are ſuppoſitions hardly to be conſidered at all, without being immediately rejected as extremely improbable if not abſurd.

If a *man* be actuated by a principle diſtinct from his body, every brute animal muſt have an immaterial

material ſoul alſo; for they differ from us in *degree* only, and not at all in *kind;* having all the ſame mental as well as corporeal powers and faculties that we have, though not in the ſame extent; and they are poſſeſſed of them in a greater degree than thoſe of our race that are ideots or that die infants. Are theſe ſouls of brutes originally and naturally the ſame beings with the ſouls of men? Have they pre-exiſted, and are they to continue for ever? If ſo, *how* and *where* are they to be diſpoſed of after death? and are they alſo to be re-united to their preſent bodies as well as the ſouls of men? Theſe are only a few of the difficulties which muſt occur to any perſon who adopts the opinion of the immateriality of the ſoul.

It is contended, that ſpirit and body can have no common properties; and when it is aſked, How then can they act upon one another; and how can they be ſo intimately connected as to be continually and neceſſarily ſubject to each other's influence? it is acknowledged to be a difficulty and a myſtery that we cannot comprehend. But had this queſtion been conſidered with due attention, what has been called a difficulty would have been deemed an impoſſibility. It is impoſſible to conceive even the poſſibility of mutual action without ſome common property, by means of which the things that act and react upon each other

other may have ſome connection. A ſubſtance that is hard may act upon, and be acted upon, by another hard ſubſtance, or even one that is ſoft; but it is certainly impoſſible that it ſhould affect, or be affected by a ſubſtance that can make *no reſiſtance at all.*——But admitting, that ſubſtances which have no common property can nevertheleſs affect and be affected by each other, to be no more than a difficulty, it is, however, a difficulty of ſuch magnitude, as far to exceed that of conceiving that the principle of ſenſation may poſſibly conſiſt with matter; and therefore, if of two difficulties it be moſt philoſophical to take the leaſt, we muſt of courſe abandon the hypotheſis of two *heterogeneous* and incompatible principles in man, which is clogged with the greater difficulty of conception, and admit that of the *uniformity of his nature,* which is only attended with a leſs difficulty.

If the operations aſcribed to mind may reſult from the powers of matter, why ſhould we ſuppoſe a being which is uſeleſs, and which ſolves no difficulty? It is eaſy to ſee, that the properties of matter do not exclude thoſe of intelligence; but it cannot be imagined how a being, which has no property beſides intelligence, can make uſe of matter. In reality, how can this ſubſtance, which bears no relation to matter, be ſenſible of it, or perceive it? In order to ſee things, it is neceſſary

ceſſary that they make an impreſſion upon us, that there be ſome relation between us and them; but what can be this relation? It is affirmed, that we have as clear an idea of ſpirit as we have of matter, each being equally the unknown ſupport of known properties; matter of extenſion and ſolidity, and ſpirit of ſenſation and thought. But ſtill ſince the ſubſtance is confeſſedly *unkown* to us, it muſt alſo be *unknown* to us what properties it is capable of ſupporting; and therefore, unleſs there be a real inconſiſtency in the properties themſelves, thoſe which have hitherto been aſcribed to both ſubſtances may belong to either of them. For this reaſon Mr Locke, who maintains the immateriality of the ſoul, and yet maintains that, for any thing we know to the contrary, matter may have the property of thought added to it, ought to have concluded that this is really the caſe; ſince, according to the rules of philoſophiſing, we ought not to multiply cauſes without neceſſity. PRIESTLEY.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

IT is maintained in the ſchools, That *as* thought *does not belong to extenſion and matter*, it is evident that the ſoul is ſpiritual. What in fact is the meaning of the word thought? Either it is void of meaning, or, like the word *motion*, it mere-

ſy expreſſes a mode of a man's exiſtence. Now to ſay that a mode or manner of being is not a body, or has no extenſion, nothing can be more clear: but to make of this mode a being, and even a ſpiritual being, nothing is more abſurd.

HELVETIUS.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

THE horror mankind have for death and annihilation, would have been ſufficient, without the aid of revelation, to have made them invent the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul. Man would be immortal in his preſent ſtate; and would believe himſelf ſo, if all the bodies that ſurround him did not every inſtant prove the contrary. Forced to yield to this truth, he has ſtill the ſame deſire of immortality. Eſau's cauldron of rejuveneſcence proves the antiquity of this deſire. To make it perpetual, it was neceſſary to found it on ſome probability at leaſt: to effect this, they made the ſoul of a matter extremely ſubtle; they ſuppoſed it an indeſtructible atom that ſurvived the diſſolution of all the other parts; in a word, a principle of life.—The being, under the name of ſoul, was to preſerve after death all the affections of which it was ſuſceptible during its union with the body. This ſyſtem ſuppoſed, men doubted the leſs of the immortality of the ſoul, as neither

experience nor obſervation could contradict ſuch belief; for neither of them can form any judgement of an imperceptible atom. Its exiſtence, indeed, was not demonſtrated; but what proof do we want of what we wiſh to believe, and what demonſtration is ſtrong enough to prove the falſity of a favourite opinion? It is true we never meet with any ſouls in our walks; and it is to ſhow the reaſon of this, that men, after having created ſouls, thought themſelves obliged to create a country for their habitation. Each nation, and even each individual, according to his inclinations and the particular nature of his wants, has formed a particular plan. Sometimes the ſavage nations placed this habitation in a vaſt foreſt, full of wild-fowl, and watered with rivers ſtocked with fiſh: Sometimes they placed it in an open level country, abounding in paſture, in the middle of which roſe a bed of ſtrawberries as large as a mountain; different parts of which they portioned off for the nouriſhment of themſelves and families.—People leſs expoſed to hunger, and, beſides, more numerous and better inſtructed, placed on this ſpot all that is delightful in nature, and gave it the name of Elyſium. Covetous mortals formed it after the plan of the garden of Heſperides; and ſtocked it with trees, whoſe golden branches were loaded with fruits of diamonds. The more voluptuous nations placed in it trees of ſugar and rivers of milk,

milk, and furniſhed it with delicious animals. Imagination, directed by different wants and inclinations, operated every where in the ſame manner. Each people furniſhed the country of ſouls with what was on earth the object of their deſires.

HELVETIUS.

THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL.

IF it be aſked, Whether the ſoul be a ſpiritual or a material ſubſtance? it muſt be granted, that neither opinion is capable of demonſtration; and conſequently, that, by weighing the reaſons on both ſides, balancing the difficulties, and determining in favour of the greater number of probabilities, we ſhould form only conditional judgements. It is the fate of this problem, as it hath been of many others, to be reſolvable only by the aſſiſtance of the calculation of probabilities.—Whatever may have been affirmed by the Stoics, Seneca was not fully convinced of the ſpirituality of the ſoul: "Your letter (ſays he to one of his "friends) came at an improper time, being de-"livered to me when I was taking a walk in the "temple of Hope. There I freed myſelf from all "doubts with regard to my ſoul's immortality. "My imagination, gently warmed by the reaſon-"ing of ſome great men, firmly believed in that

"immortality which they promiſe more than they "prove. I began to be diſpleaſed with my exiſt- "ence, and to deſpiſe the remains of an unhappy "life, when I had opened to myſelf with delight "the gates of eternity; but your letter awakened "me, and of ſo pleaſing a dream left me only the "regret of knowing it was a dream!"—A proof, ſays Mr Deſlandes in his Critical Hiſtory of Philoſophy, that formerly neither the immortality nor immateriality of the ſoul were believed, is, that in the time of Nero, the people of Rome complained that the introduction of the new-fangled doctrine of the other world enervated the courage of the ſoldiers, and rendered them timorous; that it deprived the unhappy of their principal conſolation, and added double terror to death, by threatening them with new ſufferings after this life. Without examining if it be the intereſt of the public to admit the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul, it may be obſerved, that at leaſt this dogma has not always been regarded as politically uſeful. It took its riſe in the ſchools of *Plato*: but Ptolemy Philadelphus king of Egypt thought it ſo dangerous, that he forbid it to be preached in his dominions on pain of death. Helvetius.

On the same Subject.

Newton, like almoſt all true philoſophers, was

was perſuaded that the ſoul is an incomprehenſible ſubſtance; that we have not a ſufficient knowledge of nature for us to dare to affirm, that it is impoſſible for God to add the gift of thought to any extended ſubſtance whatſoever. But the great difficulty is rather to know how matter can become cogitative. Thought, indeed, ſeems to have nothing in common with the known attributes in that extended being which we call body. But are we acquainted with all the properties of bodies? Does it not ſeem very bold to ſay to God, You have been able to give a being motion, gravitation, vegetation, and life, but cannot give it thought?

They who ſay, that if matter could receive the gift of cogitation, the ſoul would not be immortal, ſeem to have drawn an unfair conſequence. Is it more difficult to preſerve than to make? Beſides, if an undiviſible atom be eternal, why ſhall not the faculty of cogitation it enjoys laſt as long? If I am not miſtaken, they who deny God to have the power of annexing ideas to matter, are forced to ſay, that what we call ſpirit is a being whoſe eſſence is to think excluſive of any extended being whatſoever. Now, if it be the nature of ſpirit to think eſſentially, then it thinks neceſſarily and thinks inceſſantly, as every triangle has neceſſarily and always three angles, independently of God. How! on God's creating ſomething which is not matter, muſt that ſomething abſolutely think? Weak and

bold as we are, do we know whether God has not formed millions of beings, with neither the properties of ſpirits nor matter as known to us? We are like a herdſman, who, having ſeen no other beaſts than oxen, ſhould ſay, *If God pleaſes to make any other*, they muſt have horns *and chew the cud.* Which will be thought more reverential to the Deity, to affirm that there are beings without the divine attribute of cogitation abſtractedly from him, or to apprehend that God can grant that attribute to any being he ſhall pleaſe to chooſe?—— It muſt be obſerved, that Newton was very far from venturing to define the ſoul, as ſo many others have preſumed to do; he thought it was poſſible there might be millions of other thinking beings, whoſe nature might be entirely different from that of our ſoul; ſo that the diviſion of all nature into matter and ſpirits ſeems the definition of a deaf and blind man defining the ſenſes, without any idea or conception of ſight and hearing. How indeed can any one ſay, that God has not filled the immenſe ſpace with an infinity of ſubſtances, having nothing in common with mankind?

Moſt ancient nations conceived nothing beyond matter, and looked on ideas in our underſtanding as the impreſſion of the ſeal on wax. This perplexed opinion was rather a rude inſtinct than ratiocination. Succeeding philoſophers, who were

for

for proving that matter thinks of itſelf, have erred ſtill more. The vulgar were miſtaken without any previous reaſoning: theſe erred from principles; not one of them being ever able to diſcover any thing in matter that tended to prove it was intelligent. Locke alone appears to have removed the contradiction between matter and thought; recurring at once to the Creator of all thought and of all matter, and modeſtly ſaying, "Cannot he "who can do every thing, give cogitation to a "material being, to an atom, to an element of "matter?" He ſtopped at this poſſibility, as became a man of his wiſdom. To affirm that matter does actually think becauſe God can impart ſuch a faculty to it, would be the higheſt preſumption; but is it leſs to aſſert the contrary?

The moſt generally received opinion, is that which conſiders the ſoul and body as two diſtinct and quite different ſubſtances, created by God to act on each other. The only proof of this reciprocal action is the experience which every one believes to have of it. We feel our bodies ſometimes obeying our will, and ſometimes tyrannizing over it: we conceive that they in reality act on each other becauſe we feel it, and we cannot carry our inveſtigations further. An objection, however, lies to this ſyſtem not eaſily removed. An external object, for inſtance, communicates a vibration to the nerves; which motion either extends

tends to the ſoul or not: if it reaches the ſoul, it imparts motion to it, which would ſuppoſe the ſoul corporeal; if it does not, there is no longer any action. All the anſwer that can be given is, this action is one of thoſe things the mechaniſm of which will for ever remain unknown: a ſad concluſion, but almoſt the only one becoming man in more than one point of metaphyſics.

VOLTAIRE.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

Know Thyſelf, is an excellent precept, which God alone can practiſe. Who but he can know his eſſence?

We call ſoul that which animates; and ſo contracted is our underſtanding, that we know little more of it. Three-fourths of our ſpecies do not go that length, and little concern themſelves about the thinking being; the other fourth is ſeeking, what nobody has found or ever will find.

Thou, poor pedant, ſeeſt a vegetating plant; and thou ſayeſt vegetation, or even vegetative ſoul. Thou obſerveſt bodies have and give motion, and this with thee is ſtrength. Thy hound's aptneſs in learning to hunt under thy inſtruction thou calleſt inſtinct, ſenſitive ſoul; and thou haſt combined ideas, that thou termeſt ſpirit.

What is to be underſtood by theſe words, This flower

flower vegetates? Is there a real being named vegetation? One body impels another; but is there in it a diſtinct being called ſtrength? This hound brings thee a partridge; but is there a being called inſtinct? Should we not laugh at a philoſopher who ſhould tell us all animals live; therefore there is in them a being, a ſubſtantial form, which is life.

The firſt philoſophers, both Chaldeans and Egyptians, ſaid, there muſt be ſomething in us that produces our thoughts. This ſomething muſt be very ſubtile; it is a breath, it is a fire, it is æther, it is a light, it is an entelechia, it is a number, it is harmony. According to the divine Plato, it is a compound of the ſame and of the other; and Epicurus, from Democritus, has ſaid, that it is thinking atoms in us. But how does an atom think? It is ſaid, that the ſoul is an immaterial being; and that its nature is to think, becauſe it does think. But on this ſubject we ſeem to be as ignorant as Epicurus. The nature of a ſtone is to fall, becauſe it falls; but what makes it fall ſtill remains a queſtion.

We know a ſtone has no ſoul; we know that a negative and affirmative are not diviſible,—are not parts of matter: but matter, otherwiſe unknown to us, has qualities that are not diviſible, as gravitation towards a centre, given it by God. This gravitation has no parts,—is not diviſible.

The

The motory force of bodies is not a being compoſed of parts; neither can it be ſaid, that the vegetation of all organized bodies, their life, their inſtinct, are diſtinct or diviſible beings. You can no more cut in two the vegetation of a roſe, the life of a horſe, the inſtinct of a dog, than you can cut in two a ſenſation, a negation, or an affirmation. Thus the argument taken from the indiviſibility of thought proves nothing. Our idea of the ſoul is no other than of a power unknown to us of feeling and thinking.

But is this power of feeling and thinking the ſame as that by which we digeſt and walk? It certainly is not. The Greeks were well aware that thought often had no concern with the play of our organs. Inſtead of thoſe organs they ſubſtituted a ſenſitive ſoul; and for the thoughts a more fine and more ſubtile ſoul. But it is certain this ſenſitive ſoul has no exiſtence; it is nothing but the motion of our organs; nor does our reaſon afford us any more proof of the exiſtence of the other ſoul.

Let us take a view of the fine ſyſtems which philoſophy has ſtruck out concerning ſouls. One ſays, that the ſoul of a man is part of the ſubſtance of God himſelf; another, that it is part of the great All; a third, that it has been created from all eternity; a fourth, that it is made, and not created. Others affirm, that God makes them

them as they are wanted; and that they come at the inſtant of copulation. One cries, They are lodged in the ſeminal animalcules: Not at all, ſays another; they take up their reſidence in the Fallopian tubes. Some affirm, that the ſoul ſtays ſix weeks till the fœtus be formed, and then poſſeſſes itſelf of the pineal gland; but if the germ prove addle, it goes away to whence it came till a better opportunity. The laſt opinion makes its abode to be in the callous body of the brain.—— If any man has diſcovered a ray of light in this region of darkneſs, perhaps it is Mallebranche, notwithſtanding the general prejudices againſt his ſyſtem. It does not differ greatly from that of the Stoics; and who knows but theſe two opinions, properly rectified, come neareſt the truth? There is ſomething very ſublime in that ancient notion: *We exiſt in God; our thoughts, our ſentiments, are derived from the Supreme Being.*

It muſt, however, be confeſſed, that we know little concerning the ſoul but only by faith. We live upon this earth in the ſame manner as the man in the iron maſk ſpent his days in the priſon, without knowing his original, or the reaſon of his being confined. We are born, we live, we act, we think, we ſleep, we wake, without knowing how. God has given us the faculty of thinking as he has

has given us all our other appartenances; and had he not come, at the time appointed by his providence, to inform us that we had an immaterial and immortal ſoul, we ſhould have been without any proof of it. VOLTAIRE.



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

ROTANOX

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